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abstract

This is a master's thesis concerning the origins, development

and infTuences of pragmatism in American culture. The term "pragmatism"
as used here refers to a formal system of philosophy.

It is primarily a work in the history of thought; thus putting

a greater stress on the origins and influences of pragmatism than on
the questions of truth and meaning.

It begins with C. S. Peirce and William James, followed by a
chapter on the reaction of their contemporary American philosophers,
JosiahRoyce and George Santayana.

and the. Progressive movement.

The third chapter is on pragmatism

This is one of the most important chapi

ters because so little has been done in the past to make explicit the

connection between these contemporary movements.

The fourth chapter

shows the mature development of pragmatic theory brought about by
G. H. Mead and C. I. Lewis.

Chapter five chronicles the political

agetation of John Dewey, contemporary with Mead and Lewis, during the
interwar years.

Chapter six ends the thesis by pointing out some

further effects of pragmatism in religion, politics, the social sciences
and education.

In the future,any of these areas would be fruitful for

research.

Qverall, it wilT be clear that the effects of the philosophy

of pragmatism are with us today--more so than most people realize.
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CHAPTER 1

ORIGINS OF PRAGMATISM:

PEIRCE AND JAMES

Conmentators often speak of Pragmatisni as the only original

American philosophy. This is surely debatable, and one would have

to qualify such a statement in several respects before it could be
come credible. HowWer, it is certain that Pragmatism was an original

American philosophy and that it was highly influential. As Will
Durant, who .is perhaps the most popular commentator on the history of
thought, has remarked:

The reader needs no guide to the new and the old
elements in this philosophy. It is part of the modern
war betv/een science and religion; another effort, like
Kant's and Bergson's, to rescue faith from the univer
salized mechanics of materialism.

Pragmatism has its

roots in Kant's"practical reason"; in Schopenhauer's
exaltation of the will; in Darwin's notion that the

fittest (and therefore also the fittest and truest idea)
is that which survives; in utilitarianism, which measured

all goods in terms of use; in the empirical and inductive

traditions of English philosophy; |nd finally in the
suggestions of the American scene.

What all forms of Pragmatism have in common is an emphasis on

ends or results as Opposed to either means or first principles. There

is something particularly American about Pragmatism in Wi11iam James's
hands as he continually returns to the"cash value" of an idea. This

chapter will attempt to clarify how Pragmatism originated as an ob

scure methodology of the physical sciences under C. 3. Peirce and then
changed into a general philosophy under James. This change was both
crucial for its acceptance and indicative of popular American

intellectual thought at that time. In the latter respect Josiah Royce

has given James the ultimate Hegelian compliment: "...Jaihes is an
American philosopher of classic rank, because he stands for a stage in
our national self-consciousness--for a stage with which historians of
'
2
our national mind must always reckon."

Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) is universally recognized

as the founder Of the pragmatic method. A good deal is known about

Peirce but, unfortunately, no one has as yet written his definitive

biography. Unlike James, his f^me is still in the process of emerging.
Rather, it has been the practice of most book-length works on his

philosophy to begin with a short essay on Peirce, the man;, as an intro
duction. There are almost no disagreements among them, only various

omissions. The following biographical information will follow pri

marily the essay by Paul Weiss found in Richard Bernstein

s Perspec

tives on Peirce (1965).

authori

The Weiss biography is taken as

tative because he is also the co-editor of Peirce's Collected Papers
and has shown decades of interest in the man.

All discrepancies or

major additions will be footnoted.

Charles Peirce was born in Cambridge, Massachusetts, the second

son of Benjamin Peirce, the foremost American mathematicicih of his time

and a professor at Harvard. Many of both Charles' strengths and weak
nesses are directly accountable to the fact that his father closely .

supervised his education, teaching him reading, writing, cind

(especially) mathematics, at home. According to Weiss, he also en
couraged his son's eccentricities and failed to teach him how to get

along in group situations.

Charles was precocious. He began the study of Ghemistry at the
age of eight, had set up his own laboratdry before he was a teenager,
mastered the latest books on logic on his own, and would invent code

languages and mathematical games for his playmates.
Later his father sent him to several private schools as a pre

paration for, Hafvard. It may be significant to note that they were all
local schools.

Unlike James, Peirce did not have the benefit of study

abroad in his youth. Judging from Peirce's later involvement in the
classics of science, literature and logic, it may be speculated that
these schools stressed the "classical tradition," i.e., a proficiency

in reading literature in Greek, Latin, French and German. He entered

,

Harvard in 1855 and graduated in 1859--near the bottom of his class.

This may be attributed to the fact that he was young and only motivated
to work hard where his interest led him.

It was as an undergraduate

that he read Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, three pages a night, until
he had it almost memorized.

In 1861 he joined the U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey.

Among

his greatest logistical achievements was to maneuver his work stations
so that he could continue studying and lecturing at the same time.

held the job for thirty years.

He

In 1862 he received an M.A. from Harvard

and in 1863 he received the first Sc.B. that Harvard awarded.

chemistry and he got it summa cum laude.

It was in

He spent six months studying

classificatiOh under Louis Agassiz at about the same time that James

also was studying under Agassiz.

In 1864-1865 he lectured at Harvard

on the philosophy of science.

It is iinportant to note that he came to

philosophy in a specialized way. He was looking for answers to speci
fic questions of logic and natural science.

He was forced to give up his lectureship at Harvard becuase of
a persona! dispute with the president. So, perhaps in order to stay
close to the'academic life, he became an assistant at the Harvard Ob

servatory. Research work that he did there between 1872 and 1875 led
to the only book he published in his lifetime. Photometric Research
{1878), He also did pendulum and gravity research, for which he gained
international fame at the time he was the first American delegate to

the international geodetic conference in France.

Partly because of the

fame gained when his assertions about the non-uniformity of gravity were
proven, he was put in charge of the U. S. weights and measures in 1884
and sat as a member on international commissions for the same purpose.

He was the first to propose the wave length of a particular light ray
as a standard unit of measure, a procedure accepted today by all

countries on the metric system. (Since 1960, seventy years after his

proposal, one meter has been defined internationally as a certain mul

tiple of the wavelength of the orange-red line of krypton-86.)
The lack of a professorship was a large factor in keeping his

other works from being published. As A. J. Ayer says, "He thought of
himself primarily as a logician in a sense in which logic comprehended
the analysis of alT the processes of thought and inquiry into the con
ditions of their truth, rather than just the formal theory of valid

deductive reasdning."'^ He ariticipated "...Wittgenstein in the idea

5 ■

that the laws of logic had no "formal content. "

He was the only

person until Schrdder to advance Boolian Algebra. Although he only
lectured a total of eight years at Harvard and Johns Hopkins and had

relatively few students one of them was Mrs. Christine Ladd-Franklin.
He anticipated the Principia Mathematica (1910-1913) of Bertrand
Russell and Alfred North Whitehead (under whom Christine Ladd-Franklin

did her doctorate).

He also wrote on psychology, criminology, the his

tory of science, early English and classical Greek pronunciation,

Egyptology, did translations from Latin and German, prepared a thesau
rus and an editor's manual, and much more.

However, he was also handicapped by a number of difficulties

which kept him from the fame he deserved.

First, he was a poor lecturer.

He had trouble making his thoughts and ideas clear to those who were not
as well educated as himself.

Second, his extensive background and pen

chant for precision best suited him for a very advanced class, a position
to which he was never advanced in spite of his own and James's best
efforts. Third, his love life was scandalous; and this was something

no university of his time could afford to have its professors known
for.

Fourth, he did not socialize well with others, especially his

superiors. According to W. B. Gallie, "Peirce seems never to have been

able to ge't on with anyone whom he did not greatly admire and who did
hot reciprocally admire him and treat him as an intellectual equal: in
particular he found it hard to get along with university presidents and
professors."

Fifth, and ironically, he was simply not pragraatic in

his dealings outside the laboratory. His finances were as badly

managed as his love life. At one point he was forced to sell his pri
vate library, the best one oh logic in the United States, to Johns

Hopkins Uni versity in order to pay his debts• According to Gal 1i e,
Peirce in old age was considered a "hopeless eccentric" who would try,
"...to escape his creditors by working in a loft the ladder to which he

would pull up behind him.

William James and his former students con

tributed to help him in the last years of his life.

For this kindness

he adopted the middle name "Santiago" which means "St. James" in

Spanish. In summing up his idiosyncrasies one must conclude that he
did not live "pragmatically" in the sense which the term has today; he
either acted without regard to the consequences of his actions, or

simply was unable to calculate probable consequences based upon past
experience.

Concerning Peirce's pragmatism his commentators unanimously
credit the Cambridge "Metaphysical Club" as its origin or, at least,
the earliest direct influence on its operation. This may be overrated.

The "Metaphysical Club" was a fortnightly club of the early
1870's which met for the purpose of intellectual discussion. Its
usual format called for the reading of a paper by a member, followed

by a group discussion. Its most bri11iant;member was Chauncey Wright,
referred to as either a radical positivist or a naturalist, a man who

intensely enjoyed debating as a sport. AIT the other members looked
up to him and called him their "boxing master." Among those were
Oliver Wendell Holmes, John Fiske, William James, and the Benthamite

lawyer Nicholas St. John Creen. Green already had a leaning toward

10

social jurisprudence and his effect upon the group is still an open
question.

According to most commentators, the entire group, with one ex

ception, was "British-oriented."

PeirCe, of course, was that exception.

If they had been educated in the Great Tradition then Peirce felt that
they had read it all with an English slant. He, on the other hand, was
more at home with classical and Gontiriental philosbphers, especially

Aristotle, John Duns Scotus, and immanuel Kant. Before the "Metaphysical
Club" first met he already considered himself a "Scotistic realist." He
q.'

even claimed to be more of a realist than Scotus himself.

'

.

■

Hence his

unique education not only preceded his later group associations, but
also directed his responses.

He was an interloper in a group that was

foreign to him. While William James was full of praise for contempor
ary French philosophers, Peirce thought that the last French philos
opher had been Descartes.

If anything, the effect of the club was not

to shape his views but, rather, to help him to articulate them.

When Peirce gave papers for the club they were usually on the
topic of logic, a subject of little interest to the other members who
were interested in social philosophy, psychology, and jurisprudence.

Peirce was unique in the group in that he was extremely well read in

Medieval logic.

Since his logical background was so esoteric com

pareb to theirs. It is doubtful whether they could have been of much
help to him in the discussions following his presentations.

In fact,

most of the club members including James thought of him as exceptionally
odd.

n

Fianlly when Peirce got around to framing

pragmatic princi

ple in T877 (while on his way to a convention in France) it was long
after the club was defunct, and it was done for a subject directly re

lated to his work as a physicaT scientist. The principle was translated

from French into English a year later, but Hi11iam James did not pick
up the term for a full twenty years thereafter.
Peirceis; statement of the pragmatic principle reads as follows:
Gonsider the effects, which might have practical
bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to

have. Then, our conception of these ejects is the

whole of our conception of the object.

Every word and comma of this was thought about and thoroughly intended
just es-it: reads;.

J. F. Boler contends that Peirce's pragmatism makes sense best
when it is used as a tool in a natural science.

Understanding Peirce's

pragmatism is a matter of understanding its context. Boler says that,
"In general, a scientific hypothesis is not accepted because of where
■ 'i
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it comes from but because of where it leads."

'

Thus comes about

Peirce's emphasis on "ends," "consequences," "effects," and "practical
■ ■ ■ . 13

bearings." "Pragmatism, in Peirce's hands was a logical..."
Gallie says, and a tool of the natural sciences.

as

Peirce is a thorough

philosophical realist and the objects of scientific knowledge are ob
jecti ve, true, and repeatable.

According to Ayer, Peirce, unlike

James, did not equate a true proposition with one which is simply useful

to believe.^''^ Peirce's ''...pragraatismi'' according to Boler, "warns that
■

:r..'

■;
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although we can dictate the questions, we cannot dictate the answers."

12

In his professional work Peiree was a member of the worldwide community
of physical scientists. In his own study he was a member of the
Scholastic-Continental-Realist tradition of thought.

Unfortunately for Peirce, his method was not something v^hich

would work only for fellow realists. Instead he lived to see it changed
to serve ends which he never intended or even thought possible.

Chief

among those who changed Peirce's intent was William James: in 19Q5
Peirce began calling his own method "Pragmaticism," a term "...ugly

enough to be safe from kidnappers." However, since James repeatedly
gave Peirce credit for originating "Pragmatism" Peirce's name has
stuck to it.

Today the term "pragmatism" is applied to philosophical nomin
alists, those who are the polar opposite to Peirce.

For instance, Paul

Boiler describes Justice Holmes' position as "legal pragmatism."^® To
understand how this change came about one must look directly to James.
The biography of William James (1842-1910) presents the opposite
problem from that of Peirce., First, there is far more material than can
be used conveniently in a work of this size and scope. Two such sources
are his letters collected and edited by his brother, Henry James,
18

his authoritative biography by G. W. Allen.

and

There are several others;

some such as R. B. Perry's The Thought and Character of William James

runs two volumes in length.
becomes massive.

When James's own works are included the data

Only a very small part of this whole is needed for

the purposes of this work. The second drawback is that James's princi
pal and best known biographers often appear to.be "Jamesians." Either

13

consciously or unconsciously they appear to present him as a sort of
intellectual hero and standard to be admired.

On the other hand, his

detractors, such as Geprge Santayana and Mortimer Adler, are inclined
to take the opposite extreme. When there is still so much passionaroused by a philosophy it may be indicative that the issues James
treated are still alive today; that in a sense we are still a part

of the same age. In order to emphasize the "kidnapping," only a rel
19

atively brief sketch of his biography is needed. The general chronology
uses G. W. Allen as the authority because he wrote one of the last bi

ographies on James (1967). Thus, he was able to synthesize the earlier
ones and to correct their errors.

As George Santayana puts it, "William James enjoyed in his youth
What are called advantages: he lived among civilized people, travelled,
20

had teachers of various nationalities."

The senior Henry James,

according to Bernard Brennan, was a rich eccentric: "In his utterances
21

he adopted the role of prophet and mystic, denouncing church and state."
His Swedenborgian mysticism allowed him to hold views which in other
contexts would have been condemned as contradictory.

He attended

Princeton Theological Seminary for two years after graduating from Union

College, but quit because he could not accept the doctrines of orthodox
Calvinism.

Still he remained concerned with religion throughout his

life. This aspect of the father and its effect upon William cannot be
over emphasized. As A. J. Ayer sees it, logic stood in the way of

traditional religious arguments and it thus had to be shown that logic
did not compass the whole of reality.

Ayer says:

14

This is of fundamental importance to the under

standing of James's thought, since his desire to make
room for religious beliefs, without relaxing his in
tellectual standards or manipulating the evidence, was

also one of the principal motives for his pragmatism.

In particular, it strongly colore^2his interpretation

of the pragmatic theory of truth.

The senior Henry James, being independently wealthy, devoted his

life to being a professional student and to educating his children.
"This education," wrote Brennahi "was designed to minimize the influences
or)

of institutions and grim traditions."

.

The James children were contrn

ually moved from continent to continent and from school to school in
order to broaden their backgrounds.
William James had been intereisted in art since childhood, and

in 1860 he attempted to pursue it as a career.

Upon finding that he

was not cut out to become a painter he decided to attend Harvard. At
that time two of his brothers enlisted on the Union side in the Civil

War, but William held back for health reasons. He began, like Peirce,
as a chemistry major but changed to physiology. This scientific

training was the most rigorous he ever had and later helped hold in
check his tendency to make broad generalizations. Also, like Peirce,
one of his favorite professors at Harvard was Louis Agassiz, with whom
he later went on an expedition to Brazil. ;

From his background in physiology James turned to medicine and
received his M.D. from Harvard in 1869.

He was in poor health all his

life but managed to be productive in spite of the fact. He never

practiced medicine, but instead, took up teaching anatomy and physiology
at Harvard in 1873. Two years later he taught his first course in

15

psychology. His primary

in the field at that time was in how

states of the body determine mental states--a normal reaction for a

person with his forma! training. By 1876 he was promoted to the secure
position of assistant professor of physiology at Harvard. Two years
later he married and signed a contract to produce a book on psychology.

His marriage was as nearly perfect as one could hope for and the
Principles of Psychology (1890), which took him more than ten years to
Write, is a classic and monumental work in its field.
tors admire it.

Even his detrac

His brilliant style of writing made even the dullest

subjects come alive. He wrote like a public speaker and, in fact,
most of his published works were originally delivered as speeches or
lectures.

While logic had led Peirce to philosophy, James was finally
led to it by physiology and psychology.

Both logic and psychology at

that time were still properly regarded as divisions of philosophy.

It

is worth noting that neither Peirce nor James had much early or formal
training in philospphy.

Rather, both were primarily concerned with

solving problems presented to them from their own particular disciplines.
The philosophers whom each chose to read were those who offered possible
solutions to those problems.

Between the time James received his M. D. and started teaching
he suffered a mental breakdown.

Perhaps a reason for this can be found

in the tension between his upbringing and his education; his emotion
and his intellect.

He could not bear the thought of a deterministic

universe, and yet, that was the only sort of world that his studies

16

had taught him to believe In. By reading Wordsworth and Charles
24

Renouyier he managed to recover from his mental crisis.

Yet

intenectually he still remained a determinist. When teachrng psychol

ogy he reversed what is normally considered the mental cause-and
effect sequence. Saying;

...that the bodily changes follow directly the
PERCEPTION of the exciting fact, and that our feeling

of the same Changes as they occur IS the emotion.
...we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we
strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that we cry,
strike or tremble, because we are sorry, angry or

fearful as the case may be.

The neural machinery is but a hyphen between de

terminate arrangements of matter outside the body and
determinate impulses to inhibition or discharge within
its organs. When the hen sees a white oval object on
the ground she cannot leave it; she must sit upon it
and return to it, until at last its transformation
into a little mass of inoving chirping down elicits
from her machinery an entirely new set of perform
■

ances.



He immediately goes from there to describe and account for human actions
in the same biologically compulsive manner. By 1890 he still said:
I now proceed to the most vital point of my whole
theory, which is this:

If we fancy some strong

emotion, and then try to abstract from it al 1 the
feelings of its bodi1^ s^ymptomSi we find nothing left

behind, no "mind-stuff" out of v;hich the emotion can
be constituted, and that a cold neural state of in

tellectual perception :is al1 that remains. (Italics
James') ,

This is from the Principles of Psychology.

In the same work he held

that the seat of thq human "self" is located in the muscles of the face

■ ■ 27

and throat.

■. ■ JI. .:--:-.

Perhaps the key tcl uhderstanding James is to know that he held
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contradictory beliefs. Again, he was raised one way and then educated
another. His Swedenborgian father taught freedom and humanism. Often

Ralph Waldo Emerson was a guest in their house. James was basically
religious and, yet, he had received the latest scientific education.
"Science" reduced literally everything to the laws of material cause
and effect, to nothing but matter in motion.

Santayana says that, "There was a deep sense of insecurity

about him.

He wanted to embrace both the world of "science" (as

he knew it) and of traditional human values at the same time.

James

was extremely sensitive to the predicaments of the philosophy of his

age, and had the gift of being able to make them alive to others. James
was utterly appalled by the idea of a mechanistic universe and most of
all by the automaton theory of mind. He thought that while the deter
ministic scientific theories were basically true man still must be a

free and moral agent. As W. B. Gallie says:
...But though he felt this to be so, he lacked the
logical power to see and say clearly why it was so: and
the main thread of his philosophical development consists
in his persistent efforts to find philosophical justifi
cations for his initial feeling or hunch against current

materialistic doctrines. To this end he welcomed a|^

from the most diverse quarters. (Emphasis Gallie).
A. J. Ayer says William James,

...sought the advantage of being tough-minded with
regard to any questions of natural fact; and tenderminded with,respect to morals and theology. What
attracted him to Pragmatism was that it seemed to him
to make both possible.

It permitted him to have the best of both worlds, to hold contradictory
beliefs at once, to reconcile what for James was equivalent to the

18

problern of theodicy. This is a use for the pragraatic method which made
Peirce, the logician, unhappy. In truth, when James listened to
Peirce lecture he confessed that he did not understand him and later

made his famous description of Peirce as, "flashes of brilliant light

revealed against Cimmerian darknessl"

According to Gallie, James's

...Openly anti-intellectualistic teachings stand
in definite opposition to the intellectual temper of
Peirce." ■ ■ ,

■: i; "

But, unlike Peirce, James was never greatly in

fluenced by the spirit of the laboratory and never
drawn to reflect closely on its methods.

...Moreover^

and here again he stands in marked constrast to Peirce,
James confessed himself"mathematically imbecile" and

"a-iogical if not illogical," arid in one of his las^2
books he publicaliy and solemnly "renounced logic."
Peirce's great weakness lay in moral and aesthetic philosophy.

He was primarily a physical scientist and a logician and probably would

never have achieved popular fame.

James, on the other hand, had a life

long interest in all types of value theory—especially religion--and it
was religion that was in a time of crisis in the United States.

Thus

he was preoccupied with a field which held the public interest, and did
so in the strongest of ways.

Any breakthrough in this area which

supported tradition, security or "common sense" was bound to gain
immediate recognition.

James's unique contribution was to combine epiphenomenal ism

with religion.

In his Pragmatism; A New Name for Some Old Ways of

Thinking (1907) he said:

"'The True,' to put it very briefly, is

only the expedient in our way of thinking, just as 'the right' is only
the expedient in our way of behaving."

(Emphasis James).

In the

19

same Work he said that, "On pragmatic principles, if the hypothesis of
"■ ' ■

■ 34 ■

God works satisfactorily enough, it is true."

Although he goes on to
^ 35''

claim that he believes in higher forms of consciousness,

such gods

would still have a material basis, standing to us as we do to our cats
and dogs.

James, as a psychologist, thought that emotion or "temperament"

was primary in directing the human power of reason.
is epiphenomena, then so is reason.

If all thought

Human needs become drives that

dictate what is looked for or thought about.

He was sensitive to too

many varieties of philosophical experience to believe, or put his
faith in, any of them as reflections of Truth or Reality.

He was fond

of the Hegelian, Josiah Royce, as a friend and as a disputant, but he

certainly never believed in the Absolute or in any such systematic
philosophy.

Rather, for James the "true" was equated with the useful,

not with a correspondence theory of reality.
universe there are infinite-possibilities.

In a truly pluralistic

Ayer claims that he was
37

reacting against the logic of the neo-Hegelians.

However, Ayer

also recognizes that James's "radical empiricism" stressed the impor

tance of even the subjective sensations and needs, such as religion.
Religibn is useful.
alist.

He was a subjectivist and a thoroughgoing nomin

Needs and sensations are certainly real at one level, even

though they are epiphenomenal and not objective.

"Thus, for James,"

says Ayer, "it is an essential characteristic of religion and moral

theories that their role is to satisfy our emotional and practical
demands.

20

This is the use to which James put his pragmatism in "The Will

to Believe," a use which Peirce called "suicidal." This remark is

quoted by Ayer who agrees that it is a completely unwarranted extension
on

of Peirce's pragrnatism.

He says further that,"Quite apart from the

quality of their respective philosophical equipments, Peirce and James
40

were antithetical intellects."

"The Will to Belieye"^^ (1896), originally delivered as an
address before the Philosophical Clubs of Yale and Brown Universities,

probably did more to make James's fame than anything else. This is the
most concrete instance of his advocating a position rather than just

making an analysis or a description.

His main adversary is William
. 4?

Kingdom Clifford who, in "The Ethics of Belief" (1879),

had defended

the point that men ought only to hold those beliefs which they have ex
amined and of which they are reasonably sure.

This was a moral imper

ative because one's beliefs represent tendencies or predispositions to
actions-^and actions affect others.

Darwin and the whole age of natural

science had made the traditional beliefs in God untenable to such a

rational person as Clifford.

Men such as Thomas Huxley and Herbert

Spencer were extending the scope of Darwinian science so as to supersede

religion altogether, to unmask it all as mere unscientific superstition.
James fearlesSly--and perhaps foolishly--went into battle with
both Thomas Huxley and William Clifford.

enfant terriblea
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He called the latter an

accused him of not recognizing his own passional
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nature,

and opted for Pascal's phrase, "Le coeur a ses raisons que
■ ■ 45 ■

la raison ne connait pas."

■

■■'

True beliefs are those which are useful
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or profitable ones, even if contradictory and regardless of ultimate

reality. More still, for James, in the case of future events faith
can actually create its own desired end or object. This is the pragmatic
value of fatth.

He says:

...The desire for a certain kind of truth here brings

about that special truth's existence; and so it is in in
numerable cases of other sorts. Who gains promotions,
boons, appointments, but the man in whose life they are
seen to play the part of live hypotheses, who discounts
them, sacrifices other things for their sake before they

have come, and takes risks for them in advance: His faith
acts on the powers above him as a claim, and he creates
its own verification.

...There are, then, cases where a fact cannot come at all

unless a preliminary faith exists in its coming. And where
faith in a fact can help create the fact, that would be an

insane logic,which should say that faith running ahead of
scientific evidence is the "lowest kind of ihmorality" into

which a thinking being can fal1.

Yet such is the logic by

which our scientific absolutists pretend to regulate our

lives I (Emphasis James)
There is something powerful and inspiring about this on a

religious level. It should make one think back to James's Sweden
borgian father.

Yet it is easy to see how Peirce, the logician and

philosophical realist, called it "suicidal." WilT^'faith in the exis
tence of God "create the fact"?

No; but allowing people to believe in virtually anything will
ehcourage experimentatibn and "progress." It may be speculated that
what James really wanted to do was to free human action from the bonds
of either scientific or religious restraint.

James accepted the inverse of the traditional relationship
between logic and reality: for Peirce a true theory would work in
practice, its prior truth ensuring its subsequent workability;
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whereas for James whatever "worked" was the highest evidence of a true

theory.

For this James has been criticized by every major logician of

our time including RusseTl, Whitehead and Ayer.

However, Royce

appears ultimately to be right: James seemed fo embody the intellec

tual spirit of his age and the public loved him for it. He was widfJ^
accepted in spite of his faults and in spite of the shouts of those who
pointed out his logical absurdities.

He appeared as a wise old man who

offered salvation from a mechanistic and deterministic science.
■ ■ ■

• .

■
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On the other hand, contemporary materialists, such as George
Santayana were revolted.

Santayana said,

...when his book on Pragmatism appeared, about the

same time as- my Life of Reason, it gave me a rude shock.
I could not stomach that way of speaking about truth;
and the continual substitution of human psychology-
normal madness, in my vieW'—for the universe, in which ,
man is but one distracted and befuddled animal, seemed
to me a confused remnant of idealism^ not serious.
The William James who had been my master was not
William James of the later years, whose pragmatism and
pure empiricism and romantic metaphysics have made such
a stir in the world.
Later, Herbert Schneider said,

William James, the most religiously empirical of
them all, was catholic in his sympathies precisely be
cause he was protestant in his interests. Having
achieved for himself an irreligious "healthy-mindedness"
after years of struggle, he was free to extend the
broadest sympathy to "sick sou1s." His Varieties of
Rel i gious Experience [1902] is therefore not an ob-^
jective account of religion, but a clinical diagnosis
of religious diseases. The sicker the soul the better
it suited him, for such cases admirably illustrated
his philosophy of consciousness.
Perhaps Schneider understood James better than did Santayana.

appears to agree with Marx.

James

Dogmas are connected with restrictions;
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restriction create an unnatural condition, or sickness, in an acting

being; and the conscious manifestation of Such a condition is reli gion.
In his last work. The Meaning of Truth; A Sequel to 'Pragmatism'

(1909), James tried to defend himself from the attacks of the profes
sional intellectuals, those who accused him of simply trying to make

people feel good.

In the preface he said,

I had supposed it to be matter of conmon observa
tion that, of two competing views of the universe which

in all other respects are equal, but of which the first
denies some vital human need while the second satisfies

it, the second will be favored by sane men for the sim

ple reason that it makes the world seem more rational.
To choose the first view under such circumstances would

be an ascetic act, an act of philosophic self-denial of
which no normal human being would be guilty. Using the
pragmatic test of the meaning of concepts, I had shown

the concept of the absolute to mean_ nothing but the hol
iday giver, the banisher of cosmic fear. One's objective
deliverance, when one says 'the absolute exists' amounted,

on my showing, just to this, that 'some justification of
a feeling of security in the presence of the universe'
exists, and that systematically to refuse to cultivate a
feeling of security would be to do violence to a tendency
in one's emotional life which might well be respected as
prophetic. (Emphasis James).

My treatment of 'God,' 'freedom,' and 'design' was
similar. Reducing, by the pragmatic test, the meaning of
each of these concepts to its positive experiencable op
eration, I showed them all to be the same thing, vis.,

the presence of 'promise' in the world. 'God or no God?'
> means 'promise or no promise?' It seems to me that the
al ternative is objective enough, being .a question of
whether the cosmos has one character or another, even,

though ouK own personal answer may be made on subjective
grounds.

What is significant is that he virtually accepted his critics'
charges, but without allowing that they proved him wrong. Unlike his
older contemporary, Karl Marx, James was perfectly happy that the people
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should have an opiate in religion. Religion provided (or justified)
ideals which most men could not arrive at through their intellects.

If men were unlimited potentials in a process of evolution, then re

ligious ideals might provide the blueprints for them to evolve into
gods.

Henry Steel Conmager says of pragmatism, "Because it taught
that men hold the future in their own hands, it was drenched with

optimism.

However, he also says that, "Of all the philosophies

to which Americans have subscribed, pragmatism lent itself most unavoid
rp

ably to vulgarization."

Such "...a philosophy sponsored by democracy
53

suffered the consequences of that sponsorship."
apparent before the reader has finished.

This will become

CHAPTER 2

THE REACTION OF JOSIAH ROYCE AND GEORGE SANTAYANA

■

■ ■ ■ TO'- .

WILLIAM JAMES'S THEORY OF SELF AND CONSCIOUSNESS

The purpose of this chapter is to show the relationship of

James's pragmatism to the other dominant philosophies of his time,
ideal ism and materialism.

Josiah Royce is used as the representative

Hegelian Idealist, and George Santayana the spokesman forclaSsical '
materialism. These philosophers were chosen because they were James's

popular contemporieS, knew him personally, and often made reference
to him in their vvfitings.

James's theory of the self and of conscious^

ness is Stressed because it is central to both his pragmatism and that
of the next generation.

In 1880 Josiah Royce wrote to James saying:
In each moment we construct such a world because we

are interested in doing so. The final basis of our
thought is ethical, practical. These things are so
because a given moment of activity must have them so.
'Give me a world' is the cry of consciousness; and
behold, a world is made even in the act of crying.
— Some of this you will, I think, agree with; some
of it at all events I have learned from or through
you.

In an essay written two years later Royce says:

Change the book you are reading, and your whole
notion of the universe suffers some momentary change

also. ...Your change of attantio^ qualitatively al
ters your apprenhension of truth.

At every moment we are not merely receiving, atten
ding, and recognizing, but we are constructing. Out of
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what from moment to moment comes to us, we are building

up our ideas of past and future, and of the world of
reality. Mere dead impressions are given. We turn them
by our own act into symbols of a real universe.

We thus

constantly react upon what is given, and not only modify 2
it, but give it whatever significance it comes to possess.

Definite belief in external reality is possible only
through this active addition of something of our own to
the impressions that are actually given to us. No exter
nal reality is given to us in the mere sense-impressions.
What is outside of us cannot be at the same time within
us. But out of what is in us, we construct an idea of an

external world; and we ourselves give to this idea all
the validity that for us it can ever have.

Interestingly, Royce puts even more stress upon the consequen
tial aspect of reality than James.

The fact that we actively choose

which aspects of given experience to make significant makes us ulti
mately responsible for our beliefs and, thus, for the world which we
create.

In this respect Royce sides much more closely with Clifford

than with James.

Even though Royce, in a letter to C. S. Pelrce,
' 5

described James as "...my most intimate friend outside my ownfamily,"

he was quite willing to criticize James for his lack of responsibility.

From James's position the will to believe is primary for an acting
being; it is an extension of the will to live; but, since It Is so
primary or biologically based, it precedes consciousness.

The activ-.

itles of a conscious individual are the results of h|s prior beliefs.

In order to create his beliefs, to create himSelf, an individual
would have to exist before he existed, would have to create himself

before he was created.

Rather, for James, It is the body which

creates consciousness.

In 1882, fourteen years before James first delivered "The
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Will to Believe" as a lecture, Royce wrote of him:

A person for whose opinions I have much respect once
said to me that he disclaimed all responsibility for the
beliefs that he held on certain very important matters.

'I try,' said he, 'to conquer prejudice; but having
done this, I can do no more. My belief, whatever it is,
forms itself In me. I look on. My will has nothing to
do with the matter.

I can will to walk or to eat; but

I cannot will to believe.

I might as well will that my

blood should circulate.'

Despite his disclaimer, I thought, and yet think,
that he has made his beliefs very much for himself,

and that these beliefs do him honor,gas the statue does
honor to the artist that chisled it.

Royce could not bring himself to believe that James's beliefs had been
fashioned from"wholly passive matter."

He reflected that the powers

of material circumstance were great, but continued:

But my friend was a man of energy, and controlled
the current of his thought. He fought hard...and he has
so far conquered as to be the master of a very manly and
many-sided system of doctrine. I think him responsible
for this sysitem.... As a man is, so he thinks.
Royce finds his solution to, James's problem through a sort of

Kantian approach to what is good in itself--a good will.

There is an

ambiguity in the term "will": at one time it can mean a drive and at
another a choice, often both together.

force, or a motive power.
says:

James uses it as a drive, a

Royce uses It as a selective force.

^

...attention, in its most elementary forms, is the
same activity that, in a more developed shape, we call
will. We attend to one thing rather than another, be
cause we will to do so, and our will is here the
elementary impulse to know. Our attention leads us at
times into error. But this error is merely an accom
paniment, the result of our will activity. We want to

He
'
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tntensTfy an Tmpression, to bring it within the sphere

of knowTedgb. But in carrying out our impulse, wo do
more than we meant.

We not only bring something into

clearer consciqusness that Was before out of clear conconsciousness, but we qualitatively: modify this thing by
attending to it. .,.Attention seems to defeat, in part,
its own object. Bringing something into the field of
knowledge seems to be a modifying, if not transforming,
. ■ jj'proces:s..; ^ .-j.
For Royce the ultimate basis of the self is the will.

It

exists from birth, is itself a force with choice and, thus, responsi
ble,: both morally and causally, for creating or manifesting itself.

Plainly,isince active inner processes are forever
modifying and building our ideas; since our interest
in what we wish to find does so much to determine what

we find; since we could not if we would, reduce purselves
to mere registering machines, but remain always builders
of our own little worlds--it becomes us to consider well,
and to choose the spirit in which we shall examine our
experience. : Every one is certain to be prejudiced,
simply because he does not merely receive experience,
but himself acts, himself makes experience. The great
question for every truthseeker is, in what sense, to
what degree:,: with what motive, for what end, may r and
should I be prejudiced?
Royce can avoid the problem that James poses because of the difference
between potential and actual existence.

The will is an actualizing

force, in a sense a potential for actualizing since it does not act
with mechanical necessity.

It is a potential force for creating itself

in actuality, and, as such, is responsible'for the attitude that it

adopts in the process, j
Unlike James's self, which is the epiphenomena of the movements
of his mouth and throat, Royce's conscious self might be described as
the creation of his will.

Even though speech is important for the
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development of a distinctively human mind, Royce finds that "Thought
has other modes of expression than through the forms of speech.
For instance, creative actions.

Royce may be credited with anticipating the pragmatlsts
Thomas Cooley and G. H. Mead with the concept of "the significant

other" in the emergence of the self. This is not surprising in view
of the fact that significant perceptions and interpretations were the

data by which Royce's will created its (actual) existence. It creates
itself in its relationship to other selves and, secondly, as over

against the brute facts which function as matter.

Royce says:

A man is conscious of himself, as a finite being,

only in so far as he contrasts himself, in a more or less
definite social way, with what he takes to be the life,
and, in fact, the conscious life, of some other finite
being.... Our conception of physical reality is secon
dary to our conception of our social fellow-beings, and
is actually derived therefrom.

Thus not only does the self learn to define itself in its interaction
with other selves, but it is also the case that most of what is taken

for physical reality is, in fact, a matter of convention. "Matter"
is understood socially or conventionally.

According to J. H. Cotton, "Without our Neighbors we simply
would not be aware of ourselves as selves at all.
■ 12

of Royce."

Such is the thesis

Why, then, did not Royce get the credit for a theory

that went to Cooley and Mead?

Unknowingly, Cotton provides the answer

when he says: "Royce has a way of saying that our estimate of our

selves depends upon what others think of us, or upon what we believe
others ought to think.

But these are by no means identical.

For in
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our belief about what our neighbors 'ought' to think of us, we retain
13

our own measure of independent judgment."

•

For Mead, the pragmatist

and "social behaviorist," there is no independent existence (socially
speaking) and certainly no independent judgment.
Another area in which Royce took James to task was over the
knowledge of other selves, the conscious states of others.

Royce says,

"There can be no direct perception of other minds. For this general
reason, 'working hypotheses' about the interior reality which belongs
to the mind of my neighbor can never be 'converted into the cash of
existence'.

James was forced to resort to analogy, and Royce says

that this is "...fatal to the whole pragmatic theory of knowledge.
. .

.

15

Surely an argument from analogy is not its own verification."

Royce missed the chance to attack the argument from analogy as wholly
improper under these circumstances: it is suitable for judging an
unknown individual case by reference to the well known general case;
but in the case of the conscious states of others it is applied from

the basis of only one known case (the individual who is directly con

scious of only himself) to over a billion unknown cases. Still,
Royce's point is well taken.

Royce's solution is to use the criterion of coherent new informa
1 fi

tion as the sure sign of another mind.

There is a dialogue; new

ideas are communicated by means of symbols; and it all depends upon a

continuous series of mutual interpretations.^^
As early as 1881 Royce expressed agreement with James that there
was no "mind-stuff."

For James there was nothing independent of
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matter, and for Royce there was nothing, no "stuff," independent of
consciousness.

In an interesting way, their radical positions were

rather compatible on this issue; It was James's treatment of the
objectivity of the given of consciousness which bothered Royce.

Royce

wrote a letter to him that year saying:

There is just one doubt in much that you say about

the general definition of reality: Do you or do you
not recognize this reality to which you speak as in its
known or unknown forms independent of the knowing con
sciousness? Sometimes you speak as if "Sentiment" were
all, sometimes as if there were something above the
"Sentiment" to which the latter conformed

For me

the sentiment of reality, the determination to act thus

and so, the expectation of certain results, all these _

ig

facts of consciousness absolutely no transcendent reality.

For Royce the data of consciousness is objective, upheld by the Absolute.
Whereas James and Royce were best friends and their philos

ophies were compatible in practice (with Royce from time to time calling
himself and Absolute pragmatist), there was little or no good feeling
between James and Santayana.

In fact, Santayana was one of the only two

students in his entire career that James actively disliked. (The other

was Theodore Roosevelt.) For his part, Santayana began his professional

studies with the rigors of "Catholic philosophy" (presumably Thomism)
and detested James's lack of system, precision and certitude.

Santayana had a difficult time saying anything about James

that was not in some way demeaning. He says that James had an "...ir

regular education; he never acquired that reposeful mastery of particular
authors and the safe ways of feeling and judging which are fostered in
IQ

great schools and universities."

He could not stand James's apparent
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Tack of consistency. However, he knew it to be a part of his method.
He said that, "In^^ f^

Jdmes was consistent enough, as even Emerson
' 20

(more extreme in this sort of irresponsibility) was too."

Continuing,

Santayana claims that "His excursions into philosophy were accordingly
in the nature of raids."

Santayana believed that James's popularity

rested upon his poorer works--The Mill to Believe, Pragmatism and The
Varieties of- Religious Experience—rather than on his best work. The
Principles of Psychology.

Although James's psychology was his most scholarly and well

researched work, Santayana saw that it gave a cTue to
tion.

later direc

According to Santayana, James did not dare to accept the conclu

sions of his own research because they would have pointed to a mechanis
tic universei

He preferred to believe that mind and matter had
independent energies and could lend one another a hand,
matter operating by motion and mind by intention. This
dramatic, amphibious way of picturing causation is
natural to common sense, and might be defended if it
were clearly defined; but James was insensibly carried
away from it by a subtle implication of his method.
This implication was that experience or mental discourse
not only constituted a set of substantive facts; all
else, even the material world which his psychology had

postulated, could be nothing but a verbal or fantastic
symbol for sensations in their experienced order. So
that while nominally the door was kept open to any hy

pothesis regarding the conditions of the psychological
flux, in truth the question was prejudged. The hypoth
eses, which were parts of this psychological flux, could
have no object save other parts of it. That flux itself,
therefore, which he could picture so vividly, was the
fundamental existence. The sense of bounding over the
waves, the sense of being on an adventurous voyage, was

the living fact; the rest was dead reckoning.

Where

one's gift is, there will one's faith be also; and to this 22
poet appearance was the only reality. (Emphasis Santayana).
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Santayana says that, "I think it important to remember, if we are not
to misunderstand William James, that his radieal empiricism and his

pragmatism were in his mind only methods; his doctrine, if he may be,
23

said to have had one, was agnosticism."

Santayana defines James'

agnosticism as"...feeling instinctively that beliefs and opinions,
if they had any objective beyond themselves, could never be sure they
had attained it.

Thus Santayana felt that James was philosoph

ically shallow and a subtle form of religious hypocrite:
All faiths were what they were experienced as being,

in their capaGity of faiths; these faiths, not their Ob
jects, were the hard facts we must respect. We cannot
pass, except under the illusion of the moment, to any

thing firmer or on a deeper level.

There was accordingly

no sense of security, no joy, in James's apology for per

sonal religion. He did not really believe; he merely
believed in the right of believing that you might be right
if you believed.

It is this underlying agnosticism that explains an
incoherence which we might find in his popular works....

Professedly they are works of psychological observation;
but the tendency and suasion in them seems to run to dis

integrating the idea of truth, recommending belief with
out reason, and encouraging superstition.

Santayana finds that James had no ultimate basis—no ground at all—for

claiming that his fine psychological observations were not "instances
of delusion." Santayana deplored the lack of basis for a"judicial
attitude."

In The Varieties of Religious Experience We find

the same apologetic intention running through a vivid
account of what seems for the most part (as James ac
knowledged) religious disease. Normal religious exper
ience is hardly described in it. Religious experience,
for the great mass of mankind, consists in simple faith
in the truth and benefit of their religious traditions.
But to James something so conventional and rationalistic
seemed hardly religious; he was thinking only of irruptive
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visions and feelings as interpreted by the mystics who
had them.

Santayana ioompared James's study of religion in The Varieties to a
surgeon who could guarantee the success of his operation, but not
the life of the patient. He compared James's Will to Believe to
Pascal's Wager, and shows it to be fallacious for the same reasons:
first, there are a multitude of choices, not just two alternatives;
second, the motive is base:

...such a wagers-betting on the improbable because

you are offered big odds—is an unworthy parody of the

real choice between wisdom and folly. There is no heaven

to be won in Such a spi^^t, and if there was, a philos
opher would despise it.

To be boosted by an illusion is not to live better
than to live in harmony with the truth; it is not nearly
so safe, not nearly so Sweet, and not nearly so fruitful.

These refusals to part with a decayed illusion are really

an infection of the mind. Believe certain^^; we cannot
help believing; but believe rationally....

Note, however, the phrase^ "we cannot help believing." In

this much Santayaha agrees with James, The difference is that Santayana

is a type of phiTosophical realist: there is but one objective reality,
and only it is worthy of human belief--the universe is not plural.

Santayana does not believe that James could live with truth or certi
tude if he found it.

Philosophy for him had a Polish constitution; so
long as a single vote was cast against the majority,
nothing could pass. The suspense of judgment which he
had imposed upon himself as a duty, became almost a
necessity, f think it would have depressed him if he .
had had to cOhfess that any important question was finally

settled.... Experience seems to most of us to lead to
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conclusions, but empiricism has sworn never to draw them.
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Rather, Santayana thinks that James drew his false conclu

sions from a true psychological fact; the fact that will and belief
do influence one's actions.

We do not need a will to belieye; we need only a

will to study the objects in which we are inevitably
believing. But James was thinking less Of belief in
what we find than of belief in what we hope for:

a

belief which is not at all clear and not jat all neces

sary in the life of mortals.

I

Santayana not only agrees that beliefs, will, and desire do

influence actions; he takes Clifford's positijon in the extreme,
saying: "...indeed, I think we can go farther and say that in its
■

I
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essence belief is an expression of impulse, o|f readiness to act."

Like the pragmatists, he finds that human beljefs and impulses become

adjusted to the facts of reality through actiions. Again the differ
ence between James and Santayana lies in Sant|ayana's commitment to the
brute knowable objectivity of the physical world.

For this reason,

Santayana claims that James is at his worst when he claims that faith
in success can be what is needed to bring about a successful conclusion.

Here again psychological observationi is used with 
the best intentions to hearten oneself and other people;
but the fact observed is not at all understood, and a

moral twist is given to it which (besides: being morally
questionable) almost amounts to falsifying the fact it- .
self. Why does belief that you can jump a ditch help you
to jump it? Because it is a symptom of the fact that you

could jump it.;... Assurance is contemptible and fa||l
unless it is self-knowledge. (Emphasis Santayana).

He invoked Socrates to say that courage without wisdom is folly. Yet

he is closer to James's position than Clifford's in holding that
■

■
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"Scepticism is...a form of belief. Dogma cannot be abandoned...."

'
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However, he qualifies this by saying, "The brute necessity of believing

something so long as life lasts does not justify any belief in partic
ular,...

When writing about Bertrand Russell in Winds of Doctrine,

Santayana devotes twelve pages to Russell's criticism of pragmatism.
Sahtayana both paraphrases Russell and quotes him at length on this
subject, with little regard for Russell's own philosophy. Perhaps he
chose to use Russell as a vehicle of criticism so as not to cast
doubt on his own motives.

Russel1 is excellent for this purpose be

cause he took the same sort of delight as Santayana did in attempting

to make pragmatism look absurd. Sometimes Santayana would step in to

help him; for instance when Russell was explaining how the pragmatists
paid inadequate attention to the facts, Santayana added:
For we should presently learn that those facts can

be made by thinking, that our faith in them may contri
bute to their reality, and may modify their nature; in
other words, these facts are our immediate apprehensions
of facts.... Thus the pragmatiSt's reliance on facts
does not carry him beyond the psychic sphere; his facts
are only his personal experiences. Personal experiences
• may well be the basis for no less personal myths; but
the effort of intelligence and of science is to find the
basis of the personal experiences themselves; and this
non-psychic basis of experience is what common sense calls
the facts, and what practice is concerned with...the bed
rock of facts ifeat the pragmatist bui1ds upon is avowedly
drifting sand. ,

Through the selective use of Russell's criticisms and his own remarks
Santayana paves the way to suggest that the "psychological point of
view" of pragmatism,"might be the equivalent to the idealistic doc

trine.^^ Thus accusing James of being a secret idealist was the ul
timate that Santayana could do in discrediting him. He also used an
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historical appraoeh to achieve the same result as he achieved through
quoting Russell's analysis:
Such economical faith, enabling one to dissolve the
hard materialistic world into a work of mind, which mind

might outflank, was traditional in the rad^^al Emerson
ian circles In which pragmatism sprang up.

...they have declared that consciousness does not
exist, and that objects of sensation (which at first viere

called feelings, experiences, or 'truths') know or mean
one another when they lead to one another, when they are

poles, so to speak, in the same vital circuit. The
spiritual act ■ which was supposed to take things for its

object is to be turned Into 'objectlve^pirit,' that Is,
Into dynamic relations betweeh things.

It certainly was not James's early materialism that bothered
Santayana but, rather, his pervasive nominalism.
In William James...psychology was the high court of

appeal. Ultimately he wrote his Varieties of Religious
Experience--by far his most influential book-^in which he
showed his strong inclination to credit supernormal in
fluences and the immortality of the soul.

All this, however, was a somewhat troubled hope which
he tested by all available evidence; and his most trusted
authorities were often French, Renouvier and later

Bergson.... It was only later that he produced the sen
sational theories by which he is known, at least by hearsay,
all the world over: his Pragmatism, In which the reality
of truth seemed to be denied, and his article entitled
'Does Consciousness Exist?' where he answered this ques
tion In the negative.

He consTdered James to be a philosophical coward, one who could not
bear the consequences of his underlying materialism. Santayana says,
"I cannot understand what satisfaction a philosopher can find in arti

fices, or in deceiving himself and others.

I therefore like to call
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myself a materialiSt.i.."

Indeed, Santayana claimed to be a thorough-going materialist.
Matter is primary, the only "stuff" which is real in the nature of
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being'. -.He;says^it
I am not tempted seriously to regard consciousness
as the very essence of life or even of being. On the

contrary, ...Consciousness is the most highly conditioned

of existences, ...nor does its orig|^ seem more mysterious
to me than that of everything else.

Santayana, at the opposite extreme f>"om idealism, very clearly reduces
mind to an epiphenomenon of matter.

...while the designation of substance as mind-stuff
is correct, ii; is by no means exclusively or even pre

eminently proper. ...In so far as mind has stuff at all
under it and;is not purely spiritual, the stuff of it is
purely^matter.

...Moreover, organization requires a medium as well
as a stuff; and that medium in which the mind-stuff moves

is avowedly space and time. But what can exist in space
except matter...? Mind-stuff is therefore simply an in
direct name for matter...and nothing but a confusing
attachment to a psychological vocabulary could consul
for its frequent use.

I find, then, that in the psychological sphere, apart
from pure feeling Or intuition, everything is physical.

There is no such thing as mental subst|gce, mental force,
mental machinery, or mentaT causation.

Santayana considered James to be at his best in the passage in his
Psychology where he declares that one is sorry because he cries, angry
because he strikes and afraid because he trembles.

After giving a

vivid account of the human passions run wild in love and anxiety, he

explains it in a manner reminiscent of the way James explained the
same phenomena by reference to the "machinery" of a chicken:
All this is the psyche's work; ...and our super
ficial mind is carried by it like a child, cooing and
fretting, in his mother's arms. Much of it we feel
going on unmistakably within our bodies, and the whole of
it in fact goes on there. ...The psyche is an object of
experience to herself, since what she does at one moment
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or in one orgari she can observe, perhaps a morrient later,
or with another organ; yet of her life as a whole she is
aware only as we are aware of the engines and the fur
naces in a ship in which we are traveling, half-asleep,
or chattering on deck; or as we are aware of a foreign
language for the first time...without distinguishing the
words, or the reasons for these precise passionate out
bursts. In this way we all endure, without understanding,

the existence and the movement of our own psyche: fo^^it
is the body that speaks, and the spirit that listens.
Unlike James, Santayana saw the necessity of positing an uncoriscious

psyche, a natural program for maintaining the life of the body. Of
the psyche he says, "...to keep us alive is her first and essential
function.

It follows naturally from this biological office that in
44

each of us she [the psyche] is one, vigilant, and predetermined.,.."
It has that same essential function in both plants and animals.
He says:

The whole life of the psyche, even if hidden by chance
from human observation, is essentially observable: it is
the object of biology. Such is the only scientific psy

chology, as conceived by the ancients, including Ar||totle,
and now renewed in behaviorism and psycho-analysis.

One might speculate that if JameS had been a philosophical
realist like Peirce, then Santayana might have called himself a prag
matist--albeit grudgingly and with many qualifications.

This is

because of Santayana's insistence upon the practical knowability of
an objective world, and of the efficacy of reason which, as a tool,
allows men to live in harmony with nature.

Reminiscent of pragmatic learning theory, Santayana says that,

"The guide in early sensuous education is the same that conducts the
whole Life of Reason, namely, impulse checked by experiment, and ex
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periment judged again by impulse."

He says that.
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...perception and knowledge are...normally and vir
tually true: not true literally, as the fond spirit
imagines-when it takes some given picture...for the

essence of the world; but pragmatically, and for the
range of human experience....

Thus also, there is nothing to prevent consciousness--spTrit--from
having knowledge of its source.

Santayana says.

In other words, consciousness is naturany cognitive.

Its spiritual essence renders it an imponderable subli
mation of organic life, and invisible there; yet it is

attached historicallyj morally, ag^ indirectly;to its
source, by being knowledge of it.
It may be said that James's two major contemporary American
critics held complementary notions of the nature of consciousness.

For

Royce, the act of defining one's separate conscious self as over against
the rest of consciousness creates something which functions as "matter."
Santayana, on the other hand, is acutely aware of the fact that "all
matter is alive,"

ready to actualize its potentials under the right

conditions of motion and complexity.

Royce and Santayana both agree that the self can know itself and,
thus, live in an objectiye harmony with its surroundings; whereas for
James there is no such universal objectivity, and it might profit the

organism simply to experiment with its life-style.

It is this lack of

knowledge and commitment which made pragmatism radically different from
other world views.

;'XHAPTER:3';.. .
PRAGMATISM AND THE PROGRESSIV

Many researchers of the Progressive Movement in the United States
assume that there 'is a connection between pragmatism and progressivism.
Yet few are willing to make the connection explicit, other than ac

knowledging that they were contemporaneous. For instance, A. S. Link
and W. M. Leary have compiled an extensive bibliography. The Progres

sive Era and the Great War, 1896-1920,^ without a single mentidn of
either pragmatism or William James. Their only mention of John Dewey
is Sidney Hook's 1:935 biography. In The Pragmatic Revolt in American
2

History, Gushing Strput said such things as pragmatism "stimulated"
both Charles Beard and Carl Becker; that Beard defended his under

takings in"characteristieally pragmatic tones," and that Beard and
Becker would have agreed with Dewey's factual-contextuaT relativism
if they had read such works as his new logic. Strput uses the term

"pragmatic" in his title in a technical way, one which he explicitly

defines as a form of relativism.^ Then, of course, he equivocates it
with the common usage of the term in his work. Although Strout's
Pragmatic Revolt is otherwise a good work, his treatment of the connec

tion between pragmatism and the historians of the Progressive movement

may be taiken as typical: the family resemblance is taken for granted,
influences are hinted at, but little is made explicit and no causal re
lationships are established.
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Both the pragmatists and the progressive historians shared an

explanation of history. However, the best attempts to show the connec
tion between the pragmatists and the progressives has come from those
who do not share their view of history.

George Novack and David Noble

are among the best examples of this group.

George Novack is a Marxist philosopher and historian who,
when discussed among other Marxists, 1s Tabled a "Trotskyite." In 1937
he joinedwith Dewey in forming and carrying out The International

Commission of Inquiry into the Moscow Trials for the purpose of clearing
Trotsky's name.

It was Leon Trotsky himself who suggested that Novack

research and write a Marxist critique of Dewey's philosophy.
he published Pragmatism Versus Marxism:

In 1975

An Appraisal of John Dewey's

Philosophy, the second chapter of which is titled, "Dewey and the Progres
sive Movement."

Novack sees the Populist-Progressive movement as one fifty year

phenomenon; the reaction of a squeezed middle class which was seeking to
maintain its position, a "loyal opposition" life wing of the capitalist
regime.

Novack says:

The fundamental reason for the failure of Progres
sivism lay in the fact that it was truly progressive only
in its incidental features. At bottom it was a retrograde

movement which aspired to turn back the wheel gf history
and reverse the development of modern society.

Dewey belongs wholly to this movement. He was a fore
most participant in many of its most important enterprises.
In time he became the supreme and unchallenged theoretical
head of the movement. Dewey was not a leader of its plebian
legions like Weaver or La Follette. He was rather the
leader of the advanced intellectuals, those who worked out

the theoretical premises and formulated the views and
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values corresponding to the mass govement in their various
spheres of professionaT activity.

In Novack's work Dewey and his pragmatism assume the position

of highest intellectual importance. Novack tacitly accepts the position
that the "defection of the intellectuals" (not his term) precedes a

revolution and hplds the Marxist position that it will be led by those
who have been squeezed down from high positions in the capitalist power

struggle. Thus pragmatism, the. American philosophy, was (and still is
for Novack) a conservative force, bent upon uphoTding the crumbling

system through reforms. A nation's philosophy is its ultimate, dis
tilled consciousness; hence, Novack alternately sees pragmatism as

the tragedy of the middle class or as the instrument of class repres
sion wielded by the upper class.

Novack fai1s to take account of Dewey's own periods as a socialist,

his spirited defense of Trotsky and his view of the class nature of
society. On this Dewey says, "The direct impact of 1iberty always has
to do with some class or group that is suffering in a social way from
some form of constraint ekercised by the distribution of powers that
exist in contemporary society."

Dewey was also noted for such statements as:
The liberals of more than a century ago were de
nounced in their time as subversive radicals, and only
when the new economic order was established did they be

come apologists for the status quo or else content with
social patchwork. If radicalism is defined as percep

tion of need for radical change, then any liberalism g
which is not also radicalism is irrelevant and doomed.

Throughout the Thirties Dewey repeatedly called for the abolition of
monopoly capitalism and the substitution of a planned economy in its
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placey Perhaps what Novack cannot forgive is that pragmatism, as per
sonified in Dewey, does not hold Marxism as the ultimate philosophical
truth, but as an option to be considered and evaluated in practice.

During the Populist and Progressive eras there was an influ
ential trend, in Utopian literature, such as Edward Bellamy's Looking
Backward (1888), These works preceded the popularity of Marxism, and

conveyed the same message in simpler lahguage.

The message was that

society is perfectable if only it were governed rationally.

It was

antithetical to both the profit motive in business and Spencerian social

Darwinism as a general philosophy of progress. Significantly, one of
the major elements stressed by the Progressive statesmen was economic

reform through government action.

Like Bellamy, they believed that the

government could be a powerful force for human progress, and that "pro
gress" was virtually equated with material well being.
The Supreme Court was the greatest obstacle to these Progres
sive statesmen and they were more successful at 1ocal 1evels.

Charles

Evans Hughes, a New York lawyer» gained fame for exposing corruption and
inefficiency in the insurance companies.

In 1906 Hughes was elected

governor of New York and continued his reforms through the creation of
a state public utilities commission^

However, the preemptive effect

of the federal commerce power stunted the working of the commission.
Robert M. LaFollette became governor of Wisconsin in 1900 and be
came one of the greatest and best known Progressive reformers.

A$

governor he sponsored many measures designed to promote economic e
quality:

maximum hour laws, workman's compensation, inheritance tax.
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and a graduated income tax. One way or another all of LaFollette's
economic reforms ran into trouble with the Supreme Court and suffered

compromise, or outright nullification as in the case of the maximum
hours measure.

In 1906 "Battling Bob" LaFollette was elected to the

U. S. Senate where much of his effort was directed against the Supreme

Court. One of the major complaints of the Progressives (as well as the

Populists before them) was that judicial review was basically undemo
cratic.

It forced the entire nation to abide by the views of a few

old men; men who were never elected in the first place, who could not
be removed, and who themselves might be in fundamental disagreement

over any basic question (as in the case of narrow split decisions).
Ultimately, they felt that the check and balance system had not pro
vided a check upon the judiciary.

Holmes's Lochner dissent fit perfectly into the Progressive

scheme.

In Lochner vs. New York (1905--198 U.S. 45) a five to four

decision of the U. S. Supreme Court held unconstitutional a New York

law limiting bake shop hours to a maximum of ten hours a day. Holmes
said:

This case is decided upon an economic theory which a

large part of the country does not entertain. If it were
a question whether I agreed with that theory, I should
desire to study it further and long before making up my
mind. But I do not conceive that to be my duty, because I

strongly believe that my agreement or disagreement has
nothing to do with the right of a majority to embody their
opinions in law. It is settled by various opinions of
this court that state constitutions and state laws may

regulate life in many ways which we as legislators might
think as injudicious, or if you like, as tyrannical, as
this, and which equally with this, interfere with the
liberty to contract. ...The 14th Amendment does not

enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics...a Constitution
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is not intehded to embody a particular theoryv whether of

paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the
state or of laissez-faire.

It is made for people of funda

mentally differing views, and the accident of our finding
certain opinions natural and familiar, or novel and even
shocking, ought not to conclude our judgment upon the
question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the
Constitution of the United States.

Three years later, in Muller vs. Oregon (1908: 208 U.S. 412),
Louis D. Brandeis defended a similar statute before-the U. S. Supreme

Court. This time the dispute was over the constitutionality of an

Oregon law prohibiting women in certain industries from working more

than ten hours a day. In ah abrupt turnabdut the Court unahimously
upheld the Oregon statute.

Brandeis' approach was designed to mini

mize legal procederits and to stress the results of ruling one way or
the other.

He had no other choice, since the major precedent, the

Lochner case, was against him.

So, in reality, his brief consisted of

a sociological tract, and the "Brandeis brief" was to set a precedent

for future appeals.

In 1917 in Bunting vs. Oregon (1917: 243 U.S.

426) the Court in effect overturned the Lochner opinion by allowing
the state of Oregon to apply the ten hour law to men.
Eight years before his Lochner dissent Holmes revealed his

basis for it in his"bad man" or predictive theory of law. He said,
"If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as
a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which such

knowledge enables him to predict.

"The prophecies of what the

court will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean

bythelaw."^V
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Morality (and natural rights) are not to be confused with
Taw for Holmes, as evidenced by the fact that there are bad Taws.

"Manifestly, therefore, nothing but confusion of thought can result
from assuming that the rights of man in a moral sense are equally

rights in the sense of the Constitution and the Taw. ...No one wil1
deny that wrong statutes can be and are enforced, and we should not
12 ' '

al 1 agree as to which were the wrong ones."

It is also worth

noting that in some cases the statutes are, or will be, disregarded.
Here cites an example given by Louis Agassiz where the force of custom

was so strong that no enforceable 1aw could be made against it.
Holmes bel ieved that moral intent, or the state of mind
.
' . "14 ■

of a defendant, is not actually a part of a TegaT decision.;

Rather,

it is the objective consequences Of the defendant's actions that are
in question.

K

Holmes says:

The primary rights and duties with which juris
prudence busies itself again are nothing but prophecies.
One of the moral ideas...is that theory is apt to get the
cart before the horse, and to consider the right or the

duty as something existing apart from and independent of
the consequences of its breach, to which certain sanctions
are added afterward.

But, as I will try to show, a legal

duty so called is nothing but a prediction that if a man
does or omits certain things he will be made to suffer in

this or that-jway by judgment of the court; and so of a
legal right.

The pragmatic emphasis upon action and results is obvious.
In 1933 Morris R. Cohen wrote.

It is a curious fact that while critics and re

formers of the law formerly used to take their stand on
self-evident truths and eternal principles of justice
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and reason, their appeal now is predominantly to vital

needs, social welfare, the real or practical need of the
times, etc.

The seed of the protest against the overemphasis

of the logical element in the law was jDla(ji|ed by Jhering
and Justice fiolmes over a generation ago.
nl7

Cohen calls Hoimes's view of the 1 aw as;"an anthropological document

and says that it could be attached to any modern "ism" such as function
alsim or behaviorism. He says, "Hoimes's position is, I judge,; in per

fect agreement with that of a logical pragmatist like Peirce; Legal
principles have no meaning apart from the judicial decisions in con
crete cases that can be deduced from them, and principles alone (i.e.,

without knowledge or assumption as to the facts) cannot logically
decide cases.

He could have made a better comparison of Hoimes's

theory to James's epiphenomenalism or spectator theory of motivation.
There are other historians, such as Richard Hofstader, who

agree that the progressives were orderly reformers, not revolution
aries.

Reformers work within the given system^

Hofstader says:

The Progressive movement, then, may be looked upon
as an attempt to develop the moral will, the intellectual
insight, and the political and administrative agencies to
remedy the accumulated evils and negligences of a period
of industriai growth. Since the Progressives were not re
volutionarieSi it was also aaQattempt to work put a
strategy for orderly change.

Hofstader's appraisal Of the ori gin of the Progressiye movement is
similar to Novack's, but that in no way leads him to the same conclu

sions. One must believe that the basic system itself must be changed
drastically if he is not to agree with reform.

George Mowry confronts the Marxist historians directly,
saying, "The bald confident assertion of the New Left historians
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that big business shaped the Progressive program to its own interests
20

seems highly erroneous...." ,

He goes on to catalogue the struggles

that took place between the 'progressives and big business.

Regarding

the possibility of the overthrow of the whole system, he says:
One other question raised by the New Left historians
remains—that revolving around their wistful, might-have
been statement that Progressive reforms drew off the necessary
popular support for and therefore obstructed the growth of
a viable democratic socialist party. To me, at least, that

seems tppbe one of the more impossible fantasies of American
history.

The institutions of private property are too strong and ingrained, and
the Great Depression and two world wars have not been cataclysmic to
do what the progressives were supposed to have only set back.

It

is apparent that the doctrinaire Marxists are wrong.

Another contemporary historian who sees a strong tie be
tween the Progressive movement and pragmatism is David Noble.

He

says, "It is my thesis that the point of view of the modern American
historian is directly related to the world view of the English Puri
22

tans who came to Massachusetts."

This is the notion that the people

made a pact with God to remain simple and, thus, virtuous.

This is a

sort of natural harmony which, as long as it is preserved from arti

ficial "alien complexities," will keep America safe from the sort of
strife experienced by the rest of the world, especially Europe. The
major historians of each generation are, thus, philosopher-prophets,
"Jeremiahs," crying out warnings. Since all history was that of arti
ficial institutions, not of humanity itself which changes not at all,

these historians could be termed as being "against history."
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Noble says that in a 1913 essay of Car^ BeGker's, "Some
Aspects of the Influence of Social Problems and Ideas upon the Study
and Writing of History

Becker mentions Dewey and pragmatism by

name as a justification for the historian to select what he considers
to be the important facts from the almost limitless chaos of facts.
Unlike Novack, Noble views the progressives as using the pragmatists,

rather than being led by them. This is very similar to Strout's

"skeptical relativism" (another technical term) which he uses to
describe Beckeri.

Strout says:

Becker's answer to the problem ofvSynthesis led
him to the skeptical relativism that has made him such
a controversial figure. He urged the historian to
accept for his own field the implications of pragma-,
tism, which made truth and reality subject to change.

Did not pragmatism, he asked, undercut the Olympian ideal
of objectivity...? It was necessary, he felt, toanalyze
the process of historical reconstruction in the light of
this new outlook.

Strout goes as far as saying that Becker substituted will for objec
tivity. He says,"If thought and will are identified, the pursuit
of truth is" debased by practical aims, and action deprived of the

necessary guidance of knowledge. In giving such dangerous primacy
to the practical will, Becker was even more pragmatic than pragma
tism itself.

•

At this point it is worth reviewing what Dewey had to say
regarding this twenty-five^years later in 1938.
The formation of historical judgments lags behind

that of physical judgments not only because of greater
complexity and scantiness of the data, but also because
to a large extent historians have not developed the
habit of stating to themselves and to the public the
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systematic conceptual structures which they employ in or
ganizing their data to anything like the extent in which
physical inquirers expose their conceptual framework....
The slightest reflection shows that the conceptual
material employed in writing history is that of the period
in v/hich a history is written. There is no material avail
able for leading principles and hypotheses save the his
toric present. As culture changes, the conceptions that
are dominant in a culture change.

Of necessity new stand

points for viewing, appraising and ordering data arise.
History is then rewritten.

Recpgnition of change in social states and insti
tutions is a precondition of the existence of historical
judgment....Annals are material for history but are hardly
history itself. Since the idea of history involves cumu
lative: continuity of movement in a given direction toward
stated outcomes, the fundamental conception that controls

determination of subject-matter as historical is that of
a direction of movement.

2.I

History cannot be written en maSs.

All historical construction is necessarily selective.
...Furthermore, if the fact of selection is acknowledged to

be primary and basic, we are committed to the conclusion

that all history is necessarily written from the standpoint
of the present, and is, in an inescapable sense, the history

not only of the present but of that which is contempora|s
eously judged to be important in it. (Emphasis Dewey).
He goes on to give as an example how Herodotus wrote selectively what
the Athenians wanted to hear.

Dewey claims that historiographers must

posit a principle and, in so dojngi "The selection is truly a logical
•-■ ■ ■
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postulate as those recognized as such in mathematical propositions."
■He-saysi ■

The notion that historical inquiry simply reinstates

the events that once happened "as they actually happened"
is incredibly naive. ...For historical inquiry is an
affair (1) bf selection and arrangement, and (2) is con

trolled by the dominant problems and conceg^ions of the cul
ture of the period in which it is written.

It would seem that during the quarter century since Becker cited prama

tism Dewey found time to learn from Becker.

The instrumental use of
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history was just what Dewey, Becker and Beard had in mind. Dewey said:
"A further important principle is that the writing of history is it
self an historical event. ...The acute nationalism of the present era,
■ 31 ■

for example, cannot be accounted for without historical writing."
He continues to say that Marxist history has significantly influenced
history in the present also.

Dewey said that, "Intelligent under

standing of past history is to some extent a lever for moving the
32

present into a certain kind of future."

He said:

History cannot escape its own process. It will,
therefore, aIv/ays be rewritten. As the new present-arises,
the past is the past of a different present. Judgment in
which emphasis falls upon the historic or temporal phase
of redetermination of unsettled situations is thus a cul

minating evidence that judgment is not a bare enunciation
of what already exists but is itself an existential requal
ification.

Thus, for Dewey, Becker was not substituting will for either

logic or objectivity. For Dewey, the will is always an essential prin
ciple of any logical situation.. Without going into a discussion of
their truth or falsity, it can be seen that the relationship between

the pragmatists and the progressives Was a two-way affair. In this case
William James had proposed a theory of perception and action, John Dewey
had expanded it, Carl Becker ahd acted upon it and Dewey had come back
to his rescue.

The "family resemblance,"the contemporaneousness and the

sharing of methods leads one to suspect that there was something basic
shared by both pragraatism and the Progressive movement.
One of the most obvious characteristics shared by both prag

matism and progressivism is the notion of evolutionary progress. James
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Harvey Robinson (1863-1935) had done advanced work in biology at Harvard
and had studied under WiTliam James.

He approached psychology from the

standpoint of evolutionary biology as James did.

Dorothy Ross said, "Among

all the social sciences, it was psychology that suggested to Robinson the

central question the historian should ask: 'the great and fundaraental

question of how mankind learns and disseminates his discoveries and mis
.34 ■

apprehensions... "

Robinson accepted the idea that the brain—and

thought--was an instrument of adaptation.

However, evolution was more than just adaptive, it was pro-^

gressive.

Robinson added "faith'' to evolution:

i..I, for one, have faith that if we gave it a
show, mere human intelligence, based upon our ever in
creasing knowledge, would tend to remedy or greatly allev
iate many forms of human discontent and misery. This is
a matter of faith, I admit. But holding this faith, the

chief end of education seems to me to be ^be encourage
ment of a scientific attitude of mind....

His age had witnessed such amazing breakthroughs in technoiogy as to
make his generation noticably different from the preceding one.

Per

haps this can throw light oh his extravagant appraisal of science:
"Science, in short, includes all the careful and critical knowledge we
35

have about anything of which we can come to know something about."

(Emphasis Robinson).

Robinson sought to make history into a science,

thus actually helping in the progress of
pragmatists' instrumental explanation of mind.

He accepted the later
The task was now to find

out what laws governed between man and nature that ensured causal
patterns of adaptation.

Then man might control his history as he did

his physical environment.

He said:
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Hitherto writers have been prone to deal with
events for their own sake; a deeper insight will surely
lead us.l.to reject the anomalous and seemingly accidental
occurrences and dwell rather on those which illustrate

some profound historical truth. And there is a very
simple principle by which the relevant and useful may be
determined and the irrelevant rejected. Is the factor
occurrence one which will aid the reader to grasp the

meaning of any great period of human development or the
true nature of any momentous institution?

Robinson says that there have been many sorts of histories, "But the

one thing that it ought to do, and has not effectively done, is to help
us understand ourselves and our fellows and the problems and prospects

of mankind.

He calls this the most significant form of history.

More important, the present human condition is a result of past history,
and does not change as rapidly as it could if it were adequately under
stood. The understanding is an instrument for desired change or action.
Robinson used the example of an individual's history, which is, respon

sible for what he is doing at the present, to suggest that the collec
tive consciousness of societies function in the same manner.

This con

stituted a perfect instance of applying the pragmatic view of mind—the
very heart of pragmatism—to history.

Reform can only take place when

the process that produced the present is understood. He says:
We must develop historical-mindedness upon a far

more generous scale than hitherto, for this will add a
still deficient element in our intellectual equipment

and will promote rational progress as nothing else can
do. The present has hitherto been the willing victim
of the past; the time has now come when it should turn
on the past and exploit it in the interests of advance.
'

The 'New History' is escaping from the limita
tions formerly imposed upon the study of the past. It
will come in time consciously to meet our daily needs;
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it will come in time to avail itself of all those dis

coveries that are being made about mankind by anthro

pologists, economists, psychologists and sociologists-
discoveries which during the past fifty years have served

to revolutionize our i^|a of the origin, progress and
prospects of our race.

Robinson cites Karl Marx as being among the earliest who "...denounced
those who discover the birthplace of history in the shifting clouds of
heaven instead of in the hard, daily work on earth.

Although Robin

son denied that Marx's economic theory accounted for everything, he

was greatly impressed by the fruits of his new method as well as its

origin, and considered it a great advance over all past methods.

Like

Marx, Robinson saw that the historian should be the one who studies

all knowledge as a whole, he advocates becoming the historian-philosopher:
"...specialization would lead to the most absurd results if there were
not some one to study the process as a whole; and that some one is
the historian.

In effect, such an historian becomes the only

legitimate philosopher, taking a God's-eye-view of the results of all
knowledge.

The fact is that the specialist, by his nature as a

specialist, is unable to trace all the effects and interrelations of
his particular discipline.

This faith in progress becomes even stronger in Charles Beard.
Beard defines progress:

Briefly defined, it implies that mankind, by making
use of science and investigation, can progressively e
mancipate itself from plagues, famines, and social disas

ters, and subjugate the materials and forces o|2the earth
to the purpose of the good life--here and now.
'

In substance, it is a theory that the lot of man
kind on this earth can be continually improved by the
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attainment of exact knowledge and the subjugation of
the material world to the reqgirements of human wel
fare. Assoeiated with it are many subsidiary concepts.
Its controning interest is in this earth, in our own
time, not in a remote heaven to be attained after death.
It assumes an indefinite future and plans for greater

security, health, comfort, and beauty in the coming

years. While a phi^QSophy of history, it is also a
gospel of futurism.

He goes on to make the Hegelian move of identifying progress with
■'

nn

rationality itself.

.,

This Hegelian strain becomes even more evident

as he uses art and architecture to i11ustrate the Zeitqeist from

culture to culture, saying, "All branches of civilization mirror the
■ 45 ■ ■

dominant idea."

"Hegelianism" was alive and well then as it is today.

David

Noble makes the remark that, "Our final vision of the frontier is that
46

which came from the Europe of Rousseau and Hegel."

From Rousseau

came the connection of virtue with naturalism and simplicity, and from

Hegel came the notion of an unfolding national destiny.

If Noble had

followed up this last notion he might have gained a great deal.
Dewey was a philosophical idealist for a good part of his
life before he converted, through James, to pragmatism.

His idealism

may be termed "Hegelian" in that it was progressive, and it was not
held in order to contemplate a realm of perfect eternal forms.

In the

1890's he was busy defining such things as the will as "the self
realizing itself."

When he converted to pragmatism he toOk much of

his former psychology with him. Today's "progressive" education's pre
occupation with "growth" and "self-realization" is in large part
traceable to Dewey's years as a"Hegelian."
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the most famous "Hegelian" in the history of thought

is Karl Marx. When Marx stood Hegel on his head he merely substituted

History or Matter in motion fdr God. The dialectical interpenetration
of opposites, by itself, is no less mysterious without God, Spirit or
Reason. After making consciousness an effect of matter in motion,

Marx began to search for historical Taws, or regularities to explain
the progressive movement of history. Of course, the best known of
these is his dialectual materiaTism.

The key to Marxist psychology

is Marx's statement that, "it is not the consciousness of men that de

termines their existence, but their social existence that determines
4'8

their consciousness."

.

Man is matter become conscious and, up until

Marx, that consciousness was merely an epiphenomenal reflection of that
matter.

Now that Marx had discovered man's true history he could be

come "self-knowing" for the first time.

For the Marxists only the econ

omist-philosopher and the historian-philosopher can adequately perceive
the human estate.

For the pragmatiSt the true human state is perceived by the

psychologist-philosopher and the historian-philosopher. The conception
of mind is basically the same for both the pragmatist and the Marxist.
The basic difference is that whereas Marxism tends to be a form of Con

tinental rationalism in practicej pragmatism takes its lead from

Brittish empiricism: for the fiarxist reality must conform to his iron
laws; whereas for the pragmatist his laws must conform to reality, they
must "work" in practice. The Hegelian factor in both systems is that
they are "progressive." Evolution is not just change and adaptation.
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it is progress. It goes from the lower to the higher, to the more con
scious and rational.

This Hegelian faith in progress was common to the

vast majority of the reformers of the Progressive Era.
What evidence there is shows that socio-economic determinism

in America developed independently of Marx.

Stow Persons says:

The materialist interpretation of history, a

preoccupation with the economic basis of the class
struggle, and the sense that society formed an
interacting organic whole were naturalistic ideas

independent olgthe particular formulation that Marx
gave to them.
The evolutionary anthropologists, who were
historians in the broadest sense, were among the first

to indicate the possibiligies of a comprehensive in
terpretation of history.

Lewis Henry Morgan is the perfect example here.

His independent "dis

covery" of natural, progressive stages of economic evolution was often
cited by Marx and Engels.

The fact of his independent discovery gave

Marx proof that the data was scientific and objective.
another good example.

Beard is

Persons says.

As early as 1916, Charles Beard had listed the
names of those whom he regarded as mentors in the tra
dition of economic interpretation of politics: Aris
totle, Machiavelli, Harrington, Locke, Madison, Webster
and Calhoun. Marx's name was conspicuous by its absence,

and many years later, when someone questioned him on the

point. Beard readily conceded that Marx was, like himself,
a collateral descendant of these same teachers.

The omission

of Marx had not been an oversight. The bond that united
Simons and the Beards was not a common dependence on Marxism;
it was a commop-,participation in the basic presuppositions
of natural ism.

W. A. Winiams makes the point that, "Beard never attacked private pro

perty as such, not even in the heyday of the Progressive movement or the
52

New Deal."

Williams continues:
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Those who caTT Beard a Marxian would seem to make

the fundamental error of equating economic determinism
with Marxism. Economic determinism is an open-ended

system of causal analysis. Marxism, as generally under
stood and as used by the critics of Beard, is a closed

system of Utopian prophecy. Beard tried to clarify the

difference between these two systems by pointing out that

the ancients, from Aristotle to James Harrington, had em

phasized economicg^ifferences as a source of dynamic con
flict and change.

In conclusion, Williams quotes Lenin's statement that, "A Marxist is one

who extends the acceptance of class struggle to the dictatorship of the
proletariate,

(Emphasis Williams), and then reminds the reader that

Beard never did so. This is why it was natural for Beard to look to
Madison rather than Marx.

What produced the faimly resemblance among historians, sociol

ogists, economists, anthropologists, educators and philosophers of the
Progressive Era--the New Academia—now can be made explicit. It was
the materialist-functionalist view of the human mind based on the theory

of evolution, combined with a disguised Hegelian theory of progress.

The philosophy of man—what it is to be human—is primarily a theory of
mind. Virtually all the new social sciences and philosophy had con
verted from the view of mind as a changeless spirit which was capable

of intuiting eternal truths, to one of mind as a tool of adaptation,

itself still changing and in the making. The Hegelian idea of inevitable

progress had lost its zig-zag dialectical quality in favor of lineal
"stages" of development. Terms such as "manifest destiny" and "stages
of self-actualization" are testimony to the American materialist adapta

tion of Hegelianism. The Chicago pragmatists, Dewey, C. I. Lewis and
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George H. Mead, are distinguished by the fact that they worked longest
and hardest on coinpleting the theoretical aspects, the philosophy, of
this view of man and nature.

As Darnell Rucker puts it, "If psychology

Was initially subordinated to philosophy departmentally at Chicago, the
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tail may have been said to have wagged the dog."

T. A. Goudge agrees

and adds, "The pragmatists were the first group of philosophers to work
out in detail a philosophy of mind based on evolutionary principles.
Moreover, since they were familiar with classical ideas in the field,

they were able to access the kinds of changes in those ideas which
evolutionary principles required.

CHAPTER 4

THE CHICAGO PRAGMATISTS:

GEORGE HERBERT AND CLARENCE IRVING LEWIS

For all intents and purposes, World War I brought an end to

the Progressive movement in the United States. For a short time almost
the whole world was in philosophic retreat. Paul Weiss credits the war

for leading to the final disillusionment with high-minded speculation
and ultimate truths, and for the subsequent popularity of Logical
Positivism.

Of the latter he says:

This doctrine alone seemed to answer adequately to

that far-flung post-war spirit of disillusionment which
so readily gave up the belief in fixed ideals and stan
dards and the possibility of knowledge reaching beyond

the here and now. 'The Lost Generation' thought it better
to strain for present clarity than for ultimate truth.

The pragmatists had moved their center to the University
of Chicago in the decade before the war. For the next generation of

English speaking professional philosophers everything was dominated by
linguistic analysis. Earlier, James had proven that pragmatism lent
itself to linguistic analysis by stressing what he had shown terms
like the "Absolute" to mean in practice, l^hat was left for the academic

pragmatists was to justify the connection between their evolutionary
psychology and a "scientific" way of talking about the world.

In one respect pragmatism had an advantage. Since it is a
philosophy of and for action, it could lay claim to being both scien
tific and optimistic.

In spite of the fact that both G. H. Mead and
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C. I, Lewis considered Josiah Royce to be their best professor at Harvard

they both rejected him in favor of a "scientific" phTlosophy of action.
Now their task was to upgrade and defend this philosophy against Royce,

Santayana, Russell and others. , Mead and Lewis may be thought of as
those who were doing the precision work for John Dewey, leaving him free
to do popular works in politics and education.
Action is the center around which the entire philosophies

of Mead and Lewis revolve. For George Herbert Mead (1863-1931), in

telligence is not properly designated as a characteristic of mind
■

.

1

because it is mereTy the adaptation of the organism to its environment.

It is found in vegetables and unicelluar forms. Rather, mind is an ex
tension of intelligence, the basic ability of an organism to act or

adapt for its own good. Mead makes a better example of the inversion
of idealism than Charles Beard does.

In a preface to one of Mead's

works, Dewey says that not only was idealism the dominant philosophy
when Mead began his career, but that he considered Mead's entire

philosophical development to be an outgrowth of his problem with the
nature of individual consciousness.

Again, he had to square it with

the fact that reality consisted ultimately of physical matter in
motion.

In reaction to Bergson, Mead said that, "The unit of exis
tence is the act, not the moment. And the act stretches from stimulus

to response."^ Any act is an adaptation of the organism to its environ
ment. For Mead,"Thinking is a certain way of solving problems."

It

arises only when the action is complex enough that direct or habitual
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action is blocked.

Like John Watson, Mead implies that the organism

is passive in its act of adjustment to the environment:
A living organism has only such an environment
as it can respond to in so far as it receives stimu
lations from it.

Its environment, therefore,: is

bounded by the capacity of the organism to be affected
by it through its various sense processes. Further

more, the objects that exist in that environment are

g

determined by the form of the responses of the organism.

He says that, "Consciousness is involved where there is a problem,
where one is deliberately adjusting one's self to the world, trying to

get out of difficulty or pain."^ Without the possibility of action,
thought and sensation are worthless.

Mead's solution to the problem of

.mind-body dualism is to say that, "...pragmatism regards cognition as
8

simply a phase of conduct, denying any awareness to immediate experience."
John B. Watson (1878-1958) studied under both Dewey and

Mead at Chicago.

In his autobiography he states that he learned nothing

from either one of them in class, but that he and Mead had a very good

reTationship when the latter would visit him in his animal laboratory.

Mead and Dewey rejected Watson's Classical behaviorism of the reflex
arc because it did not account for conscious intelligence or planning.

Also, it was too individualistic.

However, both had the highest regard

for its "scientific" character of sticking with objective data.

Mead

said that, "Social differentiation is the function of what we call mental
life.

and behavioristic psychology is bringing this highest phase of

organization among the members of the species within the pale of scien
9

tific contemplation and control."

He says that, "The opposition of the

behaviorist to introspection is justified.

It is not a fruitful under
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taking from the point of view of psychological study. ...What the behav
idrist is occupied with, what we have to come back to, is the actual
reaction itself.

Mead explicitly and simply identifies meaning with

response.

Mead saw that Watson's animal behaviorism was capable of

great extension.

He said,"A behavioristic psychology represents a

definite tendency rather than a system, a tendency to state as far as

possible the conditions under which the experience of the individual
arises.

Of his own psychology Mead said, "It is behavioristic,

but unlike Watsonian behaviorism it recognizes the parts of the act
which do not come to external observation, and it emphasizes the act
13

of the human individual in its natural situation."

•

In discussing

Watson, Mead said that it is impossible to reduce consciousness to

behavior, but it is possible to explain it behavioristically. This is
Mead's functional approach.

He says that, "Mental behavior is not

reducible to non-mental behavior.

But mental behavior or phenomena can

be explained in terms of non-mental behavior or phenomena as arising
14

out of, and as resulting from complications in the latter."

He wrote:

We want to approach language not from the stand
point of inner meanings to be expressed, but in its
larger context of cooperation in the group taking place
by means of signals and gestures. Meaning appears with
in that process. Our behaviorism is a social behavior
ism.

If Mead had stopped at that point he might have been known as
the father of modern operant conditioning, and the connection between

pragmatism and behaviorism would be explicit. As things are, B. F.
Skinner has never mentioned his indebtedness to Mead.

Perhaps this is
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because of Mead's 'Freudian" behaviorisrn.

Mead was critical of Freud for the Tatter's excessive emphasis

on sex, and found little that was good to say about him. However, he

accepted the notion that there were general biological reasons behind
or governing most specific human actions. Mead says, "The good reasons
for which we act and by which we account for our actions are not the

real reasons."^® David L. Miller suggests that Mead's "T" and "Me"
are best explained in terms of Freud's Id and Superego.

Where Mead

differs from Freud is that the "I" could never exist without the"Me,"

the generalized "other"adapted from Thomas Cooley's looking-glass self.
Man,is strictly a social animal at the psychic level, and language is
merely a form of learned behavior. The psyche is not a product of
biology.

Also unlike Freud, internal conflicts between the "I" and

the"Me" occur only when the structure of society is inadequate to meet

the individual's problems.

He does not accept Freud's idea that "free"

man is necessarily in conflict with a society which is by nature restric
tive.

What Mead rejected in Cooley was the idea of starting with selves

which, later, took the attitude of others.

Independent conscious entities

were abhorrent to him.

Mead's conception of the human psyche pivots upon language as

the means for cooperation in action.

He picked up the idea of the ges

ture from the physician-psychologist Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) while
studying in Germany and modified it to suit his system. For Mead, "The
• *18

language symbol is simply a significant or conscious gesture."

The
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fundaraentai characteristic of a significant or conscious gesture is
that it affects the speaker in the same way as it affects the one

spoken to—i.e., they both respond the same way and, hence, they
share a common meaning. Thus he achieves his purpose and can say
19

that, "The locus of mind is not in the individual."

"Psycholog

ically, the perspective of the individual exists in nature, not in
the individual. Physical science has recently discovered this and
20

enunciated it in the doctrine of relativity."

He findSithat re

lationships and responses are beginning to take the place of con

sciousness in both science and philosophy.
Language is the means of building the self or gener
alized other.

According to Mead:

We are, especially through the use of vocal ges
tures, continually arousing in ourselves those responses
which we call out in other persons, so that we are
taking the attitude of the other person into our own
conduct. The critical importance of language in the
development of human experience lies in the fact that
the stimulus is one that can react upon the speaking in
dividual as it reacts upon the other.
■

A behaviorist, such as Watson, holds that all
our thinking is vocalization. In thinking we are
simply starting to use certain words. That is in a
sense true.

His criticism,of Watson is that Watson does not take into

account the full social complexities of language.

In short, Watson

was a psycho-biologist rather than a socio-psycho-biologist.
stiraulation is also self-stimulation:

Vocal

"That is fundamental for any

language; if it is going to be language one has to understand what
22

he is saying, has to affect himself as he affects others."
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Only in terms of gestures as significant symbols
is the existence of mind or intelligence possible; for

only in terms of gestures which are significant sj^bols
can thinking--which is simply an internalized or implicit

. conversation of the indtvi^^al with himself by means of,
such gestures--take place.

Thinking is a matter of talking to one's self, only it is a sociaT pro
duct in that it is the individual 's "I" which carries on a dialogue

with his "Me" or social "self", and even the "I" is a social product
since it cannot exist without a "Me."

Mead writes, "It is necessary to presuppose a system in order to
24

define the objects that make up that system."

system through its language.

Society provides that

Mead accepts the consequence that this

makes reality and rationality a relative matter.

He remarks: "Now

relativity...has not only vastly complicated the spatio-temporal theory
of measurement, but it has also reversed what I may call the reality
25

reference."

Mead used Einstein's theory of relativity in physics
'26

to argue to a theory of social relativity in consciousness.
notes:

Reason is the reference to the relations of things
by means of symbols.
No individual or form which has not come into the

use of such symbols is rational.

A system of these

symbols/ is what is called language,.... It always in
volves, even when language makes thought possible, a
cooperative social process. It is society that through
the mechanism of cooperative activity has endowed man
with reason. It is only through ct)mmunication that
meanings have arisen.

Language is ultimately a form of behavior and
calls for the rationally organized society within which
it can function. It implies commonoends, and common
ends are ipso facto rational ends.

He
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Striving for comraon ends—doing and saying what those around one are
doing and saying—is being rational for Mead. There is nothing more
objective than soGiety to appeal to.
At this point it is worth noting that the philologist,

Edward Sapir (1884-1939), and his famous student, the linguistic
anthropologist, Benjamin Lee Whorf (1897^1941), were contemporaries
of Mead at Chicago.

Whorf remarked;

We cut nature up, organize it into concepts
and ascribe significances as we do, largely because we
are parties to an agreement to organize it in this way—
an agreement that holds throughout our speech community
and is codified in the patterns of our language. The
agreement is, of course, an implicit and unstated one,
BUT ITS TERMS ARE ABSOLUTELY OBLIGATORY:.... (Emphasis '
Whorf).
We are thus introduced to a new principle of
relativity, which holds that all observers are not led
by the same physical evidence to the same picture of
the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are
similar, or can in some way be calibrated.

This rather startling conclusion is not so apparent
if we compare only our modern European languages....

But this unanimity exists only because.these tongue|gare
all Indo-European dialects cut to the same plan....
The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis may be taken as the extreme position of

linguistic relativity (at least as derived by social scientists). If
they Gonsciously owed anything to Mead they did not admit it.

However,

the important point is that once consciousness is no longer seen as an
independent entity, it must become relative to something.

If one

chose the behavioristic position--either classical or operant--that

thought is accounted for by speech, and that speech is learned
behavior, then it follows that thought and consciousness is a learned

process, relative to the society and language group that teaches it.
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B. F. Skinner wrote, "Without the help of a verbal

community all behavior would be unconscious. Consciousness is a social
30

product."

Michael Polanyi remarked:

All human thought comes into existence by grasping
the meaning and mastering the use of language. Little
of our mind lives in our natural body; a truly human in

tellect dwells in us^^nly when our lips shape words and
our eyes read print.

Our native gift of speech enables us to enter on
the mental life of man by assimilating our cultural her

itage.

We come into existence mentally, by adding to our

bodily equipment in articulate framework and using it for
understanding experince.

Human thought grows only within

language and since language can ex^st only in society,
all thought is rooted in society.
David Miller says that Mead,

...would agree with Wittgenstein that there can
be no private language, that...the life of a word is in
its use, that language is a social affair involving
communication, that language Is the vehicle of thought,
that thoughts and Ideas are not subjective
Parts of The Blue Book, The Brown Book, and the

Investigations read as if Wittgenstein had been communi
cating with the deceased Mr. Mead but had received only

Mead's concTusionioard not the experimental basis for
arriving at them.
Whether or not Whorf, Skinner, Polanyi, Or Wittgenstein owe

anything directly to Mead, it is obvious that they all arrived at sim
ilar conclusions concerning language.

They all hold that thought is

acquired via speech, that it determines the nature of one's thought
and that ultimately it is a learned behavior similar to any other.
Mind ultimately is located outside the organism,

C. I. Lewis (1883-1964) also stressed action as the basis

for knowing. As Lewis states, "The ruling interest In knowledge is
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the practical interest of action."

He continues by noting that

The significance of conception is for knowledge.

The significance of all knowledge is for possible action.
And the significance of common conception is for community
of action.

Congruity of behavior is the ultimate prac

ticai test of common understanding.

Speech is only that

part of behavior which is most significant of minings

and most useful for securing human cooperation.

Like Mead, Lewis finds that the key to the evolution of
the human mind is the hand.

Man's dexterous hands, his opposable

thumbs, were better adapted for rearranging the world than anything

any of the other animals possessed. All the senses are an extension
of the sense of touch.

This is what makes Lewis a pragmatist since

touching is used to manipulate the environment. Humans had the for

tune of having an adaptive nervous system commensurate with their
physical possibilities. Lewis finds the hand-brain situation to be
of almost equal importance; he has a preference for viewing evplution
as being organic rather than lineal.

However, he concludes that the

hand must have preceded brain development, since men have yet to
36' ■

catch up with their potential for physical manipulation.

Thus the

unique potential for human action is the genesis of the uniquely com
plicated human brain.
Also like Mead, Lewis sees that;the common world, or

common reality, is a social product created by the needs of cooperative
action.

He writes:

Our common understanding and our common world may
be, in part, created in response to our need to act
together and to comprehend one another....

Indeed, our categories are almost as much a social
product as is language, and in much the same sense. It
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is onl.y the possi bility of agreement that must be ante

cedently presumed. The 'human mind' is a coincidence
of individual minds which partly, no doubt, must be
native, but partly is itseTf create^^
social pro

cess. (Emphasis Lewis).
He further stated, "Our common world is very 1argely a social achieve
ment--an achievement in which we triumph over a good deal of diversity
38'

in sense experience."

One understands or anticipates what others

are goi ng to. do, what are their wants and habits; and then must coordi
nate his actions:with theirs, especially with regards to ends.

He

continues, "The sharing of a common 'reaTity' is, in some part, the
aim and the result of social cooperation, not ah initial social datum

prerequisite to common knowledge."

Thus» to a large extent social

action precedes and creates social awareness, as with Marx or Beard.
After Lewis concedes that there must be some sort of preexisting common

reality in order to entertain common action and common concepts, he
.continues:

But both our common concepts and our common reality
are in part a social achievement, directed by the commun
ity of needs and interests and fostered in the interest
of cooperation. Even our categories may be, to a degree,
such social products; and so far as the dichotomy of sub
jective and objective is governed by consideration of
conmunity, reality itself reflects criteria which are
social in their nature.

So far, Lewis sounds in agreement with Mead, Whorf, Skinner
and Polanyi.

However, this is deceptive because Lewis has a different

causal sequence.

For Lewis social reality is a matter of cooperative

action, and the stress in on physical action, not verbal.
For this reason, meaning precedes language.

The farthest
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that Lewis ever went in equating thought with language was an aside in
which he added, "Also, we largely think in words..

■Al" ■

■

His usual

position is closer to (early) James' : Lewis says,"Action precedes re
flection and even precision of behavior commonly outruns precision of

thought--fortunately for us.
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For Lewis it is the relationship of

actions that are meaningful, rather than responses as with Mead.

As if

in response to Mead, Lewis had written:

Meanings are conveyed by language... .

But it would
or

be doubtful that meanin g arises through communication
Presumably the
that verbal formulation is essentials

meanings to be expressed must come before the linguistic
expression of them,
have meaning....

.Also other things than language

He goes on to stress that certain fixed meanings are necessary to crea
tures which survive through their own behavior—regardless of language.

As if referring to Sapir and

Whorf:
■

• ■

)

,

: •

■

.

■

■

The linguistic use of symbols is indeed determined
by convention and alter able at will. Also what classif
ications are to be made, and by what criteria, and how
these classifications s hall be represented, are matters ,
of decision.

.. .Nevert heless such conventionalism would

put emphasis in the wro ng place. Decision as to what
meanings shall be estab lished, or how those attended
shall be represented, c an in no wise affect the relat^^ns
which these meanings th emselves have or fail to have.

Even though it is true that ane's culture determines what aspects of
reality its members will str ass and be aware of, the relationships of

these parts are objective and independent of human will.

The whole

system always conforms to rules and, unlike Whorf's formulation, those
rules are objective.

Action and, therefore, meaning takes place in

the objective world of relations.

According to Lewis:
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The original determinations of analytic truth, and
the final court of appeal with respect to it, cannot

lie in linguistic usage, because meanings are not the
creations df language but are antecedent, and the re
lations of meanings are not determined by our syntactic
conventions but are determinative of the significance
which our syntactic usages may have. Once we have pene
trated the circle of independent meanings and made genuine

contact with them by our modes of expression, the appeal
to linguistic relationships can enormously facilitate
and extend our grasp of analytic truth. But the first
such determinations and the final test must lie with

meanings in that sense in which there would be meanings
even if there were no linguistic expression of them, and
in which the progress of successful thinking must conform

to actual connections of such meanings eveg^if this
process of thought should be unformulated.

Lewis' conception of mind and consciousness is based in the action and
survival of the individual organism, not necessarily society. Society-
a system of cooperation—is a particular way of surviving, a later
modification of the thought process; but the human psyche itself is not
a social product.

Even though matter at the thing-in-itself stage can

be interpreted in many different ways; all of them functional, it is
still the first thing to condition consciousness via the body that
must survive in it.

He noted, "We must express meanings by the use of

words; but if meanings altogether should end in words, then words
.46

altogether would express nothing."
Lewis is careful enough to differentiate between the way

something is expressed and what is expressed. He was also influenced
enough by the Logical Positivists to believe that the verifiability
principle was not incompatible with 3 pragmatic philosophy of action.
If action and survival were objective, then so is what can be said
about action and possible action.

According to Lewis:
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The mode of expression of any analytic truths is

thus dependent upon linguistic conventions; as is also
the manner in which any empirical: fact is to be formulated
and conveyed.

But the meanings which are conveyed by

symbols^ on account of a stipulated or customary usage
of them, and the relation of meanings conveyed by an
order of symbols, on account of syntactic stipulations or
customary syntactic usagOj are matters antecedent to and
/ independent of conventions affecting the linguistic
manner in which they are conveyed. The manner in which
any truth is to be told by means of language, depends
on conventional linguistic usage. But the truth or
falsity of what is expressed, is independent of any
particular linguistic conventions affecting the expres
sion of it.\ If the conventions were otherwise, the manner

of telling it would be different, but what is to be told,
and the truth or falsity of it, would remain the same.

That is something which n^jTinguistic convention can
touch. (Emphasis Lewis)

.

He could be so opposed to Sapir and Whorf because meaning (action)
gives rise to objectivity rather than society.

Lewis could even use

this as a key to look for objective value, whereas Mead says, "There
■ 48

is no science in a statement of value."

In the case of his famous "private language" problem

Wittgenstein might have done better to read Lewis rather than Meadr
and perhaps he did, but no one knows.

Simply stated, there is no

common object or verifiability when one talks about a "private"
sensation or the sensation in itself.

A favorite passage of

Wittgenstein's, often quoted by modern behaviorists is:
The essential thing about private experience is
really not that each person possesses his own exemplar,
but that nobody knows whether other people have this

or something else. The assumption would then be possible—
though univerifiable--that one section of mankind had one

sensation of re| and another section had another. (Emphasis
Wittgenstein).
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Wittgenstein infers that there can be no use in referring to a sensa
tion at the level of sens^ion itself; for another example he uses
50

the sensation of greenness.

Wittgenstein compares private sensations to a beetle in a
box, a box which everyone has, and where no one can see into anyone
else's box.

Whatever is inside of it, if anything, does not really

matter to anyone else.

He says that, "...one can 'divide through'
■
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by the thing in the box, it cancels out whatever it is."
CO .

"irrelevant."

It is

. .

He appears to suggest that the sensation itself is

not something v/hich one informs others about.

No one can give another

any information about the qualitative aspects of his mental phenomena,
in themselves.

Any such description must rest upon what is objective,

such as the agreement to call certain kinds of surfaces shades of the
color blue; or else rest upon some connection with its natural ex

pression, such as pain-behavior.

What Wittgenstein has, here, for

the information actually communicated is tendentiousness (similar to
H. H. Price) in the case of the emotions).

Also here he has linguistic

agreement, or similarity of usage, in the case of objective qualities,
such as the color red.

Wittgenstein says that,"You learned the con- .
CQ

cept 'pain' when you learned the language.'!
54
It is "new pain-behavior."

(Emphasis Wittgenstein).
■ ■ 'r

Mead, the social behaviorist, was willing to say, "I see no
reason to assume that, if a similar neural access to cerebral tracts
55

were possible, we might not share with others identical memory-imagery."
Miller's interpretation that Mead would agree with Wittgenstein on the
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impossibility of private language is inaccurate since they were talking
about essentially different things.

For Mead there could be no pri

vate language simply because language requires another person to com
municate with and to create language or consciousness.

For Wittgenstein

the notion of "private language" refers to the object of communication.
When Mead does refer to direct experience he either takes it mechanis

tically, as above, or openly states that he knows them to be different
56

fromSindividual to individual./

Thus he lacks the subtility of Lewis

and Wittgenstein.
Lewis wrote:

It is one essential feature of what the word 'mind'

means that minds are private; that one's own mind is
something with which one is directly acquainted—nothing
more so--but that the mind of another is something which
one is unable directly to inspect.
We can have no language for discussing what no
language or behavior could discriminate. And a differ

ence which no language or behavior could convey is,gfor
purposes of communication, as good as non-existant.

Lewis explains what he meant by a concept which is "common to two minds":
The concept is a definitive structure of meanings,
which is what would verify completely the coincidence of
two minds when they understood each other by the use of

the same language. Such ideal conmunity requires coin
cidence of a pattern of interrelated connotations, prp
jected by and necessary to cooperative, purposeful
behavior.

It does not require coincidence of imagery

or sensory apprehension. (Emphasis Lewis).
Like Wittgenstein, Lewis stresses the concept and the practical signifi
icance of the thing or state known:
We are concerned with two things in our practical
understanding of each other--with communication and with
behavior. My eoncepts are, from the outside view of me
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which you have,ggevealed as modes of ray behavior, inclu
ding my speech.

He continues the paragraph by remarking, "But it is not necessary that

when we act aTike we,should feel alike...." (Emphasis Lewis).

For

Lewis what is important to the psychology of purpose is the "relation
between anticipation and realization," and it is only known through
behavior.

He-emphasized:

The eventual aim of communication is the coordi
nation of behavior; it is essential that we should have

purposes in comraon. But I can understand the purposes
of another without presuming that he feels just as I.do
when he has them.

I do not need to suppose that either purposes in
general or the content of this act in particular are, in

terms of immediate experience, identical in his g|se and
in

mine, in order to 'understand his purposes.'
■

,

■ ■ ' f.0 ■

For Lewis, "All meaning is relational,"

■



(empahsis his), and "Meanings

are identified by the relational patterns which speech and behavior in
63 ^ ■

general are capable of conveying."

Thus, even though the sensuous

content itself of one mind cannot be conveyed to another, the concept

or significance of it is objectified by its relationship to the indi
vidual and society. This can be conveyed in speech.

Not only were

Lewis and Wittgenstein dealing with the same problem, but they reached
very nearly the same solution; i.e., that the concept or significance
of the phenomena could be objectified and transmitted through language.
That was Lewis' position in 1929, twenty-four years ahead of
the publication of Wittgenstein's Investigations.

By 1941 he adopted

a new outlook; one disavowing the verifiability principle and echoing
James's The Will to Believe.

He noted, "ATT of us who earlier were
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incTined to say that unverifiable statements are meaningless—and I
64

Include myself—have since learned to be more careful."

Rather,

he found that the belief in other eonsciousnesses has "empirical sense"

even if it is not verifiable, saying: "We significantly believe in
minds other than our own, but we cannot know that such exist.

belief is a postulate."

This

He found the belief in other minds to be

similar to the belief in electrons and ultra-violet rays.

Lewis put his final stress oh language as the vehicle of

education.

Because of language humans do not have to learn everything

by trial and error or repeat the mistakes of the past.

It makes past

action a species property:

Language is..4essential to that preservation of
accumulated learning which is the root factor in the dif
ference between human life and that of other Species.
It is an indispensable instrument of that continued and

progressive human betterment which history reveals.
Granted reaT communication, we are warranted in some con
fidence that there is ndthing which is desirable to men

at large, and is attainable by any, v/hich will not be
eventually shared by all; nor any common trouble which
can be obyiated by any from which all may not eventually
■

be freed.

He continues almost to the point of being Utopian.

Progress is con

tinually accelerating because language has made social learning a
cumulative product.
Both Mead and Lewis developed theories of mind as arising out

of the action of an organism in its environment. For Mead language
is the instrument which creates mind and consciousness, the internal

dialogue.

In Paul Weiss' words, "The late Professor Mead, though a

professed pragmatist, was at heart a metaphysician."

Similar to
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the systems of Freud and Marx, to what could one appeal that possibly
might prove Mead's theory wrong? For Lewis language is a tool of
cooperation and social memory, but not something essential to the nature
or existence of the human mind.

Rather, he showed what were the limits

of using language to talk about consciousness, but did not discuss
what he assumes consciousness in itself to be.

As Weiss said of

Lewis' pragmatism, it is good work but it lacks an explicit formula
■ go , .

tion and criticism of the metaphysics which it assumes.
the formal philosophy of pragmatism was kept alive.

Nevertheless,

Thus men such as

John Dewey and Signey Hook had a respectable justification to call for

radical change in society.

CHAPTER 5

JOHN DEWEY
,

T

and

THE GREAT DEPRESSION

What distinguishes most American socio-economic deter
minists from the Marxists is a rejection of dialectical materialism

and a rejection of the dictatorship of the prpletariat. "Hegelianism"
is still present in the notion of conflict and progress. What dis

tinguishes pragmatism among the naturalistic philosophies is its em
phasis upon action together with its rejection of "metaphysics." All
ideas are but probabilities to be tested in action.

When Dewey accepted the idea that the underlying cause of

social change was neither human nor divine will, it made a profound
change in his politics. As far as is known, Dewey's voting record
up until the Great Depression was the following: 1896 for Bryan;
1912 for Theodore Roosevelt's Bull Moose ticket; 1916 for Wilson;

1924 for LaFollette; and in 1928 for AT Smith.^ Dewey made his break
with idealism in graduate school in the early eighties. Merle Curti
finds evidence of Dewey's social radicalism in his writings as early

as 1888.^
Dewey always advocated "social change;" a term which may be
translated as using government action to improve the conditions of
those less fortunate.

In terms of the Depression it is significant

that he advocated organic change (change from-within and by the existing

system) up until the stock market crisis. He voted progressive, but not
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for radical restructuring.
In lectures given in 1926 (reprTnted as The Public and Its

Problems, 1929) Oewey's tone was pedantic and uninspiring.

He never

spoke any better than he wrote, and at that time he did not convey

any urgency for his social position.

Rather, the lectures consisted

of a dry analysis with an occasional tone of "wouldn't it be nice if
...." Judging by his later writings the following remarks from those
1ectures may have been directed at the Republican administratibn:

Mo government by experts in which the masses do
not have the chance to inform the experts as to their
needs can be anything but an oligarchy managed in the
interests of the few. And the enlightenment must pro

ceed in ways which force the administrative specialists
to take account of the needs.

i

The point is that it is impossible to tell if he meant the Republican

administration.

Now contrast this with his position five years later:

I speak as one who as far back as 1912 hoped for
the resurrection of the Republican party, as one who has

at times in national elections hoped for a revival within
the Democratic party. But at last I am disillusioned;
I am humiliated at the length of time it has taken me
to pass something like political maturity. For, I sub
mit, it is an infantile cherishing of illusions, a with
drawal from the realities of economic and political facts,

to pin one's hopes and put one's trust on the pos|ibilities
of organic change in either of the major parties.

Oewey's reaction to the Depression was most noticable in
his work for The League for Independent Political Action and in his
articles in The Mew Republic.

George Dykhuizen has given a good account

of his personal letters at this time:

he condemned Hoover's lack of

action, advocated a planned economy, and saw no real promise in the
election of Roosevelt.
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The 1928 election of Herbert Hoover distressed Dewey because

he saw it as anathema to progress.

He considered the old liberalism

which Hoover represented to be based upon a fallacy, the notion that

freedom is something expressed negatively (freedom from) and its con
sequent embodiment in laissez-faire capitalism:
But the course of historic events has proved that

they emancipated the classes whose special interests they
represented rather than human beings impartially. In
fact, as the newly emancipated forces gained momentum, they
actually imposed new burdens and subjected to new modes of

oppression the mass of individuals who did nog have a
privileged economic status. (Emphasis Dewey).
Rather, Dewey saw liberty as something both positive and concrete:
Well, in the first place, liberty is not just an
idea, an abstract principle. It is power, effective
power to do specific things. There is no such thing as
liberty in general; liberty, so to speak, at large. If
one wants to know what the condition of liberty is at a

given time, one has to examine what persons can do and
what they cannot do. The moment one examines the ques
tion from the standpoint of effective action, it becomes
evident that the demand for liberty is a demand for power.

(Emphasis DeWey).
Eventually he came to state his conclusion that politics is basically
a struggle for power.

He defined politics as,

the struggle for

possession and use of power to settle specific issues that grow out of
the country's needs and problems. ...politics is the struggle for

power to achieve results

"

Thus he holds the Marxist position in
9

so far as dividing freedom into two categories, formal and factual,
puts by far the most emphasis on the factual, sometimes exclusively

as above, and draws the conclusion that this requires social(ist)
economic planning.

He writes:
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If we employ the conception of historic relativity,
nothing is clearer than that the conception of liberty
is always relative to forces that at a given time and

place are increasingly felt to be oppressive. Today, it
signifies liberation from material insecurity and from
the coercions and repressions that prevent multitudes
from participation in the vast cultural resources that
are at hand.

The direct impact of 1iberty always has to

do with some class or group that is suffering in a special
way from some form of constraint exercised by the distri
bution of powers that exists in contemporary society.
Should a classless society ever come into being the formal

concept of liberty would lose its significance.... (Em
phasis Dewey).
Dewey's other reason for attributing success to the Repub
licans was the fear on the part of the public that another party might

upset things.

The Republicans, the party of business, supposedly

knew how to manage and run affairs in a businesslike way:
after all, was an engineer.

Hoover,

For Dewey this had the ironic effect

of proving that the public wanted federal economic management.

It

was proven again when the public held Hoover accountable for the
Depression.

Dewey's reaction to the Depression went through a cycle

starting with "Fabian" socialism (he never used the term) prior to
the stock market crash.

Then, after the crash, he opted for a radical

socialism calling for a constitutional convention and ignoring the

gains of the New Deal.

Finally, as the effects of drastic social

engineering in Europe became apparent, he drifted back to a low
keyed evolutionary socialism.

The first period is best represented by the founding of
\

the League for Independent Political Action (L.I.P.A.) and from
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Dewey's Individualism Old arid New (1930), a collection of essays
drawn from his contributions to The New Republic the preceding year.
The L. I. P. A. was founded in 1928 as a reaction to Hoover's elec

tion.

The League's basic contention was that politics and economics

had to be squared, and its beacon light was the British Labor Party.
The vice president of the League at its inception was Thomas Maurer,

Norman Thomas' running mate.

Dewey showed up occasionany as a

"sympathetic onlooker" but he was nOt a founding member.

With the

stock market crash in October of 1929, Dewey thought the time was

right for change, and became a member; his reputation immediately
propelled him to its presidency.

With Dewey as president the major

task of L. I. P. A. became the education of the American pegple con

cerning economics. They hoped to elect someone with their views to
the White House by 1940.

To do this they advocated the fofmulation of a third party,

and Dewey asked Senator George W. Norris of Nebraska, a liberal
Republican, to head the new party.' Norris politely refused.

His

refusal had two consequences: first, it deepened Dewey's suspicions
of the collaboration between the old parties and; second, it gained
Dewey the animosity of Norman Thomas and the avowed socialists. The

press was also harsh on Dewey, both giving the League bad notices and
never allowing Dewey column space for interviews.

Both the press and

the other minor parties considered the League a group of intellec

tuals, whereas both the major parties considered it a threat to be
defused.

Dewey himself may have been partly to blame:

he was seventy
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years old the year of the crash, had lived through previous depres
sions, and at the start did not express the sense of urgency which
is needed in politics.

,

However, it was soon apparent that the Depression was

worse than anything in meniory--so bad, in fact, that it threatened
to be the beginning of the total economic collapse expected by the

most radical socialists.

By the time of the 1932 elections the

League had drawn up a specific platform of eighty-four recommenda
tions, including:

a quarter-billion dollars in federal funds for

jobs; three to five billion for public works; and end to prohibition
at the federal level; an immediate twenty-five percent reduction in
the tariff; a complete free trade within twenty years; U. S. member

ship in the League of Nations; recognition of Soviet Russia; an

immediate fifty percent cut in the military budget and a constitut
tional convention.

It was as thorough a socialist program as could be

submitted at that time, hedged with words like "eventual" public
ownership and recommending ah income tax up to seventy-five percent
on the highest earning individuals.

Dewey warned that the progressive

radicals should do as he did and hedge their socialism in evoTutionary
terms; i.e., not advocating it as a forthri.ght politica1 policy.

This

was because it mi^ht play into the hands of the Facists, whom he was

afraid might be in position to compete for power if the whole system
collapsed.

Unfortunately, Dewey was a bad political tactician.

The
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Socialists had held their convention four months ahead of his and had

stolen much of his thunder,

florman Thomas was calling for most of

the same things as Dewey and even admitted the same gradualism in
practice. Thomas had the advantage of being an experienced candidate
with a pre-existing party, one with its ideology and platform already
worked out.

Also, the pressure was on for a united front.

Dewey had two objections to Thomas.

First, Thomas was an ac

knowledged socialist; he was identified with socialism.
Dewey wrote:

In 1931

:

I think a new party will have to adopt many measures
which are now labeled sociali$tic--measures which are dis

counted and condemned because of that tag. But while
support for such measures in the concrete. . .will win
support from American people, I cannot imagine the Amer
ican people supporting them on the ground of Socialism,
or any other sweeping ism, laid down in advance. The
greatest handicap from which special measures favored
by the Socialists suffer is that they are advocated by

the Socialist party as Socialism. The prejiji^ice against
the name may be a regrettable prejudice

Rather, he imagined that the majority of reformers, "...all but the
most dogmatic Socialists..." would enlist in the new party.

As Harold

Laski said of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, the left wing founders of the

British Labor Party, they were "pragmatists at bottom," and that "Their
word did more than that of anyone else to give the doctrine of socialism
13

its necessary pragmatic roots in the English scene."

Dewey felt that

it was only by being such Fabian socialists that people h^ a practical

chance at achieving reform.

Through education the solutions would

suggest themselves to the voting public.

Ironically, there is an
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element of PTatonism in Dewey's brand of pragmatism: to know the good

Is to do the good, and Dewey depended upon education to make it known.
Dewey's second objection was that Thomas was an ideological
socialist rather than a practical one.

Dewey believed that men would

cooperate for the conmon good—once they were properly educated to
know what that common good was. Thomas, on the other hand, looked
at society in terms of the Marxist class struggle.

In responding to

Thomas' charge of being a group of do-nothings, late-comers, and Utopian
intellectuals, Dewey said:
It has been a constant aim of the L.I.P.A. to find

labor groups which believe in independent political action,
to bring them together, and to carry on education among
these labor groups which have not yet seen the light. We
are opposed to the defeatest policy which assumes that
there can be no effective radical political action in
the country until the majority of the population have
sunk into the "proletariat." We are not yet convinced
that the Socialist,Party has taken the latter position....
(Emphasis Dewey).,

Whereas Thomas had charged that Dewey's League holds "an intellec
tualized version of a watered-down socialism," Dewey responded that

he was making decisions without regard for dogma.

Dewey turned the

tables and shoved that Thomas' brand of socialism was as watered-down

as his own by pointing out that Thomas was only calling for national

ization of the Brinc^

means of production and distribution.

In

practice, the Socialist Party admitted to the same gradualism that
Dewey had recommended in theory. Moreover, Dewey charged the other
radicals with alienating the middle class and thus creating an un
necessary handicap.

This was, perhaps, his best point.
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As can be expected, virtually all the doctrinaire radicals

disagreed with Dewey's cooperativism. Even Sidney Hook, his most
distinguished convert to pragmatism and admirer:
Dewey's idea is a socialized America. In terms
of his own position, the only quarrel one can have
with him is his failure to appreciate the instrumental
value of class struggle rather than class collabora-^

tion in effecting the transition from Coij-gorate America

to Collective America. , (Emphasis Hook).

Hook saw nothing wrong with being a pragmatic Marxist, but neither

could he give up the notion of class struggle completely. Actually
Dewey would agree since he was trying to unify the lower and middle
classes for an attack (at the polls) on the upper. That was one in
'

■

'

'

'

'

'

stance where Dewey was a better tactician than the professionals. He

said,"In spite of the disparagin|g tone in which 'bourgeois' is
spoken, this is a bourgeois country; and an American appeal couched
in the language which the American people understand must start from
this fact.

With other socialists Dewey was a sort of friendly enemy.

He voted for Norman Thomas in 1932.

With the Marxists, however, he

had more fundamental differences.: He had been to Russia and was

among the first to advocate dipiocatic recognition. He had personally
inspected their school system andiwas impressed with their dedication

and their goals of doing so much Lith so little. Again and again he
up the Russian five year plan as examples of "scientific social
•

■

T7 ' ■

planning" which should be institUjted in the United States.

However,

he also considered it a fact thatl orthodox communists took their orders
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from Moscow rather than operating directly for the good of human kind.
This conclusion was reinforced in 1935 when New York Local No. 5 of

the American Federation of Teachers, the teachers' union which he had

helped to organize and of which he was a charter member, was brought
to a standstill by the Communist Party. Their immediate aim was

destructive.

Dewey fought back as chairman of the grievance committee

and this took much of his time away from the League. (By the time the
Conmunist Party sided with Russia in its attack on Poland and Finland
it was too late to affect further Dewey's position on either the

Depression or the New Deal.)
Second; Dewey held an opposing metaphysics or explanation

of change.

Even though he had an inclination for explaining change

dialectically he did not consider it absolutely necessary, nor even
desirable in some cases.

The preordained acceptance of violence was

especially repugnant to him.

He noted:

Insistence that the use of violent force is in

evitable 1imits the use of available intelligence, for
whereever the inevitable reigns intelligence cannot be

used. Conmi^ment to inevitability is always the fruit
of dogma....

Rather, like the consensus historians, he held that more change and

progress comes about through cooperation than through conflict and

violent revolution.

Although both Marxists and (Catholic) Thomists

consider pragmatism a philosophy of expediency, Dewey believed that
the ends are always inherent in the means, and that violent means

would always corrupt the ends. The only passage in which Dewey ever
advocated force in order to gain his ends v^as written in 1935;
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...when society through an authorized majority
has entered upOn the path of social experimentation
leading to great social change, and a minority refuses
by force to permit the method of intelligent action to

go into effect. Then force may be intelligentl^^empToyed
to subdue and disarm the recalcitrant minority.

Even then he qualified it to the point of meaninglessness.

Lastly, Dewey considered Marxism to be a religion. He
once confided to Bertrand Russell (another friendly enemy) that since

he had gotten over one religion (Hegelianism) he had no intention of
accepting another.

On this point they both agreed.

Dewey prided himself on being undogmatic.

Even so, many

Marxists considered that he and they had much in common.

They saw

Dewey as representing a progressive evolutionary step in American

thought.

For instance, Jim Cork was able to cite nine similarities

between Marx and Dewey:

1) Both find a common heritage in Hegel...Each in
his own way emancipated himself from the idealistic insights
of Hegel without sacrificing the great insights of the
German philosopher.

2) Both consider philosophy as not 'outside' this
world and above common human practices, but a very impor
tant part of the general culture of any epoch, reflecting
its comnon experiences, problems and needs.
3) The strong secular, naturalistic note in both
philosophers.

4) Both are in the materialistic tradition of
philosophic thought.

5) Both are opposed to atomism, a-priorism, sen
sationalism, Platonic essences, and the extremes of both
organism and formalism in understanding culture.

6) Both are opposed to the traditional philos
ophies of dualism (Descartes, Rant, etc.).
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7) Both are opposed to absolute truths in favor
of relative and provisional truths dependent for veri
fication Und possible further extension) upon future
inquire. ^

8) Both have a deep appreciation of the facts of
biology and accept the philosophical implications of
Darwinism,

9) Both epistemological theories are practically 21
identical.

Both stress the unity of theory and practice.

What bothered the Marxists principally was that Dewey did not adhere to
their plan for revolution, calling instead for mass education rather
than class conflict.

■V
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Yet Dewey still can be charged with dogmatism.

.

■

By the elec

tion of 1932 there was no package Of mere reform that he was willing to
accept—not even if it worked.

Beginning in 1929 his political state

ments kept getting stronger, until they reached their most radical and
uncompromising form in 1935.

It may be speculated that the "success"

of the German National Socialists had as much to do with his return to

caution as his fear of aiding domestic reactionaries—he considered

the Union Party (the Coughlin-Lemke-Smith-Towsend coalition) to be a
group of fascists.
In 1930 he blamed the private profit system for the country's
ills:

"There lies the serious and fundamental defect of our civili

zation, the source of the secondary and induced evils to which so much
op

attention is given."

■

■

•

He declared that economic causes are "fundamental."

The traditional kind of rugged and competitive individual had his place
in the pre-roachine age.; The old individualist had created the indus
trial state.

However, its time is past and we live in a "collective
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age.

As a former Hegelian himself he found it easy to accept the

Marxist substructure-superstructure explanation.

Again, he accepted

it without the encumbrance of a formal theory of dialectics:

Our material culture. . .is verging on the
collective and corporate. Our moral culture, along with
our ideology, is, on the other hand, still structured

with ideals and values of an individuali|2j derived from
the prescientific, pretechnological age.
A new individualism can be achieved only through
the controlled use of all the resources of science and

technology that have mastered the physical forces of
nature.

They are not now controlled in any fundamental
sense.

Rather they control us.

He accepted both the Marxist theory of alienation and the basic
tenant of Marxist psychology, that consciousness itself is a social pro
duct:

~

...the relationship of the economic structure

to the political operations is one that actively per

sists.

" ■.^

Indeed, it forms the only basis of present poli
tical questions. Wealth, property and the process of
manufacturing and distribution—down to retail trade

through the chain system--can hardly be socialized in
outward effect without political repercussion. It con
stitutes the ultimate issue which must be faced by new
or existing political parties.

He went on to say that"Social ism" is thought of as a bad work by the
old individualists, thus seriously handicapping any party by that name:

"But in the long run, the realities of the situation will exercise con
trol over the connotations which, for historical reasons, cling to the
■ 28"

word."

The inferehce is that socialism conforms with reality.

In terms of his own theory of pragmatism this may be criti

cized as "faith." His own theory, if consistently applied, would not
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allow him to know any aspect of reality until after it was tested in
oractice. As a praqmatist all he had a right to say was that laissez

faim capitalism had been tried and failed. Politically speaking,
Dewey was more than just a pragmatist by 1930: he was committed to a
truth which had not yet withstood the test of action, one which was not

pragmatically verified. There were other alternatives which might
have proved workable, such as the measures of controlled and regulated
capitalism offered by the New Deal. However, Dewey maintained that,
"We are in for some kind of socialism....

Economic determinism is

29

now a fact, not a thoery."

By 1931 his tone had become more vicious. The "economically pri
vileged" had become his target rather than the private profit system,
and he had begun to call them the enemy instead of the problem; "The
enemy is one, for its elements are combined to maintain economic
on

privilege in control of government."

.

.

He called Hoover's "engineering
31

mind," "...the servant of capital employed for private profit."

He charged that, "The deadlocks and impotence of Congress are definitely
the mirror of the demonstrated incapacity of the captains of industry
and finance to conduct the affairs of the country prosperously as an
32

incident to the process of feathering their own nests."

His criticism

had become more specific, directed at particular classes and individuals
rather than at the more abstract level. He charged also that the Demo

crats had accepted all the same basic assumptions as the Republicans

and had "cormiitted themselves to the policy of alliance with big business."
Thus there was no hope for basic change to come out of either party;
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their self-interest macfethem intransigent. Property interests always
came before human interests. His economic determinism also grew

stronger that ydar. He said, "Foi' it is the pressure of necessity
33

which creates and directs all political change."

_

.

Logically speaking,

he should not have blamed both the individual culprits and the system
that determined their behavior.

This trend continued until 1935 when it climaxed in his ad
. 34

vocating what amounted to censorship

and the limited sanction ot

violence (see above). His emotion and his authoritarianism grew to

gether. Dewey's "Hegelianism" showed up again that year in his state
ment that an individual's freedom is realized through acquiescence to

collective regimentation: "Regimentation of material and mechanical

forces is the only way by which the mass of individuals can be re
leased from regimentation and consequent suppression of their cultural

possibilities."^^
All the evidence points to the fact that Dewey was fully

aware of emotionalizing the issues. Consistent with pragmatism, he
remarked:

Here we come to the nub of the matter.

Intelli

gence has no power per se. In so far as the older
rationalists assumed that it had, they were wrong.

Hume

was nearer the truth. . .when he said 'reason is |gd
always must be the slave of passion' of interest.

Pragmatism itself hinges upon a modification of the behaviorist theory

of mind; thinking occurs only when unthinking or habitual behavior is

blocked, jit is a form of problem solving behavior. In 1931 Dewey stated:
Again, no movement gets far on a purely ihtellec
tual basis. It has to be emotionalized; it must appeal
to social imagination....
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I Everything points to a simple conclusion. The
only way to achieve any lasting reform is to |incl the
one great
issue on which all others converge.
gr
Dewey's on e

great unifying factor was: "Recovery of the agencies of the
^ ■

by the hational community for the service of the nation

government
He stated

' 38

"

that this was not rigid or dogmatic, but that it would pro

vide an identifiable enemy. It even provided the sense of conflict
'
■
. ■
■
'■ .
V ■ ■ .
■■
Furthermore, he could satisfy his own pragmatic

'
needed for a; movement.

theory at the same time by saying, "No commitment to dogma or fixed
doctrine is necessary. The program can be defined in terms of direct
j ,

^

■ ' 39 ■

social neeids and can develop as these change."

^

In the next breath

he advocated nationalization of the power companies and regulation of
the stock market. .

Of course there is a contradiction between the dogma of

socialism itself and the pragmatic dogma of having no dogma, but

former Hegislians have only rarely been stopped by contradictions. The
actual too]! of transfer that Dewey did propose was taxation:
-

, . i

■

■ ■,

■

■

■

■

■

■

jSince private Control of national resources of
the lahd with its mines, mineral deposits, water power,-_
oil, [and] natural gas, is the stronghold of mon'opolistic

privilege, it must be attacked at its fortress. ...taxation
of lanid values, which are due to the requirements of society,
is thel-only adequate^method. They must. . .pass into the
hands pf the public.

In 1931 wh^n this was written he still could be called a "Fabian" or

evolutionaiy socialist, even though a hurried one. Within another two
years he w^s calling for a constitutional amendment that would outlaw
all absentee ownership.

Dewey was not embittered because Roosevelt Won in 1932. He
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expected ijt. However, he was discouraged by the fact that not even

The New Relpublic took his third party movement seriously. A few years
later the League died of neglect.

Dewey was committed to socialism, and nothing that Roosevelt
could have done short of nationalizing the economy v^ould have pleased

him.

Unlike a good pragmatist, his mind was already made up ahead of

time.

He lad predicted that anything good which either of the old

parties did while in office would be undone if the emergency ended.

So, ironically, his estimation of Roosevelt agreed with that of the

conservatTie, Peter Viereck: both considered Roosevelt to be a crypto
conservatile, a harmonizer of the old system while talking as if he
represented the new.

Whereas Viereck approved, Dewey wrote:

The gigantic Roosevelt experiment of 'relief,
reform and recovery' showed a definitely new bias, to
a controlled and humanized capitalism as contrasted to
the brutality of laissez-faire.

But the necessary con

clusiorii seems to be that npvsuch compromise with a de
caying system is possible.

He said,"And now in its second summer, the Roosevelt experiment is

being generally admitted a failure."

As totalitarian'elements gained

both at home and abroad many liberals began to swing back to Roosevelt,

yet Dewey never found much that was good in the New Deal. He wanted

strong govelrnment and "social Control" but could say almost nothing
positive about how it should work, except to the point to the Russian
five year plans.

After 1935 he began to mellow. When asked a month before
the 1936 election how he intended to vote he replied:
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I intend to vote for Norman Thomas as President.

It was a disappointment that no genuine mass third party

was organized, especially in view of the fact that the socalled Union Party is a union of inflationists and semifascist elements.

I realize that fear of reactionary

Republicanism will lead many to vote for Roosevelt who ^
have no faith in the Democratic Party; but I do not believe
that the actual difference between the policies of the old

parties will be great, whoever is elected. I think the
Republican Party is conducting a campaign under false pre
tenses.

After that time the rise of totalitarianism abroad reached

alarming proportions. Dewey always referred to himself as a "social
democrat" and believed wholeheartedly in democracy.
never did

However, he

manage to answer the question of what there is in pragmatic

Social cor trol

that ensures that it will be used for good purposes,

As we will

see in the next chapter, Benlto Mussolini and Georges

Sorel both

cited James's pragmatism as thdir basic inspiration.. How,

for\ instar ce,

is a dialectic of ideas possible when the government owns

the pressl

It may be speculated that Dewey's total commitment to

socialism reflected his Hegelian background and his deep seated optimism.

For Hegel, Marx and Dewey, man's freedom was to be in harmony with his
role in a strong state; a state which was responsive to the reasonable

general will of Its people. However, it can be shown that"Dewey's
actions were in perfect harmony with James's pragmatism. The pragmatist
is free tc

hold any belief or myth that gives him comfort. As mentioned

below, there was no national experience to demonstrate that socialism
"worked-," only evidence that no system in the world at that time was

1iving up to its expectations.

Yet, believing that socialism would

improve things might make a difference.
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After the 1936 election Dewey went back to writing on logic

and education.

Then he went off to Mexico to defend Leon Trotsky.

When

asked in lj940 how he would vote he responded: "Shall vote for Norman
Thomas.

„44

See no permanent hope from either of the old parties.

that time ihe was eighty-one. In 1944 he voted for Roosevelt and in
i . ■
^
,
■ ■
1948 cast his last ballot for Truman.

At

CHAPTER 6

FURTHER INFLUENCES OF PRAGMATISM

The continuing influences of pragmatism may be subdivided
into four areas:

first, James's Varieties of Religious Experience

is often cited as the first work in the phenomenology of religion.

It

may have presaged a trend in nominalistic phenomenology.
Second; the effects of James's Wi11 to Believe is still

strong in religion, where it was first used.

Moreover, it has had a

stronger effect on politics outside the United States than on religion.

Third; the psychology upon which pragmatism is based holds

sway throughout the social sciences.

It may be Understood as the appli

cation of Darwinism to the study of the; human species.

Fourth; a whole generation of Americans have had their educa
tions shaped by the philosophy ascribed to by John Dewey.

Indeed,

Dewey's feme rests upon his reputation as the foremost American educa
tor, rather than as a stateman or a logician.

No work of this length can fully explore any of these four
areas.

However, the following may help make some of the issues clear

and suggest further areas of research.

I will begin with the emerging

movement of a nominalistic phenomenology.

James M. Edie sees William James's phenomenological, or

descriptive, study of religion as not only preceding the continentaT

phenomenologists, but as still having something to teach them about
"the phenomenology of reTigious experience:
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James's methocloTogical contributions to the

study of religious experience are not only more sound
phenomenologically than some of the studies which have,
under the influence of Husserl, up to now explicitly

invoked a phenomenological method, but they are also

the filrst to establish any solid ba^is for a true phe
nomenology of religious experience.
Edie even goes to the extent of asserting that,

.the founders and

'fathers' of the phenoraenological movement in Europe have given us
2

nothing in the way of a phenomenology of religious experience."

' ■'

As

Edie sees it, these founders are Husserl, Marleau-Ponty, Gabriel Marcel
and even Sartre.

He argues that a truly phenomenological study of

religion would eschew the current study of the history and sociology

of religion. The history, sociology and anthropology of religion are
studies of its manifestations, not the essential thing in itself.

He

states thit an examinatioh of the phenomena of human consciousness will

lead back to the actual foundations of religion.

"This is the orienta

tion of William James in his Varieties of Religious Experience, and this

is what distinguishes him from other phenomenologists and philosophers

of religion."

He even claims that James was more Husserlian than the

school which bears the name and says, "I am. . .claiming that William

James was|the first to attempt a phenomenology of religious experience
in an experimental sense, and I would point out that he has had almost
no successor. . .up to the present time."
What Edie fails to notice is the one thing that makes James's

"phenomenology" unique: the fact that it stresses variety and subjectiv
ity; in short, its plural ism. This is an essential aspect Of James's

pragmatism and may be the explanation as to v/hy he has not influenced
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continental phenomenology. The continental phenomenologists are
committed to a search for objective essential structures which are the

same for all persons. They are Realists.

Hence, this serves to ex

plain why James did not have a major effect in this area.

What effect

there has been is evidenced by the fact that people such as Edie are

stiIT calling for a nominalistic phenomenology.
On the other hand, the effects of James's Will to Believe

are numerous and far reaching.

The most obvious of these effects is in

religion. Some philosophers, but especially theologians, are still
willing to say that the "leap of faith" is both necessary and justified.

Paul Van Buren, for example, begins with a purely nominalistic approach:
I point out that as a theologian, not a philosopher,
T see the problem of contemporary philosophy from a certain
angle and in connection with particular problems. Whatever
limitations this particular approach may have, it is part
of what I wish to argue on James's behalf that its particu
larity is not only no disqualification, but simply the
only way to procied, frankly accepting one position in the
context of many.

i

He agrees that there are places where people are simply forced to hold
a belief one way or another without adequate evidence--such as whether

or notlife is worth living.
ence and actually tend ^t

Such beliefs as these do make a differ

bring about their own truth; for instance,

lifesreaily becomes worth living.

Then Van Buren points out that,

"...Jlraes focused on two sorts of questions, the moral and the religious..."
and the important fact of the matter is that, "Neither logical demon
stration nor empirical verification will be able to settle these
questians."

The frame of reference for the existence of a proof is
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missing. "In an important and unavoidable way, facts are man-made."^
As will be seen later, this religious nominalism will lead Van Buren
to advocate an affiliation between James and Wittgenstein.
Predictably, The Will to Believe had as much effect, if not

more, on European political theory than it did in religion. H. S.
Thayer credits the French philosopher, Georges Sorel, with being a
' O■

variety of pragmatiSt.

(This is quite a concession on Thayer's part,

since he is a consistent defender of pragmatism and is especially fond

of James.) Sorel reflects the Bergsonian anti-intellectual sort of
pragmatism that stems directly from The Will to Believe.

Believing

in certain myths--particularly the myth of the general strike--will
not only justify violent actions, but even bring them about.

For

Sorel, like James, there is a sense in which believing makes it so.

Thayer says, "There are clearly certain broad similarities
between Sorel's view of the function of the myth for social groups and

James' argument in The Will to Believe concerning the benefits of
n,

belief to certain individuals."

■

.

■

The difference in application was

thati whereas James saw that belief might comfort and motivate indi
viduals, Sorel saw that they might solidify and motivate whole masses..

Since his time it has been recognized that ;almost all mass movements

require an ideology, no matter how strange or absurd it might be.
It is "pragmatic" when one makes use of the principle that the Chicago

sociologist, W. I. Thomas, discovered while researching The Polish
Peasjant in Europe and America: "That which is believed to be real is
realMn its consequences."

What James had not done, and what he was
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criticized bitterly for, was to overlook the important distinction
betwjeen ontologic reality and consequential reality.
According to Thayer, "It was in 1921, in De 1 'utili§ du
Praqmatisme, that Sorel stated his partial acceptance of James's

pragmatism and argued for its 'usefulness' as a means of settling

controversies."^^ James had written The Will in the context of the
battle between established religion and evolutionary naturalism.

What

Sofek did not lite about James was his Protestantism, but, like others,
it was something that he could dispense with without changing the method
ology that was the core of pragmatism.

Both James and Sorel had a great influence in Italy.

Thayer

quotes a revealing passage from an interviev; with Mussolini in the

London Sunday Times of April 11, 1926:
I

The pragmatism of William James was of great use

to me in my political career. James taught me that
action should be judged rather by its results than by
its doctrinary basis. I learnt of James that faith in

action, that ardent will to live and figh^-j to which
Fascism owes a great part of its success.

" ■ I

. ■

■ ■

.

"\

Benito Mussolini had even been a member of a group that called itself
12

"The

Pragmatic Club."

Praqmatismo can be traced directly to James.

Its foremost

native spokesman was Angel0 Papini (1881-1956), who met James in Rome

in l!505i He already had a very high regard for James and afte|r the
meeting came almost to idolize him. They continued to exchange letters,
with James forming a very high opinion of Papini, almost to the point of

seeiijig bis own reflection in him. According to Thayer, "James had. . .
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begun to think Of pragmatism as a philosophy, a program, a world-wide

intellectual movement of which he was the founder; and after meeting
13

the

Italians, he was suddenly conscious of being the leader."

He

wrote articles on Papini and Pragmatismo.

even

It was not long until the Italian pragmatists came under
attack from two directions.

The first was the Catholic Church which

saw I pragmatismo as a form of Modernism--a way of thinking which it
pronounced heretical. The second came from the Italian academic phil

osophers, such as Benedetto Croce. After James died, the two major

Italian pragmatists, Vailati and Calderoni, died in 1907 and 1914,

resp|ctively, and Papini converted to Christian mysticism. Italian
pragmatism flourished for only ten years and died in the disillusion

ment of the Great War.

However, that high point coincided with the

formative years of II Puce.

Papini said, "From induction by Will to

Believe, there is given a single aim: aspiration to be able to act

(Wilje zur Macht).
1

■ ■

■■

■ ■■■ ■ '■ .

With the help of other European influences the
.

■ ■■

■

■

■ . '■■ ■ ■

■ ■■

"will to believe" became the transition to the "will to power."
The most pronounced and continuing effect of pragmatism

outside the United States was in England.

James's pragmatism reached

England first and, according to Thayer,

^

The most famous pragmatist outside the United

tates was Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller (1864-1937).
t the height of his influence early in the present
entury, Schiller was regarded the equal of James as

Ijeading spokesman for pragmatism. On the continent,
far more attention was directed to the works of James

and Schiller than to any of the other pragmatists.
However,

unlike James, by mid-century his name had vanished so completely
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that people mistook his name for that of the German poet.
Schiller was quite influenced by James and, according to

Thayer, "He attempted to persuade James to drop the name pragmatism in
favoif of humanism.

For humanism, Schiller contended, represented the

■

16

broader movement into which pragmatism fitted as a part."

That may

have been the best insight of his career, except that he failed to
notice that Fascism was also a part of that movement.

Still, one

might argue that the popularity of Fascism was, in part, due to the

factIthat it posed as a brand of humanism.

^

Like his friend James, Schiller was a good writer and the

creation that he most admired was The Will to Believe.

James tried

to direct his attention to Dewey and the Chicago School, but Schiller

was not interested in their social philosophy.

Like James, he was a

romantic individualist.

Schiller was a Fellow of Corpus Christi College, Oxford,

wherd he did most of his writing; the Idealist, F. H. Bradley being
for nim what Royce was for James,

He came to America

in 1893 in

order to get a Ph.D. at Cornell, but failed in the attempt and went
back to Oxford.

Then in the last ten years of his life he taught at

the Lniversity of Southern California, thayer speculates that it was
Schi 1 ler's

intense antagonism to Bradley that resulted in his being

forced to leave Oxford.

G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell first rose

to fame in England for attacking the Hegelians. The difference was
that their attack was more analytic than rhetorical.

they began to turn that attack on the pragmatists.

Starting in 1908
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Two British philosophers of roore contemporary significance
are

% P. Ramsey and Ludwig Wittgenstein, It is a fact that the works

of b 3th

James and Dewey were known in England well before World War I

losophical books and journals were published in the U.S. and
Britain simultaneously and people such as Schi11er had openly acknowl

edged their indebtedness to pragmatism. The mathematical and logical
..

work

.
.
, . .
of- Peirce
was acknowledged
by Russell, ............
Schroder, and Keynes.17

Peir :e
were

carried on correspondence with other British philosophers who

interested in the problem of meaning.

"Rus sel1's

According to Thayer,

frequent references to Peirce and his recognition of Peirce's

irapo rtant contribution to the algebra of logic are evident in the
Pri n

ciples."^^

j

F, P. Ramsey (1903-1930) was a Cambridge philosopher and
mathematician. He was a friend of Wittgenstein and his first published
work was an outstanding review of Wittgenstein's first work, the

Trajtatus. Ramsey's review and the fractatus both came out in 1922,
and Ramsey made explicit use of Peirce's logical distinctions in his
criticism.

In the last three years of his short life Ramsey was to

cite! Peirce again and again. Peirce, but not James, could be cited

to cjriticize the norainalists.
For instance, one of the greatest problems in the philos

ophy of mathematics and epistemology is the justification of the method
of induction.

Ramsey found Peirce's ideas to be the best solution

here: true thebries work because__of their inherent truth. Thus it is
''reasonable."

It should be noted, however, that the more rigorous
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BertrandRusselT continued to refer to this as one of the skeletons in

the closet of philosophy, Thayer says, "The pragmatism of Ramsey is
clear.

It is derived mostly from Peirce, but perhaps also from James's

disci|ssion of the connection between belief and ways of acting.
■'

1

It was
19 ■

Wittgenstein, however, who took considerable interest in James."

'

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), a Fellow of Trinity College,

is certainly among the most famous philosophers of the century. Thayer
holds that the influence of Ramsey, shown by Wittgenstein's repudiation

of tpe Tractatus and his last work. The Philosophical Investigations,
"...h rings

the philosophy of Wittgenstein into very basic harmony with
20

pragiT atism."
First,
ture

He finds three reasons for this in the Investigations.

he changed from the notion of formal objective language struc

to the notion that the usage and context determine what is correct.

Seconp, instead of an attempt to "picture" or correspond to the objec
tive world, the meaning and usage of language is a behavioral phenomenon,

subject to cultural relativity.

Third, his theory of language as re

gardsiprivate states of mind (e.g., "love,""fear,""pain," "pleasure")

may bi described as a sort of verbal behaviorism. (Thayer never
actually uses the term "behaviorism," but, for reasons which shall
folio(V,

he could just as well have.)

Thayer noted,"The resulting inquiries in the Investiga
tions,

in both their critical and positive conclusions, are very much

in accord (sometimes coinciding remarkably) with the outlook of Dewey
2^

and Mead."

Wittgenstein had come all the way from an affinity with

Peirce to a radical linguistic nominalism. Thayer notes that.

m

"...Wittgenstein often referred to James in his lectures, and for a time
James's Psychology was the one book that he kept in his sparsely fur
22

nished room."

As noted earlier. Van Buren sees a connection between James

and Wittgenstein. He speculates that there is a similarity of basic
'■style'' between James and contemporary ordinary language philosophi
■ ■ pO"'

zing.

Speaking directly of James he wrote, "His pragmatism was a

rough anticipation of the use theory of words: find the cash value of
.
. ■ ■; . ■ ■ ■ ■
■ ■■
■ ■ ■ : ■ . ■ ■■ ■ ■' ■ 1 ■ •■ ■
a word, see how the word is used, its 'particular go,' and a problem

can be dissolved, James argued."

OA

Although Van Buren does not make

this explicit, his use of the word"dissolve" here is to remind the
reader of Wittgenstein's constant use of the term "evaporate."
These are, in fact, used to express the same theme:

clear up the se

mantic problems, and the philosophical ones will disappear.
It is interesting to note the radical Wittgensteinian ex
tent to which Van Buren, the theologian, can take linguistic philosophy.

"The question about the world is always the question of what we say
about the world, but how we are to speak, and it is solely of our

speaking that the question of truth is in order."

25

.

"Life and language

are one, for James as for Wittgenstein, and to speak of life is to take
•

a Step into life's future, following the leading of our language."

26

("Consciousness" would have been a better word for Van Buren to use than
"life.")

He suggests that theology could profit by seeing its problems

as just so many sides of the same coin--one created by language and, at
the same time, overcome by a pragmatic qonception of language.
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It is often speculated that pragmatism never died; it just
changed names variously in order to avoid being associated with all the

criticism directed at William James.

James's pragmatism, especially

his "cash value" notion of truth and "believing makes it so" view of

reality, became a focal point for critics.

Philosophers who are sympa

thetic to James, such as H. S. Thayer, refer to this misfortune as "the
27

inheritance of uncompleted theory."

The implication is that James

bore the brunt; of the assault, while it was for others, such as Dewey,
Mead, and Lewis to firm up the theories which he had only put forth in
rough

form.

Dewey saw the pre-Darwinian view of life as teleological:

unlike

the random changes of the elements, living things went through dis
tinct cycles which culminated in an example of a particular kind, and
which gave birth to a new orderly cycle of life.

There were distinct

natures and proper ends for all life, with individuals more or less

fulfilling those natures and ends. The important thing was that these

goals are independent of the individuals, functioning as something
constant and objective by which they can be judged.

What Dewey spoke

against is a classical realist view.

The design argument thus operated in two direc
tions. Purposefulness accounted for the intelligibility
of nature and the possibility of science, while the ab
solute or cosmic character of this purposefulness gave
sanction and worth to the moral and religious endeavors

of man. Science was underpinnedpind morals authorized
by one in the same principle....

But, "The Darwinian principle of natural selection cut straight under
29

this philosophy."

After Darwin the philosopher has a different task:
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"Philosophy forswears inquiry after absolute origins and absolute final

ities in order to explore specific values and specific conditions that
generate them."
Interest shifts from the wholesale essence back

of special changes to the question of how special changes
serve and defeat concrete purposes; ...shifts from the
ultimate goal of good to the direct increments of justice

and happiness; that intelligent administration of existent
conditions may beget....

For Deweyi "The influence of Darwin upon philosophy re

sides in his having conquered the phenomena of life for the principle
of transition, and thereby freed the new logic for application to
32

mind and morals and life."

Speaking of the old philosophical

problems, he sees that something unexpected happens when they are
approached from the standpoint of an altogether new method.

not solve them:

we get over them.

"We do

Old questions are solved by dis

appearing, evaporating, while new questions take their place, u33
could make a lengthy comparison at this point with Wittgenstein, who

"solved" all the problems of philosophy by "dissolving" them with his
method.)

;
The preceedihg direct quotes have all come from Dewey's

essay The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy.

This influence has

been apparent to virtually everyone who has made a study of full-

fledged pragmatism.

Merle Curti found that Dewey's switch from a

divine to an evolutionary theory of mind actualTy increased his

optimism.

For the vast majority of pragmatists (excluding Thorstein

Veblen) the notion of evolution implied that things were always
getting better--it almost sounds like a contradiction to say that
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anything might evolve or progress for the worse.
Curti»

According to Merl

.Dewey has laid stress on the potentiality of remaking for

the better both man and society through the planned application of the
experimental method

34

"

The old problems had been persistent, "But

once the full implications of evolution were grasped, all ideas and
values were to be thought of in terms of origin and process; then it
35.

became natural to view life itself as an experiment.

"

In some respects Dewey stems from the eighteenth
'eentury philosophers of the Enlightehment; like some of
them he conceives of human nature as plastic in charac
ter and capable of improvement through improved social
environment. What distinguishes him is his emjDhasis

upon education, the community (as opposed to thOoindi
vidual) and the new nineteenth century sciences.
The progressive education movement reflected
more, indeed, than the application of pragmatism and
instrumental ism to education.

It reflected the im

pact of the doctrine of evolution itself. 

The implications for today's philosophies of mind, language
and logic are equally revolutionary, and serve to make the transition
to the instrumentalist program of education more comprehensible.
In 1973 T. A. Goudqe wrote an article titled. Pragmatism's
Contribution to an Evolutionary View of Mind.

The pragmatists were the first group of philos
ophers to work out in detail a philosophy of mind based
on evolutionary principles. Moreover, since they were
familiar with classical ideas in the field, they were
able to assess the kinds of changes in these ideas which

evolutionary principles required.

He agrees that the adaptive use of language is especially important to
the formation of the human mind.

social product.

From this it is clear that mind is a

Dewey asked the rhetorical question, "Would we have
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any IntellectuaT operations without the language which is a social pro

duct?"^^ In 1931 he stated;
The psychological tendencTes which have exerted
an influence on instrumentalism are of a biological rather
than a psychological nature.. They are, more or less,

closely reTated to the important movement whose promoter
in psychology has been Doctor John Watson and to which he
has given the name Behaviorism.

Although Dewey and Mead were personal friends of Watson at
Chicago, Dewey cotild never wholly accept the classical conditioning of
Pavlov and Watson.

In 1896 in a paper titled The Ref1 ex Arc Concept of

Psychology he showed that the atomistic approach to stimulus and response

did not allow for lapses of tiine between the two, nor did it leave much
room for the individual to work actively to transform his society.

The

Pavlovian-Watsonian organism is a passive creature, merely reacting
upon its environment.

Thayer says that this paper

...was an important event in the history of
Anerican psychology.... This was a biological and

evolutional psychology.

Functional psychology took

as its basic data not alleged psychic events, but
behavioral processes in biologicaT and social con
texts. The Chicago group gave birth to what was to
be known as "social behaviorism."

Dewey was significant in that he changed the behavioristic model from
an atomistic one to one of a much more organic nature.

The contextual

nature meant that the organism itself was a part of the environment
that it was responding to.

It is a very clever device for saying

that human beings can manipulate their environment, even though they
are not really free.

The most mature and refined philosophy of mind stemming
directly from the above is the operant conditioning of B. F. Skinner.
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Skinner says that, "Without the help of a verbal community all behavior
'■ 42' ■ ■

would be unconscious.

Consciousness is a social product."

"We

learn to see that we are seeing only because a verbal -community arranges
for us to do so."

"The heart of the behavionst position on conscious

experience may be summed up in this way: seeing does not imply some
' 44■

thing seen."

, '

■

What this social concept of language, thought and conscious
ness does to formal logic hardly needs explaining.

Morton White notes

that "Dewey, Holmes, and Veblen were the leaders of the campaign to
mop up the remnants of formal logic, classical economics, and juris
■ 45' ■' ■

prudence in America."

By 1897 the outline of what I have called 'the
Itberal ideology' had been drawn. It was antiformalist,
evolutionary, historically oriented; it was deeply con

cerned with the economic aspects of society. ...Pragma
tism was already a national password.

White combined Dewey, Veblen, Holmes, Robinson and Beard as one group.

In spite of all his classical training and scholarship. Holmes was

identified as a pragmatist because of his statement in the Lochner

dissent that the life of the law was not one of logic.

The outgrowth

of this social philosophy of mind was the modern notion that one's
environment--not the person himself--is responsible for his actions;

and the way to make better persons is to meke better, healthier, en
vironments.

Darnell Rucker wrote:

The Chicago group represented an important shift
in thinking away from belief in a world as a given ex
ternal reality and mind as a different, internal reality.

Mind, thought, and consciousness are explained as
products of active processes involving a number of agents.
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There is no isolated individual who must be somehow ex
ternally connected with other individuals to form a

society. The very process which gives rise to human
beings is a social one: hence agents are essentially
social beings.

The Chicago Philosophy derived largely from de
velopments in psychology, just at the time that psychol
ogy was beginning in earnest to separate itself in the
academic world from philosophy. If psychology was initially
subordinated to philosophy departmentally at Chicago, the
tail may have been said to have wagged the dog.

He goes on to point directly "the dependence of philosophy upon psychol
ogy." It bears repeating that the pragmatism of James began as an out
growth of his psychology.

The most important consequences of the evolutionary, nomin

al istic, pragmatic philosophy may be in education. Thayer clarifies
Dewey's puzzling statement that the educational process "has no end

beyond itself." This becomes clear in the light of his assumption that
AO

"growth itself is the Only moral 'end'."

"He also meant that the edu

cational process is not subordinate to any other, nor a means to any
thing else, to any process or social institution; just as life has no
■ ' ■ .49

end but itself."

The underlying theory of evolution is evident.

According to John ChiIds,

It is doubtful;..whether any thinker has contributed
. as much as Dewey to the development of a theory of human
behavior and mind which is consonant with the principle

that man is an emergent within a natural evolutionary
process, and which undertakes to account for his rational

powers wjthout any resort to any kind of transcendental
; forces. ■ ,

The philosopher-educator most in line with Dewey is Sidney
Hook. He sees Dewey's criterion of growth as the aim of education as

essentiai to democracy. "Education for growth, then, goes hand in hand
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with education for democracy and a justification of one is tantamount
51' '

to a justification of the other."

■

U|ltimately he sees the consequences

of democracy—and, thus, education for democracy--as being better than
all the other alternatives.

His justification is "pragmatic" in the

sense that it is based on consequences, rather than principles.

When

comparing democracy to other forms of social organization, he says:
...we can point to consequences of the following
type: it makes for greater tranquility, justice, freedom
security, creative diversity, reasonableness, and less
cruelty, insensitiveness and intellectual intolerance
than any otheK social system than has so far been devised
or proposed.

Apparently he has too much optimism to consider the possibility Of a
"tyranny of the majority," or not enough idealism to reflect that there
may be some principles which should not be subjected to the vote.

However, Hook brings his own ideals to bear very effectively
53

on the Thomists, Adler and Hutchins.

He does so by showing that

their position denies the possibility of change or evolution in human
nature.

Education can be uniform only if human nature is something

real and uniform--something objective and unchanging.

This boils down

to either an abstract rationality or a spirit as what is meant by
"human nature." So, he throws the burden of proof back to,the Thomists
to convince him and everyone else that this is the case.

Using them

as a model or paradigm case, he also brushes aside all other "meta
physical" views of human nature and their claims upon education.

Yet,

he does recognize the objectivity of the "science" which he accepts:
"A teacher is not disloyal who teaches the theory of evolution in a
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fundamentalist community."

He never squares this with his definition

of a good education: "We may define a good education as one that plays
55

a certain integrative role within its culture...."
he never examines his own metaphysical assumptions:

The fact is that
change means

evolution, evolution means progress, and progress is good.
J. L. Childs examines three representative, but divergent,

avowed pragmatists in education:

Kilpatrick, Counts, and Bode.

William

H. Kilpatrick stresses the role of education in building character.

Childs cites his group as the most influential group in the new educa
56

tion movement,

and goes on to cite Dewey's admiration of him. The

one thing that he detested most about his own formal education was
57

that it was book-centered.

This tends to cut students off from the

totality of life and turns many of them away from school.
For Kilpatrick, education is conceived not pri
marily as preparation for a remote and vague future, but
rather as vital and meaningful response to the demands
of the present. Education, as he interprets it, is not
a process of memorization. . .from the Standpoint of the
development of the child, the fatal weakness of bookcentered education is that^the essential character buil

ding is absent, namely, behaving in a 1ife situation.'
The crucial test of learning is not the ability of the
child to recite what he has studied, it is rather the

ability of the child to respond to actual 1ife circum

stances with enriched meaning and added power of control.
(Emphasis Childs).
>
"Thus in the educational theory of Kilpatrick the evolutionary theory

of human behavior, the method of experimental science, and the ethic of
democracy have been combined to emphasize the wholehearted purposeful
59

,

act in the education of the young."

Kilpatrick's "law" of learning

is reminiscent of Watson and Skinner:

"We learn what we live....

learn our responses, only our responses, and all our responses.

We
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George S. Counts viewed the edueational process as an in
duction into society.

Like kilpatrick, he "adopted the orientation

of evolutional naturalism," and took "a functionalist view of man

and culture...."

Unlike Dewey and Kilpatrick, Counts was concerned
62

with the need of pupils to acquire basic skills.

This is a critical

part of their introduction, one which underlies the ability to do
"meaningful" things well.

He saw that without rigor and mastery of

specific basic skills little can be accomplished.
His goals were the same as Dewey's, so he was also against
the traditional method of rote learning.

He saw Dewey's new education

as having carried a healthy reaction to an extreme and consequently

argued for the need for both meaning and ability. Yet, he found the
new education preferable to the old system.
63

Counts found three major faults in the new education:

first, it overemphasized the idea of the child's freedom at the expense

of what is "imposed" on them by adults. Second, he disagreed with the

notion that modern science and technology has Speeded up social evolu
tion to the point where there is no dependable means of knowing what
particular things children should learn for tomorrow's world. The
third factor is the new education's failure to confront and clarify

the conflicting social theories of the society of which it is a part.
Its own ends were too vague to ensure that they did not become corrupt
or perverted.

As a result of his firsthand study of European and Asian
educational systems, Counts found American faith in the necessary
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connection between education and enlightenment to be naive.

He ob

served that some of the most authoritarian states spend vast sums on

education, and concluded that the purpose of education will eventually
be decided by external forces, not educators.

Because of his work in history, sociology, anthropology and
education. Counts ultimately stressed the close connection of educa
tion to society^

"In his opinion, the distinctive hole of the school

is to give the young the vision, the knowledge, and the methods and
techniques of thought that will enable them to carry the responsi
■ 65

bilities that Americans must carry in this period."

was certainly a pragmatist.

■

'

In this, he

His respect for foundations, wide back

ground and a heal thy dose of cynicism place him among the most pro

mising of the philosophers of the new education.
Another pragmatic educator, BoydH. Bode, was chairman of
the Department of Principles of Education at Ohio State University.

He saw the process of education as a reconstruction of experience.

He is a pragmatist in that his major concern was with what he saw as

a traditional dichotomy between theory and practice.

Also, he did

not reject the stimulus-response notion of behaviorism altogether,
just the early atomistic version that the pragmatists had already re

jected.

Rather, he sought an explanation of mind and learning which

would leave a place for meaning and purpose.

Thus, he gave much time,

to refuting the strictly "behavioral" methods of learning.

"We do

not educate for a majority and freedom when we turn our pupils into
docile subjects and subject them to an authoritarian program whose
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life significance they do not grasp."

68

Bode had three criticisms of the new pragmatic education:

first, there was an over-emphasis on the child's "felt needs." This
stresses the subjectivity of the child at the expense of the objec

tive needs and requirements of his. culture. Second, he saw that "in

cidental learning" will never cover all aspects of life, and held that
learning itself can be meaningful.

This is a position half way be

tween Kilpatrick and Counts on the subject of rigor and discipline.
Third, he believed that the new education's emphasis on growth had
over-extended the notions of freedom and democracy at the expense of
"social orientation."

Our task as educators in not to spoil children

by indulging them, but to evoke their deeper interests
by showing them the way in which the various activities

of the school are significantly related to preparing gg
them for effectual sharing in the common way of life.
Like Counts, he feels that specific subject matter has an important place.

However, like all pragmatists, he also feels that whatever objectivity it
may have is merely a social matter.
ChiIds notes:

A. . .factor which led the pragmatists to stress
the role of the child in the life of the school is their

evolutionary view of behavior as a process of never-ending
adjustment to surroundings. They stress that it is
through these adjustive acts that habits are developed
and attitudes are formed.

Since we learn as we do and

undergo and consciously relate what is done with what
is undergone, habits and attitudes cannot be bestowed
upon a child no matter how resourceful the teacher.
, They must rather be learned and earned through his own
purposeful activity.

123

The picture Childs has just given is one of a pupil in an
enormous Skinner-box, in the "process of never-ending adjustment to

surroundings." When he is "hungry" for some education he will do just
enough "adjusting" to slake his hunger. This, in fact, is all that
can be meant by "purposeful activity."

Actually, the assumption of neurological homostasis which

underlies the pragmatic (problem solving) theory of thinking and

learning has long since been discredited. (This assumption prevented
Dewey from accepting an intrinsic theory of aesthetics.) However,
there are more general criticisms of Dewey's pragmatism, and they take
both analytic and personal tones.

As a former pragmatist

herself, Asher Moore criticizes

the pragmatic movement in such a personal manner as to be poetic.
finds two major objections;

She

first, it failed to be objective and;

second, it over-emphasized the future to the point where it could not
cope with either the past or the present—and the future never arrived.
The youthful boisterousness which made pragma
tism unable to learn from history made it also impatient
of the slowness, the technicality, the abstractness, and
the chilly dryness which are the scientific reality. It
tried to be tough-minded, but for lack of being singleminded, it lacked self-definition.

In one more attempt to get students of the human
ities to swallow at least a token bit of scientific

medicine, an American university recently offered a course
called "Physics for Poets." I fear that pragmatism was
Scientific Philosophy for Poets.

This criticism is that pragmatism did not fall into either
of what she sees as the two major modern philosophical paths:

the
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"scientific" (analytic and positivistic) and "humanistic" (which is more
honorific in the sense of the word "philosopher", such as Kiekegaard,

Nietzsche, Santayana and Buber).

One could take this scheme of hers

and do something which she only hinted at: it is possible to say
that there were simply no great "humanists" after James and Dewey
who were willing to call themselves pragmatists.

However, Moore

just can not bring herself to put either of them on a level with a
Santayana or a Buber.

Perhaps this is because they were not "wise" enough to

live in the present:

her second objection.

Even in fragments this

comes across best in her own words.

...Pragmatism was not monstrous, and it did not
deny intrinsic value. But what it emphasized was the
good which is to be found not in the whole, but in the
future, and not through philosophy, which teaches us to
love what is, but through science and action, which change
it. As Nietzsche said, the present is a tightrope to the
future, but whereas Nietzsche saw that the present is al
ways present, so that whatever truth and happiness there
is must be found on the rope, pragmatism looked forward
to the actual coming of a better future.. The other

pasture, it thought, actually could be made greener.

Its

Good News was not of a Savior but of the Promised Land.

The Promised Land was a mirage which vanished in
the concentration camps and undergrounds of Hitler's
Europe.

It had failed her as a science and it had failed her as a vehicle of

wisdom to live by. She attributed it to ybuth--both hers and that of
the new sciences.

There was another way that Dewey lost popularity with the
intellectuals:

this was when he showed that his pragmatism could be
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used to justify U. S. entry into World War I.
war, R. Bourne,

One vocal critic of the

..thought of pragmatism as a philosophy of technique,

a philosophy which tells you how to accomplish your ends once your ends
73

have been established."

Bourne was a liberal, and the first on the

left to openly attack pragmatism.

Whate sayS:

Bourne's outlook and attitude toward Dewey's prag

matism impressed itself on the literary left in the
twenties, when Dewey was viewed as safe and professional.
Bourne's attack on Dewey in 1917 was based upon dis
appointment. Dewey had served as a symbol of intelligent
humanitarianism, of a desire to mold society in the

interests of peace, economic security, and freedom. His
Support of the war, therefore, came as a shock to those
who saw it as a direct contradiction of all these values.

'

Dewey ceased to be the gentle, sage spokesman of creative
liberalism in certain quarters. Like the German Social
Democrats, he was described as the philosophical represen

tative of a selling-out movement, a failure^to face the
crisis which the war presented to liberals.

From that time on, pragmatism was open to the charge of being
a philosophy of technique by both liberals and conservatives.

Marxists

were justified in making the same basic criticisms as the Thomists:
change alone does not equate with evolution, progress or goodness.

This was not helped any by the fact in his early writings Thorstein
Veblen always associated being "pragmatic" with "business" and expediency

(as opposed to "industry").

World War II helped to confirm Bourne's

criticisms.

A third major difficulty with Dewey's pragmatism stemmed
from its foundation in the theory of evolution.

The lack of concrete

subject matter in education was but a small scale reflection of the
fact that it was incapable of concrete programs anywhere.
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Liberalism faced the danger of trying to be coherent without
forming a set of doctrines which would someday become reactionary.
According to Morton White, "Liberalism as Dewey defines it, in an effort
to escape this dilenima, is hardly more than a proposal that we apply
■
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the so-called scientific method of intelligence to social problems."

For White, "This Tack of clarity obscured a good deal of Dewey's polit
7fi

ical thinking in the twenties."

Dewey was bound in a contradiction.

He was afraid of setting up concrete theories or ends which might end
up as unalterable dogma.

Yet he wanted to be a social engineer.

Thus

he was bound--by his dual convictions—to be ineffective at either: As
White says, "...we cannot be engineers without knowing what to build.

"The ambiguity of Dewey about the possibility of setting up^a social
program without lapsing into dogmatism was one of the chief reasons for
78

the defections from liberalism in the thirties."

Finally, there was the criticism of the analytic philos
ophers led, of course, by Bertrand Russell.

Dewey preferred to use

.viords such as "judgment" or "warranted assertion," instead of "truth,"
as the end of inquiry.

Thayer speculates that this was a direct re
79

suit of Russell's criticisms of James's conflicting notions of truth.

Dewey, Lewis and Mead had refined their inheritance of uncompleted

theory for twenty years and come up with a theory of inquiry, rather
than a theory of truth.

Russell's analytical refutation of pragmatism's"theory of

truth," such as it is, has become the paradigm ever since: (A) It can
never be known if a theory is true or false, because all of its
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eonsequences can never be known. (B) The same idea cani be both true
or false under different circumstances. (C) For reasons A and B, the
very pragmatic definition of truth can never be verified or known true:
thus, an infinite regress.

,

^

Yet, this did not prove satisfactory; the pragmatists did

not claim any static "truths." Russell said, "I now come to what is
most distinctive in Dr. Dewey's logic, namely the emphasis upon inquiry
as opposed to truth or knowledge.

Inquiry is not for him, as for most
8Q

philosophers, a search for truth; it is an independent activity...."

Russell simply could not abide the notion of inquiry apart from truth.
He ridiculed in every way he could the notion that, "Truth is not an
81

important concept in Dr. Dewey's logic."

Where Russell struck the mark with most of his readers was

in bringing up the relation between knowledge and concrete ends:
"Knowledge, if Dr. Dewey is right, cannot be any part of the ends of
life; it is merely a means to other satisfactions.

...For my part, I

believe that too great an emphasis upon the practical robs practice
Op

of its raison d'etre."

Russell even compares the similarities of Dewey's objectives
with those of Karl Marx.

After quoting the essential passage from his

eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach--"philosophers have only interpreted the
world in various ways, but the real task is to alter it"--he says:

"Allowing for a certain difference in phraseology, this doctrine is
83

essentially indistinguishable from instrumentalism."
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Thayer criticizes Russe!1's comparison of Dewey and Marx,

For Dewey, philosophic interpretations hay£
altered the world.... And for Dewey, as for any sane
thinker, the real problem is how to alter the world for
the better. But the method Dewey proposes for this pur

pose is to be found in the writings of Dewey, not in
those of Marx. (Emphasis Thayer).
Notice that Thayer is not denying Russell's basic assertion.

Rather, Dewey's Fabian method for bringing about change is different
from Marx's.

Dewey had improved on James's Wi11 to Believe and, with

the help of Mead and Lewis, kept the method of pragmatic belief before

the public.

Yet, it was not good enough on a practical level to re

main popular, and no analytic philosopher wants to be associated with

it.

Asher Moore's criticism (noted above) best describes the feelings

of those who once sympathized with pragmatism.
Its 1egacies are the term "pragmatic;" the usage theory of

meaning that led to the third edition of Webster's Dictionary, the

operant conditioning theory of behaviorism, with all its implications

in social theory; a literal faith in "progress," almost to the point
of equating change with improvement; and, of course, the continuing

coRinitment to the new education.

It is true that pragmatism cannot

take all the credit for these manifestations.

The social sciences

had a hand in their formation as well. However, the philosophy of
pragmatism was the primary attempt ta unite them through a common

method and purpose.
credit.

As such, it deserves the greatest share of the

In perspective it can be seen as an early attempt to deal

with the advance of the social sdiences, especially the assimilation

of Darwinism.

It did attempt to provide a directive influence, and
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that may explain why its legacies are Still so apparent:

no other pre

scriptive or normative philosophy has been accepted to take its place.

FOOTNOTES

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER 1

Will Durant, The Story of Philosophy: The Lives and Opinions
of the Great Philosophers. New York: Washinqton Square Press, Inc.,
1962. p. 518.

Josiah Royce, The Basic Writings of Josiah Royce, vol. I,
ed. J. J. McDermott. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969.

p. 208.

3

Richard J. Bernstein, ed. Perspectives of Perrce; Critical

Essays on Charles Sanders Peirce.

New Haven:

Yale University Press, 1965.

p. ■ 1-12:

^A. J. Ayer, The Origins of Pragmatism: Studies in the Philosophy
of Charles Sanders Peirce and William James.

Cooper and Co., 1968.

San Francisco:

Freeman,

pp. 4-5.

^Ibid., p. 5.
W. B. Gallie, Peirce and Pragmatism.
Publications. Inc., 1966. p. 35.

New York:

Dover

^Ibid., p. 36.
R

Rulon WelTSi "Charles S. Peirce as an American."
op. cit., p. 18 n9. This is taken as but one example.

Bernstein,

- . -Q

John F. Boler, Charles Peirce and Scholastic Realism: A
Study of Peirce's Relation to John Duns Scotus. Seattle: University
of Washington Press, 1963. p. 7.
.

^°Ibid., p. 4.



^^Charles Sanders Peirce.
Sanders Peirce.
Press, 1960.
"12

The Collected Papers of Charles

eds. Paul Weiss and Cambridge: The Harvard University

p. 258.

Boler.

op. cit., p. 15. .

■- ■ ■ ■

132

' 'IS-

Gallie.

op. cit., p. 21.

■ 14

Ayer.

op. cit., p. 8.

■ . 15. ■ ■

Boler.

op. cit., p. 14;

^^Paul F. Boiler, American Thought in Transition: The Impact of
Evolutionary Naturalism, 1965-1900.
1973. p. 164.

Chicago:

Rand McNally and Company,

^^Henry James, The Letters of William James. Boston: Little,
Brown, and Co., 1926.
18

Gay Wilson Allen, William James:
Viking Press, 1967.

A Biography.

New York:

The

^^Ibid., pp. xrV-XX.
20

George Santayana, The Works of George Santayana.
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936. p. 39.

New York:

■ 21^ '

Bernard P. Brennan, William James.
Publishers, Inc., 1968. p. 16.
" ■ ■ ■ 22 '■
Ayer.
■'

New York:

vol. VII.

Twayne

op. cit., p. 180.

23

Brennan.

op. cit., p. 24.

^^Ibid., p. 34.
"25
' ■'
William James, "What is an Emotion?"

Reviews by William James,
and Company, 1920.

Collected Essays and

ed. R. B. Perry.; London:

Longmans, Green

pp. 247-249.

OR

York:

William James, The Principles of Psychology, vol. II.
Henry Holt and Co., 1890. p. 451.

^^Ibid., vol. I. pp. 300-302.
■ 28

Santayana. op. cit., p. 40.

New

133

9Q

GaTlie.
• ■ ■

op. cit., p. 24.

TO

Ayer.

op. cit.,

p. 182.

■31

William James, "What Pragmatism Means." Pragmatism and
American Culture, ed. Gail Kennedy. Boston: D. C. Heath and Co.,
1950. p. 1.

Gallie.
33

op. cit.,

p. 22.

William James, Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of
New York: Longmons, Green and Co., 1943. p. 222.

Thinking.

^^Ibid., p. 299.
^^Ibid., p. 299
3-fi

William James, "What Pragmatism Means."

Kennedy,

op. cit..

p. 2.
37

Ayer.

op. cit.,

p. 176.

^^Ibid., p. 186.
■ ■ ■ . ■■ 3Q

Gallie.

op. cit., pp. 25-26.

^°Ibid., p. 29.
41

William James, "The Will to Believe" (complete). Religion
from Tolstoy to Camus, ed. Walter. Kaufmann. New York: Harper Torch
bboks, 1964.
■■■■'

pp. 221-238.

dp ■ '

■■ ■ '

William Kingdoffi Clifford, "The Ethics of Belief"

Religion from Tolstoy to Camus,

Torchbopks, 1964.
■ ' " ■ '43

James.

pp. 201-220.
"Will to Believe."

op. cit., p. 225.

^^Ibid.v pp. 226-227, 228, 231.

'^^Ibid., p. 233.

(complete).

ed. Walter Kaufmann. New York:

Harper

134

pp. 234-235.

^^Georoe Santavana. "A General Confession" The Golden Age of
American Philosophy, ed. Charles Frankel.
Inc., 1960.

New York:

George Braziller,

pp. 272-273.

^^Herbert Schneider, "Radical Empiricisra and Religion." Essays
in Honor of John Dewey: On the Occasion of his Seventieth Birthday
October 20, 1929. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1929. pp. 336-337.

^^Wi11iam James, The Meaning of Truth: A Sequel to 'Pragmatism'.
New York:

Longmans, Green and Company, 1909.

50tl•j
Ibid.,

pp. ix-x.

p. X.

Henry Steel Commager, The American Mind: An Interpretation
of American. Thought and Character Since the IBBQ's. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1950. p. 96.

^^Ibid., p. TOO.

^^Ibid., p. 101.

!

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER 2

^Josiah Royce, The Letters of,Josiah Royce. ed. J. Glendenning.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970.
2■

p. 89.

■

Josiah Royce, Fugitive Essays.
Press, 1920. p. 355. .

:.'.-^.Ibid.V.P- .360',:

Cambridge:

Harvard University

■

\

^Ibid., p. 361.
^Royce, (1970). op. cit., p. 280.
^Royce, (1920). op. cit., p. 345.
^Ibid., p. 345
^

^Ibid., p. 354.
®Ibid., p. 362
^%osiah Royce, Royce's Logical Essays: Collected Logical

Essays of Josiah Royce. ed. D. S. Robinson.
Brown Co., 1951. p. 16.

Dubuque, Iowa:

William C.

■ ^Josiah Royce, The Basic Writings of Josiah Royce, Vol. I. ed.
I. K. Skruspskelis.
pp. 248-249.

Chicago:

The University of Chicago Press, 1969.

12
■
' ■■ ■
James H. Cotton, Royce on the Human Self.

Harvard University Press, 1954.

Cambridge, Mass:

p. 44.

^^Ibid., p. 50.
^^Royce, (1969). Op. cit.. Vol. II. pp. 478-479.

^^Ibid., p. 750

136

p. 751.

^^Royce devised this method in 1916. Twenty-two years later,
in 1938, H. H. Price used virtually the same argument in one of the
most famous articles ever written on the subject of other minds. Why
Royce did not receive any credit in it is anybody's.guess. See:

Henry Habberley Price» "Our Evidence for the Existence of.Other Minds,"
Philosophy, XII, No. 52.

^^Royce, (1970). op. cit., pp. 107-108.
"19 ■ '■ ■

George Saritayana, Character and Opinion in the United States:

with Reminiscences of William James and Josiah Royce and Academic Life
in America.

'■''Ibid.,

p. 67.

^hbid.,

P- 67.

^^Ibid,,

pp. 70-71

^^Ibid.,

pp. 74-75

^^Ibid.,

p. 75.

^^Ibid.,

pp. 76-77

^®Ibid.,

p. 80,

^^Ibid.,

p. 86.

^^Ibid.,

P-

^^Ibid.,

p. 82.

87.

-Ibid., PP- 87-88

^^Ibid.,

p. 87.

^^Ibid.,

p. 89.

137

George Santayana, "Scepticism and Animal Faith." i The Works of
George Santayana, Vol. XII.

Mew York:

Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937.

p.. 14.

^Sbid., p. 15.
^^George Santayana, "Winds of Doctrine." The Works of George
Santayana, Vol. VII.

New York:

Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937.

p. 104.

^®Ibid., p. 105.

^^Ibid., p. 107;
^^Ibid., pp. 107-108.
■ -'30 ' ■ ■

D. Cory.

George Santayana, The Birth of Reason and Other Essays, ed.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1968. pp. 132-133.

^°Ibid., p. 134.
George Santayana, "Realms of Being*" The Works of George
Santayana, Vol. XIV. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937. p. 340.

^^Ibid., p. 374.
^^Ibid., p. 331.
^^Ibid., p. 329.
^^^Ibid., p. 326.
4-fi

George Santayana, The Life of Reason: or the Phases of

Human Progress.

New York:

Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953.

p. 6.

^^Santayana, "Realms of Being" (1937). op. cit., p. 344.
%bid;, p. 343.
^^Ibid.Vp. 327.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER 3

^A. S. Link and W. M. Leary, eds..The Progressive Era and
The Great War, 1896-1920.
2

New York:

Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969.

Ctishing Strout, The Pragmatic Revolt in American History:

Carl Becker and Charles Beard,
Press, 1959.' p. 14.

New Haven, Conn.:

Yale University

^Ibid., p. 100.

^Ibid., p. 9.
5' ■ ■ ■ ■ .

George Novack. Pragmatism Versus Marxism: An Appraisal of
John Dewey's Philosophy. New York: Pathfinder Press, Inc., 1975. p. 39.

®Ibid., p. 40.
7john Dewey, Intelligence in the Modern World: John Dewey's
Philosophy,

ed. J. Ratner.

New York:

The Modern Library, 1939. p. 451.

%id., p. 455.
.:

■

■

9 ■ ■ ■

A. H. Kelly and W. A. Harbison, The American Constitution:
Its Origins and Development. New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1970. p. 529.

^^OTiver W. Holmes, "The Path of the Law." Harvard Law Review.
Vol. X, No. 8. (March 25, 1897).
Ibid., p. 461.

^^Ibid., p. 560.
■^Ibid., p. 460.

^^Ibid., p. 463.
^^Ibid., p. 458.

p. 459.

139

^^Morris R. Cohen, Law and the Social Order: Es'sa.ys in Legal
Philosophy.

New York:

Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1933.

p. 165.

^^Ibid., p. 203.
^^Ibid., p. 213.
^^Richard Hofstader, ed., The Progressive Movement: 1900-1915.
Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963.
po

pp. 2-3.

.

George E. Mowry, The Progressive Era, 1900-1920: The Reform
Persuasion.

Washington, D.C.: The American Historical Association, 1972.

p. 35.

^hbid., p. 36.
oo

David W. Noble, Historians Against History: The Frontier
Thesis and the National Covenant in American Historical Writing Since 1830.

Minneapolis, Minnesota:

University of Minnesota Press, 1965.

p. 3.

^^Ibid., p. 81.
24

Strout.

op. cit., p. 38.

^^Ibid., p. 44.
9

John Dewey, Logic, The Theory of Inquiry. New York:
Rinehart and Winston, 1960. (Original 1938) p. 233.

^^Ibid., p. 234.
^^Ibid., p. 235.
^^Ibid., p. 236.
^°Ibid., p. 236.

^hbid., p. 237.
^^Ibid., p. 239.

Holt,

140

p. 239.

' • 34
'- ■ ■ ■ ■ -V'
Dorothy Ross, "The New History and the New Psycho!ogy
An
Early Attempt at Psychohistory." The Hofstader Aegis; A Memorial.
S. Elkins and E. McKitrick eds. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974.
pp.:220-221.
■ '35 '

James Harvey Robinson, The Humanizing of Knowledge.

York:

George H. Doran Company, 1923.

New

pp. 62-63.

^^Ibid., p. 57.
27

James Harvey Robinson, The New History; Essays Illustrating
The Modern Historical Outlook. Springfield, Mass.: The Walden Press,
1958. (Original 1912) p. 15.

^^Ibid., p. 17.

^^Ibid., p. 24.
"^^Ibid., p. 50.
^^Ibid.,, p. 67.
42 '
Charles A. Beard, "The Idea of Progress."

ed. C; Beard.

A Century of Progress.

New York: Harper and Brothers PublIshers, 1933.

p. 3.

^^Ibid., p. 6.

^^Ibid., p. 18.

^Ibid.v'p. T9.::/.... -;^
■' ■

" ■46'

Noble., op. cit., p. 16,

^^John Dewey, The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898. Vol. II.
ed. 6. E. Axtelle, et. al.

Carbondale and EdwardsVille,

Southern Illinois University Press, 1976.
■chapters.

p. 357.

Illinois:

The

See also preceding

141

Karl Marx

A Contribution to the Critique of Poli tical EGonomy.

trans. S. W, Ryazanskaya.

York:

New York: International Publishers, 1970. p. 21

Stow Persons, The American Mind; A History of Ideas.
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1958. p. 325.

New

;^°Ibid., p,. 325.
^^Ibid., p. 329.
■ -rp

■ '

'■,

. ■

William Appleman Williams, "A Note on Charles Austin Beard's
Search for a General Theory of Causation." The American Historical
ReView: A Quarter1y. Vol. LXII, No. 1. October, 1956. p. 62.

^^Ibid., p. 63.
^^Ibid., p. 63.
Minnesota:

Darnell Ricker, The Chicago Pragmatists. Minneapolis,
The University of Minnesota Press, 1969. p. 29.

56 ■ •

■ "

T. A. Goudge, "Pragmatism's Contribution to an Evolutionary

View of Mind." The Monist; An International Quarterly Journal of
Genehal Philosophical Inquiry. Vol. 57, No. 2. April, 1973. p. 133.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER 4

^Paul Weiss, "The Year in Philosophy" The New Republic. CI
(Dec. 6, 1939).

p. 204.

0

George Herbert Mead, The Philosophy of the Act, ed. C. W.
Morris et. al. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1959. p. 404.
o

George Herbert Mead, The Philosophy of the Present. La Salle,
Illinois: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1959. pp. xxxvi-xxxvii.
.4 ■

■

Mead, Philo. of Act, op. cit., p. 65.

^Ibid., p. 79.
®Ibid., p. 403.
^Ibid., p. 657.
®Ibid., p. 360.

^Ibid., p. 490.

^^George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self and Society; From the Standpoint
of a Social Behaviorist. ed. C;W. Morris.
Chicago Press, 1934. p. 105.

Chicago:

^^Ibid., pp. 76, 78.
^^Ibid., p. 38.
^^Ibid., p. 8.

^^IbTd., p. 11.
^^Ibid., p. 6.
^^Mead, Philo. of Act, op. cit., p. 480.

University of

143

/'^David L. Miller, George Herbert Mead: Self, Language and the
World.

Austin:

University of Texas Press, 1973.

p. 6.

TO

Mead, Mind, Self and Society,

op. cit., p. 79.

^^Mead, Philo. of Act, op. cit., p. 372.

^°Ibid., p. 517.
21

Mead, Mind, Self and Society,

op. cit., p. 69.

^^Ibid., p. 75.
^^Ibid., p. 47.
24

Mead, Philo. of Present, op. cit., p. 40.

^^Ibid., p. 60.
^^Ibid., pp. 64-66.
^^Mead, Philo. of Act, op. cit., p. 518.
^®lbid., p. 518.
29

Mass.:

Benjamin Whorf, Language, Thought and Reality.
The M. I.T. Press, 1970. pp. 213-214.

30

8. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity.
Books, 1972. p. 183.
31 ■

Michael Polanyi, Knowing and Being,

Chicago:

Polanyi, The Study of Man.
Press, 1960. p. 60.

Chicago:

New York:

Bantam

ed. Marjorie Green.

The University of Chicago Press, 1969.

32'

Cambridge,

p. 160.

The University of Chicago

^^Miller, op. cit., p. 67.
OA

Knowledge.

C. I. Lewis, Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of
New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1956. p. 85.

144

p. 90.
I. Lewis. Our Social Inheritance.
Indiana University Press, 1957. p. 25.

Bloomington, Indiana:

07 ■ '

Lewis, Mind and World Order, op. cit., p. 21.

^^Ibid., p. 93.

^^Ibid., p. 115.
^°Ibid., p. 116.
I. Lewis, "Realism or Phenomenalism?" The Philosophical
Review, LXIV (April, 1955). p. 234.
AO

Lewis, Mind and World Order,

op. cit., p. 3.

■ ■'4,0

Illinois:

C. I. Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation.
Open Court Publishing Co., 1962. p. 72.

La Salle,

^%id., p. 79.

^^Ibid., p. 131.
^^Ibid., p. 140.
^^Ibid., p. 148.

^^Mead, Philo. of Act, op. cit., p. 458.
UlQ

Anscombe.

'

'

;

Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. N.
New York:

The Macmillan Co., 1970. p. 95.

^°Ibid., p. 96.
^hbid., p. TOO.
^^Ibid., p. 100.
^^Ibid., p. 118.

145

^Sbid., p. 89.
^^Mead, Phito. of Act, op. cit., p. 377.
^^Mead, Mind, Self and Society, op. cit., p. 33.
I. Lewis, "Some Logical Considerations Concerning the
Mental." Journal of Philosophy 38 (1941).

p. 226.

^^Lewis, Mind and World Order, op. cit., p. 112n.

^^Ibid., p. 89.
^°Ibid., p. 102.
^hbid., p. 103.
^^Ibid., p. 107.

®^Ibid., pp. 109-110.
f\d

Lewis, Journal of Philo. op. cit., p. 232.

®®Ibid., p. 232.
Lewis, Our Social Inheritance,

op. cit., p. 38.

^^Paul Weiss, "G. H. Mead: Philosopher of the Here and Now."
The New Republic, LXXII (Oct. 26, 1933).

p. 302.

^^Paul Weiss, "Pragmatists and Pragmatists." The New Republic.
LXII (March 26, 1930).

p. 162.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER 5

^George Novack, Pragmatism Versus Marxism: An Appraisal of John
Dewey's Philosophy^

New York:

Pathfinder Press, 1975.

p. 263.

7

Merle Curti, The Social Ideas of American Educators.
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1935. pp. 502-503.
■ 3 ' ■

■

■'

John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems.

New York:

New York:

Henry

Holt and Co., 1927. (From lectures given in 1926.) p. 208.

''^John Dewey, "Who Might Make a New Party?" The New Republic,
LXVI (April 1, 1931).

p. 177.

■^George Dykhuizen, The Life and Mind of John Dewey. Carbondale
and Edwardsvtlle, Illinois:
pp. 251 ff.

Southern Illinois University Press, 1973.

John Dewey, "Philosophies of Freedom" (1928).
Writings of John Dewey.

ed. J. Gouinlock.

New York:

The Moral
Hafner Press^ 1976.

p. 193.

^John Dewey, "Liberty and Social Control" (1935). Problems of Men.
New York:

Philosophical Library, 1946.

^John Dewey, "The Future of Radical Political Action." The Nation,
CXXXVI (Jan. 4, 1933).

p. 8.

John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action.
Putnam's Sons, 1935. pp. 34-35.
•

New York:

/•^Ibid., p. 48.
John Dewey, "Correspondence: A Third Party Program."
Republic, LXX (Feb. 24, 1932). pp. 48-49.

^^John Dewey, N.R., LXVI. op, cit. p. 178.

G, P.


The New

147

/'^Harold J. Laski, "The Founders of the Fabians." The New
Republic, LXXVI (Oct. 25, 1933).

p. 313.

^^John Dewe.y, The Nation, op. cit., p. 9.

^^Sidney Hook, "A Communication: John Dewey and His Critics."
The New Republic, LXVII (June 3, 1931).
John Dewey, N.R., LXVI.

p. 74.

op. cit., p. 178.

^^John Dewey, "Surpassing America" The New Republic, LXVI
(April 15, 1931); see also, John Dewey, "Social Science and Social Control"
The New Republic, LXVII (July 29, 1931).
18

John Dewey, L.S.A. op. cit., p. 78.

^^Ibid.,. pp. 80-81.
20

^^Ibid., p. 87.
?1

Jim Cork, "John Dewey and Karl Marx" John Dewey: Philosopher
of Science and Freedom, ed. Sidney Hook. New York: The Dial Press, 1950.
pp. 338-340.
79

John Dewey, Individualism Old and New.

Balch and Co., 1930.

p. 31.

^^Ibid., p. 33.
24

Ibid., p. 74.

^^Ibid., p. 93.

^^Ibid., pp. 55-56.
^^Ibid., pp. 103-104.

^^Ibid., p. 104.
^^Ibid., p. 119.

.

New York:

Minton,

148

^^John Dewey, "Policies of a New Party," The New Republic,
LXVI (April 8, 1931).

p. 203.

^^John Dewey, "The Weed for a New Party; The Present Crises."
The New Republic, LXVI (March 18, 1931).

p. 115.

^^John Dewey, "The Weed for a New Party: II." The New Republic,
LXVI (March 25, 1931).

p. 150.

33

John Dewey, N.R., LXVI (March 18, 1931), op. cit., p. 115.

^^John Dewey, "Intelligence as Social" (1935). Moral Writings,
op. cit., pp. 213-214.
35

John Dewey, L.S.A. op. cit., p. 90.

John Dewey, "Intelligence and Power." The New Republic,
LXXVII (April 25, 1934). p. 307.
37

John Dewey, N. R., LXVI (April 8, 1931). op. cit., p. 203.

38

Ibid., p. 203.

^^Ibid., pp. 203-204.
40

Ibid., p. 204,

^^John Dewey, "Introduction." Challenge to the New Deal, eds.
Bringham and Rodman.

\^^Ibid., p. V.

New York: Falcon Press, 1934.

p. vi.

!

43

John Dewey, A letter in The New Republic, LXXXVII (Oct. 7, 1936).

p. 249.
44.

John Dewey, "How they are Voting." The New Republic, CHI
^ept. 23, 1940). p. 412.

FOOTNOTES ,

CHAPTER 6

James M. Edte, "William James and the Phenomenology of Religious
Experience." American Philosophy and the Future: Essays for a New Generation
M. Novak, ed. New York:

Charles Schribner's Sons, 1968, p. 248.

^Ibid., p. 249.

^Ibid., pp. 250-251.
''^Ibid., p. 251.
5'' ■

Paul M. Van Buren, "William James and Metaphysical Risk."
Philosophy and the Future, op. cit., p. 89.

American

®Ibid,, p. 91.
^Ibid,, p. 98.
8

New York:

H. S. Thayer, Meaning and Action; A Critical History of Pragmatism.
The Bobs-Merrill Co., 1968. pp. 320-323.

^Ibid., p. 321.

^°Ibid;, p. 322.
^hbid., p. 322.

^^Ibid., p. 323.
^^Ibid., p. 327.
^^Ibid., p. 331.

^^Ibid., p. 273.

^®Ibid., p. 274.

I

150

17

Ibid., p. 305 n4.

18

Ibid., p. 306.

19

id., p. 311.

20

Ibid., p. 312.

Ibid., p. 313.
22

Ibid., p. 313.

23
Van Buren, op. cit., p. 89.
24

Ibid., p. 100.

25

Ibid., p. 101.

26

Ibid., p. 102

27

H. S. Thayer, op. cit., pp. 159 ff.

28

John Dewey, "The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy."

Darwinism and the American Intel!ectual; A Book of Readings.
ed. HomewoOd, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1967. p. 203.

R. J. Wilson

29

Ibid., p. 204.

30

Ibid., p. 205.

31

Ibid., p. 206.

32

Ibid., p. 202.

33

Ibid., pp. 209-210.

34

Merl Gurti, The Growth of American Thought.
and Brothers Publishers, 1943. p. 563.
35

Ibid., p. 561

New York:

Harper

151

^^Ibid., p. 563.
p. 564.

A. Goudge, "Pragmatism's Contribution to an Evolutionary
View of Mind."

The Monist:

An International Quarterly Journal of

General Philosophical Inquiry.

Vol. 57, No. 2.

April, 1973.

p. 133.

^^John Dewey, "The Unity of the Human Being." Essays in
Philosophy from David Hume to Bertrand Russel1.
Library, 1959.

New York:

The Pocket

p. 392.

^^John Dewey, "The Development of American Pragmatism."
Pragmatic Philosophy: An Anthology.
and Co., 1966.

A. Rorty, ed. New York:

Doubleday

p. 212.

^^H. S. Thayer, op. cit., pp. 184-185.
AO

B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity.
Bantam Books, 1972. p. 183.

Nev/ York:

AO

B. F. Skinner, "Behaviorism at Fifty." Behaviorism and

Phenomenology; Contrasting Bases for Modern Psychology.
University of Chicago Press, 1970.

Chicago: The

p. 88.

^^Ibid., p. 89.
^^Morton White, Social Thought in America: The Revolt Against
Formalism.

Boston:

Beacon Press, 1963.

p. 11.

^®Ibid., p. 107.
^^Darnell Rucker, The Chicago Pragmatists. Minneapolis, Minnesota:
University of Minnesota Press, 1969.

^^H. S. Thayer, op. cit., p. 181.
^^Ibid., p. 182.
^'^John L. ChiIds, American Pragmatism and Education; An
Interpretation and Criticism.

New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1956. p. 53.

152

^^Sidney Hook, Education for Modern Man. New York: The Dial
Press, 1946.

p. 9.

^^Ibid., p. 11.
^^Ibid., pp. 18-23.
^^Ibid., p. 42.
^^Ibid., p. 29.
L. Childs, op. cit., p. 179.

^^Ibid., p. 188
^^Ibid., p. 190.
59

Ibid., p. 193.

®°Ibid., pp. 194-195.
^hbid., p. 217.

^^Ibid., pp. 218-219.
®^Ibid., p. 222.

^^Ibid.Vpp. 233-234.
®^Ibid., p. 247.

^^Ibid., p. 250.

^^Ibid., p. 259.
®^Ibid., pp. 267-268.
®^Ibid., pp. 269-270.

^°Ibid., p., 342..

153

^^Asher Moore, "The Promised Land." The Monist. op. cit., p. 184.

^^Ibid., p. 187.
^^Morton White, op. cit., p. 170.

^^Ibid., p. 172.
: .a; ; :r-^ibid.;,^'p.''2od.,. ■ ■■
^®Ibid., p. 201.
^^Ibid., p. 244.
^^Ibid., p. 245.
S. Thayer, op. cit., pp. 193-194.
on

Bertrand Russell, "Dewey's New Logic." The Basic Writings of
Bertrand Russell. Egner and Denonn eds. New York: Simon and ShuSter,
1961. p. 195.

^^Ibid., p. 196.
^^Ibid., p. 205.
^^Ibid., p. 196.
M

H. S. Thayer, op. cit., p. 198.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

154

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Allen, Gay Wilson

Will jam James:

A Bibliography.

New York: The

Viking Press, 1967.

Ayer, A. J. The Origins of Pragmatism; Studies in the Philosophy of
Char!es Sanders Peirce and Wi11iam James.

San Francisco:

Freemanj

Cooper and Co., 1958.
Beard, Charles A.
ed. C. Beard.

"The Idea of Progress." A Century of Progress,
New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1933.

Bernstein, Richard J. ed. Perspectives on Peirce; CriticaT Essays on
Charles Sanders Peirce. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965.
Boler, John F.

American Thought in Transition:

Evolutionary Natural ism, 1865-1900.

The Impact of

Chicago:

Rand McNally and

Company, 1971.

. Charles Peirce and Scholastic Realism; A Study of Peirce's
Relation to John Duns Scotus.

Seattle:

University of Washington

Press, 1963.

Brennan, Bernard P. William James.

New York:

Twayne Publishers Inc.,

T968.

ChiIds, John L. American Pragmatism and Education; An Interpretation
and Criticism. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1956.

Clifford, William Kingdom. "The Ethics of Belief." (Complete)
Religion from Tolstoy to Camus,
Harper Torchbooks, 1964.

ed.

Walter Daufmann.

New York:

Cohen, Morris R. Law and the Social Order; Essays in Legal Philosophy.
New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1933.

Commager, Henry Steel. The American Mind; An Interpretation of
American Thought and CharaGter Sinee the 1880's.
University Press, 1950.

Cotton, James H. Royce on the Human Self.
University Press, 1954.

Curti, Merl.

New Haven:

Cambridge, Mass.:

The Growth of American Thought.

Harvard

New York: Harper and

Brpthers Publishers, 1943.
.

The Social Ideas of American Educators.

Scribner's Sons, 1935.

Yale

New York:

Charles

■:

■ V,

. > -V'^:

Dewey, John.

' ■ ■ ■ ■' :

''IntroduGtioh."

and Rodman.

■ V-': '; ,::v^ ■-1-55 ■ ' '

ChaTten^ge to the New Deal.

eds. Bringham

New York: /FalGon Press, 1934.

'The InfluenGe of Darwinism on Philosophy," Darwinism and the
AirieriGan IntelleGtual; A Book of Readings. R. J. Wilson ed,
H
The Dorsey Press, 1967,

The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898.

Vol. It. ed. G, E.

Axtelle, et. al. Carbondale and Edwardsvnle, 111inoi s:
Southern Illinois University Press, 1976.

■^

The

"The Unity df the Human Being." Essays in Philosophy from David
Hume to Bertrand Russel1. New York: The Pooket Library, 1959.

■ .' . ■

' Individual ism Old and New.
.

New York:

Intel1igenee in the Modern World:

Ratner.

Minton, Baleh and Co., 1930.

John Dewey's Philosophy,

ed. J.

New Yprkv The Mpdern Library, 1939.

Liberalism and SoGia1 Aetion.

New York:

G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1935.

_. .Logio, The Theory of Inquiry.

New York:

Holt, Rinehart and

Winston, 1960.

. The Moral Writings of John Dewey.
Hafner Press, 1976.
.

"The Future of Radioal PolitiGal Aotion."

(Jan. 4, 1933).
.

ed. J. Gouinlook.

"Correspondenoe:

New York:

The Nation,

CXXXVI

-,■:■ ■:/
A Third Party Program."

The New Republie, LXX

(Feb. 24, 1932).
"How They are Voting."

The New Republig, CIII (Sept. 23, 1940).

_.

"Intelligence and Power. ''

The New Republie, LXXVII (April 25, 1934).

.

A letter in The New Republic,

.

"The Need for a New Party; The Present Crisis."

LXXXVI (Oct. 7, 1936).
The New Republic,

LXVI (March 18, 1931).
."The Need for a New Party:

11"

The New Republic, LXVI

"(March 25, 1931).

_.

"Policies of a New Party." The New Republic, LXVI (April 8, 1931).
"Who Might Make a New Party?"

The New Republic, LXVI (April 1, 1931).

:156

Problems of Men.

New York:

Philosophical Library, 1946.

The Public and Its Problems.

New York:

Henry Holt and Co., 1927.

Durant, Wi11. The Story 6f Philosophy: The Lives and Opinions of the
Great Phi1osophers. New York: Washington Square Press, Inc., 1962.
Dykhuizen, George. The Life and Mind of John Dewey. Carbpndale and
Edwardsville, Illinois: Southern 111inois University Press, 1973.
Edie, James M.

"William James and the Phenomenology of Religious

Experience." American Philosophy and the Future; Essays for a New
Generation.

M. Novak, ed. New York-

Gallie, W. B. Peirce and Pragmatism.
}966. r, .

Charles Schribner'S Sons, 1968.

NeW York:

Dover Publ ieations. Inc.,

Goudge, T. A. "Pragmatism-s Contribution to an Evolutionary View of
Mind." The Monist; An International Quarterly Journal of General
Philosophical Inquiry. Vol. 57, No. 2. (April, 1973).
:

Hofstader, Richard,
Cliffs, N. J.:

Holmes, Oliver W.

ed.

The Progressive Movement; 1900-1915,

Englewood

Prentice-HaTl, Inc., 1963.

"The Path of the Law."

Harvard Law Review, Vol. X,

No. 8. (March 25, 1897).

Hook, Sidney.

Education for Modern Man.

New York: The Dial Press, 1946.

"A Coramunication: John Dewey and His Critics." The New Republic,
LXVII, (June 3, 1931).
James, Henry.

The Letters of William James.

Boston:

Little, Brown and

Co., 1926.

James, William, "Does Conscioushess Exist?" The Writings of William
James.

ed. J. D. McDermott.

New York:

The Modern Library, 1968.

. The Meaning of Truth; A Sequel to 'Pragmatism'. New York:
Lohgmans, Green and Company, 1909.

_______

"What Pragmatism Means?" Pragmatism.and American Culture, ed.

GaiT Kennedy. Boston:
V

;

D. C. Heath and Co., 1950.

Pragmatism; A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking^

New York:

Ltingmans, Green and Co., 1943.

_. The Principles of Psychologyi> VoTs. I & II. New York: Henry Holt &
■Co..,' .,1890.

_.

"What is an Emotion?"

ed. R. B. Perry.

London:

Collected Essays and Reviews by William James,
Longmans, Green and Co., 1920.

157

. "The Will to Believe." (Complete) Religion from Tolstoy to
Camus, ed. W. Kaufmann. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964.

Kelly, A. H. and Harbison, W. A. The American Constitution; Its
Origins and Development.

New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1970.

Laski, Harold J. "The Founders of the Fabians." The New Republic,
LXXVI (Oct. 25, 1933).
Lewis, C, I.
Illinois:
.

An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation.

La Salle,

Open Court Publishing Co., 1962.

Mind and the World Order; Outline of a Theory of Knowledge.

New York:

Dover Publications, Inc., 1956,

Our Social Inheritance. Blodmington, Indiana: Indiana
University Press, 1957.
. "Realism or Phenomenalism?"

The Philosophical Review, LXIV

(April, 1955).

"Some Logical Considerations Concerning the Mental." Journal of
Philosophy, 38 (1941).

Link, A. S. and Leary, W. M. eds. The Progressive Era and the Great War,
1896-1920. New York: Appleton^Century-Crofrs, 1969.
Marx, Karl. A Contribution to the Critigue of Political Economy, trans.
S. W. Ryazanskaya. New York: International Publishers, 1970.

Mead, George Herbert.

Mind, Self and Society; From the Standpoint of a

Social BehavioriSt.

ed. C. W, Morris.

Chicago*

University of

Chicago Press, 1934.
. The Philosophy of the Act, ed. C. W. Morris et. al. Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1959.

_. The Philosophy of the Present. La Salle, Illinois: The Open
Court Publishing Co., 1959.

Miller, David L. George Herbert Mead: Self, Language and the World.
Austin: University of Texas Press, 1973.
Moore, Asher. "The Promised Land." The Monist; An International
Quarterly Journal of General Philosophical Inguiry. Vol. 57, No. 2

(April, 1973).

——————

Mowry, George E. The Progressive Era, 1900-1920; The Reform Persuasion.
Washington, D. C,: The American Historical Association, 1972.

158 ■ ■

Noble, David W. Historians AgainstHistory: The Frontier Thesis and the
National Covenant in American Historical Writing Since 1830. Minne

apolis, Minnesota:

Novaek, George.
Philosophy.

University of Minnesota Press, 1965.

Pragmatism Versus Marxism:
New York:

An Appraisal of John Dewey's

Pathfinder Press, Inc., 1975.

Peirce, Gharles Sanders. The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce.
eds. Paul Weiss et. al. Cambridge: The Harvard University Press,

■:::TT-96o,.:
Persons, Stow.

The American Mind; A History of Ideas.

New York:

Holt,

Rinehart and Winston, 1958.

Polanyi, Michael. Knowing and Being, ed. Marjorie Green.
University of Chicago Press, 1969,

_.

The Study of Man.

Price, Henry Habberley.

Chicago:

Chicago:

The

The University of Chicago Press, 1960.

"Our Evidence for the Existence of Other Minds."

Philosophy^ XII, No. 52 (1938).

Robinson, James Harvey.

The Humanizing of Knowledge.

New York:

George H.

Doran Company, 1923.

_.

The New History; Essays Illustrating the Modern Historical Outlook.

Springfield, Mass. :

The Walden Press, 1958.

Ross, Dorothy. "The New History and the New Psychology: An Early.
Attempt at Psychohistory." The Hofstader Aegis; A Memorial. eds.
S. ETkins and E. McKitrick.

Royce, Josiah.

New York:

Alfred A. Knopf, 1974.

The Basic Writings of JosiahRoyce, Vols- I & II.

I. K, Skruspskelis.

Chicago:

.

Cambridge:

Fugitive Essays.

ed.

The University of Chicago Press, 1969.
Harvard University Press, 1920.

The Letters of Josiah Royce. ed. J. Clendenning.

Chicago:

The

"University of Chicago Press, 1970.
. Royce's Logical Essays; Collected Logical Essays of Josiah Royce.
ed. D. S. Robinson. Dufauque, Iowa: William C. Brown Co., 1951

Rucker, Darnell. The Chicago Pragmatists. Minneapolis, Minnesota:
The University of Minnesota Press, 1969.
Russell, Bertrand. "Dewey's New Logic," The Basic Writings of Bertrand
RusselT. eds. Egner and Denonn. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1961

159

Santayana, George. "A General Confession." The Golden Age of American
Philosophy, ed.

C. Frankel.

New York: George Braziller Inc., 1960.

. The Birth of Reason and Other Essays,
Columbia University Press, 1968.

ed. D. Cory.

New York.*

, Character and Opinion. in the United States; With Reminiscences of
William James and Josiah Royce and Academic Life in America. New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1921.

.

. The Life of Reason; Or the Phases of Human Progress.

New York:

Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953.

. Physical Order and Moral Liberty; Previously Unpublished Essays
of George Santayana. eds. John & Shirley Lachs. Charlotte, North
Carolina: Heritage Printers, Inc., 1969.
. "Realms of Being." The Works of George' Santayana. Vol. XIV.
New York:

Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937.

_. "Scepticism and Animal Faith." Ibid., Vol. XII.
_. "Soliloquies in England." Ibid., Vol. IX.
. "Winds of Doctrine."

Ibid,,

Vol. VII.

Schneider, Herbert. "Radical Empiricism and Religion," Essays in Honor
of John Dewey, On the Occasion of His Seventieth Birthday October 20,

1929. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1929.
Skinner, B. F. Beyond Freedom and Dignity.

—

New York: Bantam Books, 1972.

Strout, Cushing. The Pragmatic Revolt in American History: Carl Becker
and Charles Beard.

New Haven, Conn.:

Yale University Press, 1959.

Thayer, H. S. Meaning and Action; A Critical History of Pragmatism.
New York:

The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1968.

Whorf, Benjamin.

Language, Thought and Reality.

Cambridge, Mass.:

The M. I. T. Press, 1970.

Williams, W. A."A Note on Charles Beard's Search for a General Theory
of Gausation" The American Historical Review, LXII (Oct., 1956).

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophica1 Investigations. trans. 6. E. M.
Anscombe.

New York:

The Macmillan Co., 1970.

